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Abstract 
 
This thesis articulates a normative theory of international law based on new natural 
law theory.  New natural law theory is a theory of ethics, politics, and law that is 
based on the classical natural law doctrine of Thomas Aquinas.  The primary 
reference point of the thesis in relation to new natural law theory is the work of John 
Finnis, who in Natural Law and Natural Rights and subsequent writings elaborates 
the theory in the consideration of fundamental concepts in political philosophy and 
legal theory.  The thesis examines the tenets of new natural law theory regarding the 
common good, authority, law, justice, human rights, and legal obligation, and uses 
these to formulate normative claims regarding the moral purpose of international law 
and the moral standards that international law should satisfy in light of its purpose.  
The thesis posits the existence of an ‘international common good’, encompassing a 
set of supranational conditions that are instrumental to human welfare and that 
require international cooperation for their realisation.  The thesis claims that the 
primary moral purpose of international authority and international law is to further 
the international common good through resolving the coordination problems of the 
international community of states.  Identifying ‘principles of justice’ for international 
law, the thesis asserts that positive international law should promote and demonstrate 
respect for human rights, and should also promote and protect the international 
common good.  The thesis further argues that states have a general moral obligation 
to obey international law, based primarily on the necessity of state compliance with 
international laws in order to facilitate the effectiveness of such laws in promoting 
the international common good.  These claims are elaborated with reference to 
existing features of international law, and through comparison with existing 
normative and non-normative perspectives in international legal theory on the 
concepts considered. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
I.  Objective 
 
This thesis seeks to construct a normative theory of international law that is 
grounded in new natural law theory.  The thesis examines the tenets of new natural 
law theory in relation to political philosophy and jurisprudence as primarily 
articulated by John Finnis, and applies these to articulate a theory regarding the 
moral purpose of international law and the moral standards that international law 
should satisfy in light of its ascribed purpose. 
II.  Background 
 
1.  An Overview of New Natural Law Theory 
 
‘Natural law theory’ is a term used to describe a particular set of theories that 
have been articulated since classical antiquity in the realms of ethics, moral theology, 
and legal theory.
1
  The diversity in the content of the theories that have at various 
times been called ‘natural law’ theories is considerable, and as such it is difficult to 
provide a definition of the concept of natural law that is both comprehensive and 
accurate.  Nevertheless, two broad themes may be identified for describing the 
characteristics of natural law theories in relation to ethical and legal theory.  First, as 
ethical theories, natural law theories typically entail an assertion that there are 
objective moral norms or ‘laws’ governing human conduct that are in some way 
                                                 
1
 For accounts of the history of natural law thought, see e.g., Michael Bertram Crowe, The Changing 
Profile of the Natural Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and 
Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); Brian Bix, “Natural Law: The Modern Tradition” in Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, 
eds., The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 61. 
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related to the nature of persons.
2
  Second, as legal theories, natural law theories are 
characteristically concerned with providing an account of the nature of positive law 
and its putative relationship to moral standards that are external to it.
3
 
New natural law theory, also called the ‘new classical natural law theory’ or 
more simply the ‘new classical theory’ of natural law, is a restatement and 
development of the classical natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas.
4
  The theory has 
its origins in the work of moral theologian Germain Grisez, who developed the 
theory beginning with an exegetical study of Aquinas’s work on practical reason in 
1965.
5
  Other writers that have long been associated with the ‘new natural law 
school’ include John Finnis and Joseph Boyle, while more recent proponents of the 
theory include Robert George, Patrick Lee, Gerard Bradley, and Christopher 
Tollefsen.
6
  John Finnis is a principal proponent of the new classical theory across 
                                                 
2
 See Kenneth Einar Himma, “Natural Law” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online: Internet 
Enclyclopedia of Philosophy <http://www.iep.utm.edu/natlaw/>, Sec. 1.  Natural law theorists vary 
substantially in their precise expressions of this claim, diverging on questions such as how exactly 
moral norms are related to human nature, and how human nature itself is to be understood and 
described.  See Bix, ibid. at 64-65. 
3
 See Bix, supra note 1 at 66, 75-76; Himma, ibid. 
4
 For Aquinas’s natural law doctrine, see generally Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, q. 94.  
Most of the primary proponents of the theory employ the term ‘new classical natural law theory’ and 
appear to prefer this term to ‘new natural law theory’, since they regard the theory as a restatement of 
Thomistic natural law doctrine rather than a substantively new theory of natural law.  John Finnis 
indicates that the term ‘classical’ affirms the link between this theory and the thought of Plato, 
Aristotle, and Aquinas.  See John Finnis, “Reflections and Responses” in John Keown & Robert P. 
George, eds., Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013) 459 at 468-69 n. 31.  At the same time, some advocates of the theory such as Christopher 
Tollefsen do use the term ‘new natural law theory’, and the term has gained currency as a label that 
distinguishes this theory from the work of other contemporary natural law theorists, including other 
interpretations of Thomistic natural law theory. See e.g. Christopher Tollefsen, “The New Natural 
Law Theory” (2008) 10(1) LYCEUM 1 [Tollefsen “New Natural Law”]; Howard P. Kainz, Natural 
Law: An Introduction and Re-Examination (Chicago: Open Court, 2004) at 45 et seq.  In this thesis, 
the terms ‘new natural law theory’ and ‘new classical theory’ will be used interchangeably. 
5
 See Germain Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa 
theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2” (1965) 10 Natural Law Forum 168 [Grisez “First Principle”]; 
see also, among other works: “Towards a Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing” (1970) 15 Am. J. 
Juris. 64; Germain Grisez & Russell Shaw, Beyond the New Morality: the Responsibilities of 
Freedom, 3d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); “Against 
Consequentialism” (1978) 23 Am. J. Juris. 21. 
6
 Representative works of these authors include Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, & John Finnis, 
“Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends” (1987) 32 Am. J. Juris. 99;.John Finnis, Joseph 
Boyle & Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
10 
 
the fields of ethics, political philosophy, and jurisprudence; Finnis articulated a 
comprehensive statement of the theory in Natural Law and Natural Rights, first 
published in 1980, and has written extensively on the theory since that time.
7
 
New natural law theory has been aptly described by one of its advocates as 
being a theory about “basic human goods, moral norms, and the reasons for action 
they provide”8  The theory provides an account of the basic dimensions of human 
well-being, and the principles of practical reasonableness that are to guide human 
conduct for the sake of ensuring human flourishing.
9
  The ethical framework of new 
natural law theory provides the foundation for the further claims of new natural law 
theorists in relation to political philosophy and legal theory: the theory features a 
notion of a ‘common good’ that is characterised as a shared objective relevant to 
advancing the welfare of persons living in community, and it articulates conceptions 
of justice, human rights, authority, law, and legal obligation that are all described in 
varying ways in terms of their relationship to the common good. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
1987); Robert George, In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) [George In 
Defense]; Patrick Lee, “Human Nature and Moral Goodness” in Mark Cherry, ed., The Normativity of 
the Natural (New York: Springer, 2009); Gerard V. Bradley & Robert George, “The New Natural 
Law Theory: A Reply to Jean Porter” (1994) 39 Am. J. Juris. 303; Christopher Tollefsen, “Lying: The 
Integrity Approach” (2007) 52 Am. J. Juris. 253. 
7
 See generally John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) [Finnis NLNR].  Examples of Finnis’s other works in which aspects of the new classical 
theory are discussed or applied include: “The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary 
Social Theory” (1984-1985) 1 J. Law, Ethics & Pub. Pol. 115; “Law as Coordination” (1989) 2 Ratio 
Juris 97; “Natural Law and Legal Reasoning” in Robert P. George, ed., Natural Law Theory: 
Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 134; “Foundations of Practical Reason 
Revisited” (2005) 50 Am. J. Juris. 109 [Finnis “Foundations of Practical Reason”].  These and other 
writings are also contained in a recently published compendium of essays encompassing Finnis’s 
thought over the course of five decades: see John Finnis, Collected Essays of John Finnis, Vols. 1-5 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
8
 Robert George, “Natural Law and International Order” in George In Defense, supra note 6, 228 
[George “Natural Law and International Order”] at 229.  
9
 In this thesis, the terms ‘flourishing’, ‘fulfilment’, ‘well-being’, and ‘welfare’ will be used 
interchangeably as is done by proponents of the new classical theory.  Of these, the term that is 
perhaps most particular to the vocabulary of new natural law theory is ‘flourishing’: see infra note 17 
and accompanying text. 
11 
 
Ethical Theory 
 
New natural law theory asserts that humans are naturally inclined towards 
certain ends, which they refer to as ‘basic goods’ or ‘values’.10  These goods are 
described as ‘basic’ since they constitute intrinsic reasons for human action: humans 
pursue them for their own sake and not for the sake of some further objective.
11
  The 
term ‘good’ signifies the desirability of these ends, which stems from their 
relationship to human welfare: in Finnis’s words, each basic good “is desirable for its 
own sake as a constitutive aspect of the well-being and flourishing of human persons 
in community.”12  Finnis identifies the following as basic values: knowledge of 
reality, including aesthetic experience; bodily life including the elements of full 
human vitality (namely health, vigour, and safety); friendship and harmonious 
association between persons in its varying forms; skillful performance in work and 
play; marriage; practical reasonableness; harmony with the ultimate source of all 
reality.
13
  New natural law theorists maintain that the list of basic goods, identifying 
the objects of human inclination, is supported by evidence from anthropological and 
psychological studies into human nature and its characteristics.
14
 
According to the new classical theory, the basic goods are all equally 
fundamental, such that no particular good can be ranked as more important than 
                                                 
10
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 7 at 59ff. 
11
 See ibid at 62. 
12
 John Finnis, “Commensuration and Public Reason” in Collected Essays of John Finnis, Vol. 1, 
supra note 7, 233 [Finnis “Commensuration and Public Reason”] at 244; see also Finnis NLNR, supra 
note 7 at 61. 
13
 See Finnis “Commensuration and Public Reason”, ibid at 244 n. 25.  Finnis’s original list of the 
basic values, which appeared in the first edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights, essentially 
followed that previously provided by Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw: see Grisez & Shaw, supra 
note 5 at 79-82; cf. Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 86-90.  Finnis’s description of these values has been 
modified and refined over time: thus, for example, marriage has been included as a distinct basic 
good, while aesthetic appreciation has been characterised as an aspect of knowledge rather than a 
discrete basic value.  See e.g., Finnis “Natural Law and Legal Reasoning”, supra note 7 at 135; see 
also Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 447-48. 
14
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 81, 83-84; Grisez, Boyle & Finnis, supra note 6 at 113. 
12 
 
another according to an objective hierarchy of value.
15
  Each basic value is further 
described as being a general form of good that can be pursued in a virtually infinite 
variety of ways: thus, for example, the good of knowledge is similarly instantiated in 
a person’s act of taking driving lessons, reading a newspaper, or studying for a 
university degree.
16
  Pursuit of the basic goods, which new natural law theorists 
describe as ‘participation’ in these goods, is an ongoing and indefinite process and is 
considered an essential dimension of human ‘flourishing’, that is, living a full human 
life.
17
 
New natural law theory posits that natural law principles are self-evident 
principles of practical reason identifying the objects of human inclination as goods to 
be pursued.
18
  The notion of practical reason has its origins in classical thought, and 
may be understood as reason in its mode of directing what is to be done.
19
  The new 
classical theory affirms that practical reason plays an integral role in apprehending 
the objects of human inclination as human goods and directing persons to pursue 
them.
20
  The resulting directives, or natural law principles, are specifications of what 
Aquinas describes as the first principle of practical reason, namely that “good is to be 
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided”.21  These principles are, as Finnis notes, 
                                                 
15
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 92-94. 
16
 See ibid. at 84-85. 
17
 See ibid. at 96, 103.  Finnis indicates that the term ‘participation’ best corresponds to the idea that a 
person’s enjoyment of each of basic goods is inexhaustible, whereas the terms ‘pursuit’ and 
‘realisation’ may suggest that the basic goods are finite objectives: ibid. at 96.  Finnis and other new 
natural law theorists do nevertheless employ the terms ‘pursue’ and ‘realise’ in relation to the basic 
goods, and they will be used herein interchangeably with the term ‘participate’. 
18
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid at 23.  By ‘self-evident’, new natural law theorists mean that the principles 
of practical reason are underived, in the sense that they are not deduced or inferred from any more 
fundamental principles: see Robert George, “Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory” in George In 
Defense, supra note 6, 31[George “Recent Criticism”] at 44-45; Grisez, Boyle & Finnis, supra note 6 
at 106. 
19
  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), VI, 2, 1139a26-31; Aquinas, supra note 4, I, q. 79, a. 11; see also Grisez “First Principle”, 
supra note 5 at 175, describing practical reason as “the mind working as a principle of action”; Finnis 
NLNR, ibid. at 12 and 20, notes to section I.4. 
20
 See Grisez “First Principle”, ibid. at 179-80. 
21
 Aquinas, supra note 4, I-II, q. 94, a. 2. 
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“propositions of high generality and comprehensiveness, and… sources of all 
intelligent thinking about what to do.”22  The generality of the principles corresponds 
to the open-ended nature of the basic goods they identify – goods which, as already 
noted, can each be realised indefinitely and in countless diverse ways.   
The principles of practical reason, according to new natural law theory, are 
not themselves moral principles: these precepts, while identifying the various ends 
that constitute aspects of human fulfillment and directing that these ends be pursued, 
do not provide guidance as to how they are to be pursued in a virtuous manner.
23
  In 
this regard, new natural law theory advances Aquinas’s natural law framework by 
identifying a set of ‘requirements of practical reasonableness’ that complement the 
principles of natural law and facilitate the process of moral decision-making.
24
  
Finnis describes practical reasonableness as “reasonableness in deciding, in adopting 
commitments, in choosing and executing projects, and in general in acting,”25  The 
requirements of practical reasonableness cited by new natural law theorists include 
the principle that persons should not choose to destroy or impair a basic good, and 
the principle of fairness indicating that individuals should not demonstrate arbitrary 
preferences among persons in their conduct.
26
  Just as the principles of practical 
                                                 
22
 Finnis “Foundations of Practical Reason”, supra note 7 at 118 [emphasis in original]. 
23
 See Finnis NLNR at 101; Finnis “Foundations of Practical Reason”, ibid. at 120. 
24
 These are also referred to by some new natural law theorists as ‘modes of responsibility’.  See 
generally Grisez & Shaw, supra note 5 at 117-39; Finnis NLNR, ibid., Ch. 5.  The term ‘natural law 
principles’ used in its broadest sense encompasses both the principles of practical reason and the 
requirements of practical reasonableness: see Finnis NLNR, supra note 7 at 23. 
25
 Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 12.  Elaborating on this, Finnis indicates that the basic good of practical 
reasonableness concerns seeking to bring reasonable order into one’s own habits, practical attitudes 
and actions, entailing harmony between one’s internal feelings and judgments as well as harmony 
between one’s judgments and behaviour.  See ibid. at 88; Finnis “Commensuration and Public 
Reason”, supra note 12 at 244 n. 25.  
26
 See Grisez & Shaw, supra note 5 at 119-120, 130; Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 106-109, 118-124.  While 
there is overlap between the lists of requirements of practical reasonableness articulated by new 
natural law theorists, these lists differ in their precise formulations.  Finnis’s list in the first edition of 
Natural Law and Natural Rights identified the following nine requirements of practical 
reasonableness: adopting a coherent plan of life; having no arbitrary preferences among the basic 
values; having no arbitrary preferences among persons; maintaining a certain detachment from the 
specific and limited projects one undertakes; not abandoning one’s commitments lightly; being 
14 
 
reason are said to specify a first principle of practical reason, the requirements of 
practical reasonableness are described as being specifications of a ‘first principle of 
morality’.27  This master moral principle, to cite Finnis’s formulation, indicates that a 
person’s choices and actions for the sake of basic human goods should be compatible 
with a will towards the ideal of ‘integral human fulfilment’, that is, the flourishing of 
all human persons and their communities in all the basic goods.
28
 
According to the new classical theory, the requirements of practical 
reasonableness guide moral decision-making by indicating principles that, if not 
adhered to, will result in conduct that is not compatible with a will towards integral 
human fulfilment.
29
  Such conduct is considered immoral under new natural law 
theory because the theory construes morality as resulting from adherence to all the 
requirements of practical reasonableness: it is a truism of the new classical theory 
that “to be morally good is precisely to be completely reasonable”.30   As Finnis 
further explains, conduct that respects the requirements of practical reasonableness 
and is thereby consistent with a will towards integral human fulfilment reflects a 
                                                                                                                                          
efficient in the methods one uses to achieve objectives, within reason; not choosing to damage or 
impede a basic good; favouring and fostering the common good of one’s communities; acting in 
accordance with one’s conscience.  See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 103-126; cf. Grisez & Shaw, ibid. at 
117-139.  In the Postscript to the second edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis suggests 
that the requirements of promoting the common good and following one’s conscience are essentially 
synonymous with the ‘first principle of morality’: see Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 456-57.  
27
 See Grisez, Boyle & Finnis, supra note 6 at 127-28; Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 451. 
28
 See Finnis “Commensuration and Public Reason”, supra note 12 at 243-44; see also Grisez, Boyle 
& Finnis, ibid. at 128, 131.  Grisez now refers to this ideal as ‘integral communal fulfilment’, 
encompassing the fulfilment of all persons as well as divine good: see Germain Grisez, “The True 
Ultimate End of Human Beings: The Kingdom, Not God Alone” (2008) 68 Theological Studies 38 at 
57; see also Tollefsen “New Natural Law”, supra note 4 at 3, 15-17 for discussion. 
29
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 7 at 451. 
30
 Grisez, Boyle & Finnis, supra note 6 at 121.  New natural law theorists maintain that immoral 
choices arise where fully rational thought is deflected by sub-rational motivations, namely feelings or 
emotions, leading persons to act in ways that satisfy particular preferences but that disregard one or 
more of the requirements of practical reasonableness: see ibid. at 123-24; see also generally Grisez & 
Shaw, supra note 5, Ch. 9. 
15 
 
practical appreciation of the fact that the basic goods are as good for any other 
human person as they are for oneself.
31
 
Political Philosophy and Legal Theory: The Work of Finnis 
  
While most of the leading proponents of the new classical theory have 
described and applied the theory in relation to ethics and moral theology, Finnis is 
one of a few new natural law theorists to use the theory as a basis for considering 
issues in political philosophy and jurisprudence, and is the pre-eminent scholar on 
new natural law theory in relation to the latter field.
32
  In his seminal work on the 
new classical theory, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis articulates the ethical 
framework of the theory and then relates this framework to analysing key concepts 
and issues in political philosophy and legal theory: Finnis examines the notions of 
the common good, justice, rights, authority, law, and obligation, and additionally 
considers the issue of injustice in law and its impact upon obligation.
33
  As Finnis 
makes clear, his analysis of the abovementioned concepts is fundamentally 
normative in character: Finnis indicates that his objective in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights is to elaborate a theory of natural law “primarily to assist the practical 
reflection of those concerned to act, whether as judges or as statesmen or as 
citizens”, and that the book’s concern in discussing institutions such as political 
authority and law is to justify these institutions, and to identify standards that they 
should satisfy, by having reference to their relationship to natural law principles.
34
 
                                                 
31
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 7 at 451. 
32
 See the illustrative list of Finnis’s works cited at supra note 7.  Other new natural law theorists 
applying the theory in the domains of political and legal theory include Robert George and Gerard 
Bradley: see supra note 6 for illustrative works of these authors. 
33
 See generally Finnis NLNR, supra note 7, Chs. 6-12.  The Postscript to the second edition of 
Natural Law and Natural Rights provides a detailed overview of the ways in which Finnis’s thought 
in relation to these topics has  evolved in the years since the text was first published, referencing 
Finnis’s other relevant works: see ibid. at 420-24, 459-76. 
34
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 18, 23-24, 418. 
16 
 
The key features of Finnis’s discussion of political and legal theory in 
Natural Law and Natural Rights may be briefly summarized.  Of primary 
significance is Finnis’s articulation of the concept of the common good, a concept 
that is foundational to the relationship between the moral framework of the new 
classical theory and the theory’s claims in the domains of political philosophy and 
jurisprudence.  Finnis describes the common good as signifying a set of conditions 
that enables members of a community to realise the basic values for themselves, and 
that accordingly explains the collaboration of community members.
35
  This primarily 
instrumental conception of the common good highlights the contingent nature of 
human well-being, and the corresponding importance of certain conditions for 
facilitating the pursuit of the basic goods by individuals and communities.
36
  Finnis 
affirms that the need to promote the common good of one's communities, considered 
as a requirement of practical reasonableness, is essentially synonymous with the first 
principle of morality that directs persons to choose and act in a manner that favours 
integral human fulfilment.
37
 
Finnis characterises justice and human rights as concepts that are 
fundamentally interrelated with the common good and that specify the content of the 
latter concept.  According to Finnis, justice – in its simplest terms, treating people in 
the manner that is due to them – is a requirement of practical reasonableness that is 
inherently entailed by the requirement to promote the common good.
38
  Human 
rights, meanwhile, identify the dimensions of human flourishing that correspond to 
the basic goods and that are to be respected and promoted in accordance with natural 
                                                 
35
 See ibid. at 155; see also discussion in Chapter 2 at 45-46 below. 
36
 See discussion in Chapter 2 at 48, 55 and 60 below. 
37
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 7 at 456-57; see also discussion in Chapter 2 at 46-47 below. 
38
 See discussion in Chapter 4 at 134 below. 
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law principles.
39
  Finnis affirms that human rights give precise expression to what is 
due to persons as a matter of justice, and that respect for human rights is part of the 
set of conditions comprising the common good.
40
 
Political authority and law, according to Finnis, are institutional concepts that 
both derive their normative significance from their relationship to furthering the 
common good.  Finnis affirms that the exercise of authority in community is justified 
based on the opportunity that authority provides for stipulating definitive solutions to  
a community’s ‘coordination problems’, that is, the problems that may arise as 
persons confront an array of reasonable possibilities for pursuing the common good 
in the context of community life.
41
   Authority relates to promoting the common good 
because authority facilitates the coordination of a community that is necessary in 
order that members of the community can pursue the basic values.   Law, as Finnis 
further explains, enables the stipulation of solutions to coordination problems in a 
manner that is particularly suited to facilitating coordination: the features of law and 
legal order encourage the promulgation of norms governing a community that are 
clear, enduring and procedurally fair.
42
  Law furthers the common good because the 
characteristics of legal order enhance the prospects for successful and enduring 
coordination of a community, and contribute to maintaining ideals of justice in the 
process of coordination. 
Finnis describes legal obligation as being fundamentally a moral obligation 
that is primarily based on the need for persons subject to law to accept legal 
stipulations as binding if law is to be effective in facilitating the coordination of a 
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 See discussion in Chapter 4 at 137-38 below. 
40
 See discussion in Chapter 4 at 139-40 below. 
41
 See discussion in Chapter 3 at 83-84 below. 
42
 See discussion in Chapter 3 at 85-86 below. 
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community and thereby furthering the common good.
43
  Adherence to legal 
obligations by members of a community is thus itself relevant to advancing the 
common good.  As Finnis further indicates, however, the moral obligation to obey 
legal rules is contingent upon the consistency of such rules with the objective of 
promoting the common good: laws that are unjust, and thus incompatible with the 
goal of furthering the common good, do not generate a moral obligation to obey 
them.
44
 
Finnis’s endeavour in Natural Law and Natural Rights to relate new natural 
law theory to providing a normative interpretation of central concerns in political 
philosophy and legal theory forms the substantive and structural basis for the present 
project; accordingly, each of the concepts introduced above will be examined in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters.  For the moment, it is instructive to underscore 
the conceptual significance of the common good in Finnis’s exploration of political 
and legal theory in relation to the new classical theory.  Finnis’s chapter introducing 
the idea of the common good in Natural Law and Natural Rights is pivotal to both 
the architecture of the book and the normative project in which Finnis is engaged.  
Appearing roughly halfway through the book’s thirteen chapters, the discussion of 
the common good unites the preceding three chapters setting out the ethical 
framework of new natural law theory with the subsequent chapters examining the 
political and legal concepts outlined above.  By relating all of these concepts to the 
common good – either as specifications of the common good, as in the case of justice 
and human rights, or as institutions and phenomena that are justified based on their 
relationship to the common good, as in the case of authority, law, and legal 
obligation – Finnis identifies the way in which these concepts are linked to the 
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principles of practical reason that direct persons to pursue their own flourishing and 
favour integral human fulfilment.  In so doing, Finnis emphasises the priority of 
considerations of human welfare in understanding the significance of the political 
and legal structures that govern human communities. 
Contribution of New Natural Law Theory to Contemporary Ethical and Legal 
Theory 
New natural law theory is mainly grounded in Aquinas’s natural law doctrine 
and significantly echoes it in relation to its core tenets.  The new natural law 
affirmation of the existence of basic goods as objects of natural human inclination, 
and the identification of natural law principles as directives of practical reason, are 
drawn directly from Aquinas’s thought;  Thomistic natural law theory is similarly the 
source of many of Finnis’s claims pertaining to political philosophy and 
jurisprudence, including his assertion that law’s purpose is to promote the common 
good, his account of the relationship between positive human laws and natural law 
principles, and his claims regarding the effects of injustice in law on obligation.
45
  At 
the same time, the interpretation of Aquinas’s natural law theory by new natural law 
theorists is novel in a number of respects, such as its claims regarding the equal value 
of all the basic goods and the pre-moral character of the principles of practical 
reason.
46
  The new classical theory also introduces its own distinctive elements that 
represent a development of Aquinas’s natural law doctrine, including its elaboration 
of Aquinas’s list of basic goods and its postulation of a set of requirements of 
practical reasonableness.  New natural law theorists are additionally distinguished 
                                                 
45
 See generally Aquinas, supra note 4, I-II, q. 90, a. 2; q. 94, a. 2; q. 95, a. 2; q. 96, a. 4.  On Finnis’s 
characterisation of the relationship between human laws and principles of natural law, see the 
discussion in Chapter 3 at 87-89 below. 
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 See Ralph McInerny, “The Principles of Natural Law” (1980) 25 Am. J. Juris. 1 at 6-11.  It may be 
noted that new natural law theorists regard themselves as providing the correct interpretation of 
Aquinas’s natural law doctrine and clarifying previous misconceptions: see generally e.g., Grisez 
“First Principle”, supra note 5. 
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from Aquinas in presenting natural law theory in a manner that is independent of a 
theological foundation.
47
  Finnis’s application of the ethical framework of new 
natural law theory to the analysis of issues of political and legal theory itself 
constitutes a unique contribution to natural law scholarship, particularly in relation to 
legal theory; Finnis has provided new insights into the tenets of classical natural law 
theory through dialectical engagement with the work of leading contemporary jurists 
such as Herbert Hart and Joseph Raz, and has drawn fresh attention to the idea that 
moral considerations are relevant for understanding  the significance of fundamental 
concepts in jurisprudence.
48
 
New natural law theory has been the subject of a wide array of criticisms 
regarding virtually all of its distinctive propositions.  The new natural law 
characterisation of the principles of practical reason as self-evident and pre-moral, 
and the claim that there is no objective hierarchy among the basic values, are among 
the many defining aspects of the theory that have been challenged.
49
  It has also been 
suggested that the principles of practical reason and the requirements of practical 
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 The development of natural law theory in the classical era was significantly influenced by 
Christianity and Catholic theology: see generally e.g., Crowe, supra note 1, Ch. 3.  Aquinas, himself a 
theologian, characterised natural law as a ‘participation’ in divine law by rational persons, and thereby 
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misconceptions voiced by Hart and Raz regarding the claims of natural law theorists).  Cf. generally 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3d ed. (Oxford University Press, 2012); H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism 
and the Separation of Law and Morals”(1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason 
and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 2d 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
49
 See generally e.g., Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame, IN; 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), Chs. 2-3; McInerny, ibid. at 11-15.  These challenges have 
simultaneously involved an allegation that new natural law theory is not an accurate representation of 
Aquinas’s natural law doctrine: see e.g., McInerny, ibid. 
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reasonableness do not provide sufficiently precise guides for practical deliberation.
50
   
Several of Finnis’s claims arising from his application of the new classical theory to 
political philosophy and jurisprudence have also been questioned, including his 
characterisation of the common good, his account of the coordinating role of 
authority, and his explanation of the moral foundation of legal obligation.
51
  New 
natural law theorists have responded on a number of occasions to many of the 
criticisms raised, using these opportunities to clarify or reformulate the precise 
content of their claims.
52
 
The articulation of the new classical theory has significantly contributed to a 
contemporary renaissance in natural law scholarship.  Apart from the considerable 
body of work that new natural law theorists have generated over the course of several 
decades, other works on natural law theory have emerged that adopt many of the 
fundamental tenets of the new classical theory, but differ in their precise 
formulations of these tenets or feature their own distinctive claims.
53
  Additionally, a 
few writers have recently applied new natural law theory to the analysis of issues 
outside the realms of ethics and jurisprudence, such as economic justice.
54
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 See e.g., Valerie Kerruish, “Philosophical Retreat: A Criticism of John Finnis’ Theory of Natural 
Law” (1983) 15 U. W. A. L. Rev. 224 at 227-33. 
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 See e.g. Stephen D. Smith, “Cracks in the Coordination Account? Authority and Reasons for 
Action” (2005) 50 Am. J. Juris. 249; Robert M. Scavone, “Natural Law, Obligation and the Common 
Good: What Finnis Can’t Tell Us” (1985) 43 U. Toronto. Fac. L. Rev. 90 at 111-14; see also the 
discussion in Chapter 2 at 51-55 below on criticisms of the new natural law description of the 
common good. 
52
 See e.g., John Finnis & Germain Grisez, “The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph 
McInerny” (1981) 26 Am. J. Juris. 21; Grisez, Boyle & Finnis, supra note 6; George “Recent 
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2.  Natural Law Theory and Normative Scholarship in International Legal Theory 
 
International law, as is well known, has a significant historical link to natural 
law theory.  The earliest writers on international law in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were jurists and theologians who drew upon the classical natural law 
thought of Aristotle and Aquinas in articulating their ideas regarding the principles of 
inter-state relations.
55
  Hugo Grotius, often described as the founder of modern 
international law, identified natural law as a source of the jus gentium, or law of 
nations, alongside positive laws created through state consent.
56
  Writing before 
Grotius, Francisco de Vitoria cited natural law principles concerning the rational 
nature of human persons in asserting that the ‘Indian aborigines’ of the New World 
had the right to own property and exercise control over it, contrary to the claims of 
the Spanish colonialists.
57
  Another influential Spanish scholar, Francisco Suárez, 
similarly affirmed natural law as the foundation of the positive rules of the law of 
nations, observing that the notion of universally applicable laws arising through the 
habitual practices of states was possible precisely because of the close relationship 
between the content of the jus gentium and natural law.
58
  Subsequent writers in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Wolff 
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 The historical influence of natural law theory in the early development of international law is  
canvassed in Alfred Verdross & Heribert F. Koeck, “Natural Law: The Tradition of Universal Reason 
and Authority” in Ronald St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston, eds., The Structure and Process 
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and Emeric de Vattel, were also influenced by diverse natural law doctrines in 
developing their respective theories of international law.
59
 
In the nineteenth century, the influence of natural law doctrines in 
international law declined significantly as natural law theory became supplanted by 
the emergent school of legal positivism.
60
  Leading proponents of positivist thought, 
such as Karl Bergbohm and John Austin, rejected belief in the existence of objective 
norms discoverable through reason and characterised law as resulting exclusively 
from the exercise of sovereign will by a state.
61
   Legal positivism represented a turn 
towards the scientific study of law, with a focus on identifying norms through 
reference to empirical evidence.
62
  The positivist doctrine led to the advent of a 
dominant interpretation of international law that characterised this law as having its 
origin in state consent, and that recognised treaties and international custom – which 
were understood as having a tangible relationship to state consent – as exclusive 
sources of international legal norms.
63
 
The earliest writers on international law influenced by classical natural law 
theory did not deny the juridical significance of international laws derived from the 
expressed will and practices of states; rather, these writers suggested that such 
positive rules of international law existed in addition to, and in relationship with, the 
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principles of natural law.
64
  In this regard, it may be noted that the advent and 
eventual ascendency of positivism in international legal thought constituted a 
fundamental change in the approach to understanding and describing international 
law that had prevailed in prior centuries.  Two key and interrelated aspects of this 
change may be highlighted.  First, the positivist rejection of the idea that natural law 
principles had any relationship to the norms of positive international law resulted in 
an abandonment of conceptualisations of international law that featured a normative 
dimension.  The positivist claim that international law consisted exclusively of laws 
originating in positive acts of state consent stood in stark contrast to the affirmation 
of earlier international law scholars that natural law principles existed in relation to 
the jus gentium as ‘higher’ law.  This affirmation, which was grounded in classical 
natural law doctrine on the relationship between positive law and the principles of 
practical reason,
65
 expressed the core idea that positive international law remained 
susceptible to evaluation according to principles that did not themselves derive from 
states.  With the demise of natural law doctrines in international legal theory, this 
notion was largely lost.
66
    
Second, positivist doctrine supplanted an earlier purposive conception of 
international law, that is, an interpretation of international law as furthering particular 
objectives.  Vitoria and Suárez, in keeping with the natural law doctrine of 
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Aquinas,
67
 both expressed the idea that international law existed for the ‘common 
good’ of all persons; Suárez further specified that international law’s purpose was to 
achieve particular goals, namely the maintenance of peace and justice between states, 
which were themselves necessary for achieving what he called the ‘universal 
good’.68  Significantly, these claims related international law to the promotion of 
human welfare, and thereby affirmed that international law did more than merely 
stipulate the rules of conduct applicable to states in their international relations.  
Positivism, on the other hand, suggested no such purposive framework for the 
international legal order, instead characterising international law as a merely a 
technical instrument for the attainment of politically-determined state objectives.
69
  
Furthermore, far from relating international law to considerations of human well-
being, positivist doctrine reinforced the state-centric conception of international law 
according to which states were seen as the only entities having rights and duties in 
the international sphere.
70
 
Contemporary international legal theory is no longer dominated by the rigidly 
positivist ideology that was characteristic of international legal scholarship in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  While international law is still understood 
as being primarily a product of state consent, it is generally acknowledged that 
modern international law cannot be entirely explained in positivist terms: for 
example, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies “the 
general principles of law recognized by civilised nations” as a source of international 
law alongside treaties and international custom, thereby affirming the existence of a 
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source of international legal norms that is not grounded in state consent.
71
  
Furthermore, modern international legal theory has moved beyond the positivist 
focus on identifying and analysing the sources of international law.  International 
legal theory today features a genuine diversity of perspectives, and includes theories 
that approach the study of international law with reference to concepts and 
viewpoints drawn from fields such as sociology, international relations, and various 
streams of modern legal thought including feminist legal theory and critical legal 
studies.
72
  Corresponding to this plurality of conceptual approaches, contemporary 
international legal theory also demonstrates a variety of substantive concerns: no 
longer confined to the analysis of strictly legal concepts, international legal scholars 
have devoted their attention to examining a range of extra-legal factors that are 
themselves relevant to understanding the nature and functioning of international law, 
such as the role of power dynamics between states in shaping the content of 
international norms, and the significance of gender imbalances in international law-
making processes in accounting for certain characteristics of international legal 
regimes.
73
 
Until fairly recently, however, the array of conceptual approaches seen in 
international legal scholarship did not include any specifically normative theories of 
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international law.  In this regard, international legal theory continued to reflect the 
impact of the positivist rejection of natural law doctrines that occurred in the 
nineteenth century.  As some writers have suggested, the absence of normative 
accounts in international legal theory has been compounded by the relative 
prominence of realist and postmodern perspectives in contemporary international 
legal thought, which cast doubt on the relevance of moral considerations in 
international relations and the viability of normative theorising about international 
law.
74
   
In recent decades, nevertheless, a number of normative theories of 
international law have emerged.
75
  These theories posit the existence of moral 
criteria,  such as fairness, that international law should satisfy, and identify moral 
objectives, such as the protection of basic human rights, that international law should 
promote.
76
  These normative theories also seek to analyse specific principles and 
issues in international law, justifying or criticising the existing law based on its 
relationship to the moral standards and objectives identified.  Proponents of 
normative approaches in international legal theory have applied their theories to 
consideration of a range of topics corresponding to contemporary concerns in 
international law and international affairs, including the right to self-determination, 
                                                 
74
 Influential works in the realist and post-modernist schools include Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979) and Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia,  
supra note 71.  See Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, “Introduction” in Samantha Besson & John 
Tasioulas, eds., The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 1 at 3. 
75
 Representative works in this regard include: Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Fernando Tesón, A Philosophy of 
International Law (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Allen Buchanan, Justice Legitimacy, and 
Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Mortimer N.S. Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law: The 
Fundamental Requirements of a Just World Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).  See 
Besson & Tasioulas, ibid. at 5. 
76
 See generally e.g., Franck, ibid.; Buchanan, ibid. 
28 
 
humanitarian intervention, the prosecution of soldiers for international war crimes, 
and global climate change regulation.
77
 
The advent of these normative theories of international law may be seen as 
significant in at least three ways.  First, it arguably testifies to an increasing 
recognition of the importance of normative inquiry in relation to international law.  
As Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas have recently noted, the most crucial 
questions concerning international law that are arising in the face of contemporary 
global developments are fundamentally normative in character: in this regard, they 
highlight phenomena such as the emergence of a variety of global challenges 
pertaining to issues such as terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and 
the threat of pandemics, that appear to require the creation of appropriate 
international legal mechanisms since they cannot be adequately addressed by 
individual states.
78
  Responding to such challenges by means of international law 
necessarily involves contemplation of what constitutes an ‘appropriate’ legal solution 
to the problems faced, which in turn invites reflection on what criteria are involved in 
determining  appropriateness.  Second, the emphasis on human rights considerations 
that is a prominent theme in normative international legal scholarship is congruent 
with the way in which international law, since the end of the Second World War, has 
demonstrated increased attention to articulating the legal responsibilities of states for 
protecting the welfare of persons; this development is primarily manifested in the 
growth of international human rights law.
79
  Third, the normative theories described 
have reintroduced a dimension of evaluative scholarship, and a consideration of the 
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ends of international law, into the domain of international legal theory; this 
represents a return to an approach that, as already noted, was characteristic of the 
earliest theories of international law that were influenced by natural law doctrines. 
 
III.  Description of the Thesis 
 
This thesis examines the core claims of new natural law theory in relation to 
political philosophy and legal theory, and seeks to use the new natural law 
framework to articulate a normative theory of international law.  Proceeding from 
Finnis’s application of the new classical theory to interpreting fundamental concepts 
in political and legal theory, the thesis considers the implications of new natural law 
theory for describing the purpose of international law and institutions, the moral 
criteria that the content of international law should satisfy, and the justification of 
international legal obligation. 
This thesis is premised upon a belief that new natural law theory, having 
already made an important contribution to current knowledge and discourse in the 
fields of ethics and jurisprudence, has the potential to similarly offer insights that are 
valuable for contemporary international legal theory.  Finnis and other advocates of 
new natural law theory have themselves, on a small number of occasions, sought to 
relate the theory to reflection about contemporary international law and affairs; 
notable instances of their work in this regard include Finnis’s interpretation of the 
emergence and significance of customary international law, and Robert George’s 
discussion of the new classical theory in the context of considering the themes of 
governance and law making in the international sphere.
80
  There are also signs that a 
growing number of writers on international law are being influenced by new natural 
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 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 7 at 238-45; George “Natural Law and International Order”, supra 
note 8 at 231-42; see also generally Finnis, Boyle & Grisez, supra note 6.  
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law theory and seeking to apply it to analysing specific concepts and issues in 
international law.
81
  Thus far, however, there has been no attempt to articulate an 
overall normative theory of international law based on a systematic and 
comprehensive examination of new natural law theory in its relationship to political 
and legal theory. 
An exploration of the implications of the new classical theory for interpreting 
international law in normative terms is complementary to the contemporary growth 
of normative international legal scholarship.  Inasmuch as new natural law theory is 
grounded in classical natural law doctrine, the effort to relate the theory to 
international legal theory implicitly reaffirms the origins of the evaluative and 
purposive approaches to analysing international law that are now enjoying a 
resurgence.   Furthermore, while new natural law theory reaffirms the substance of 
many of the claims of classical natural law doctrine, this thesis suggests that the new 
classical theory also offers its own distinctive contribution to the endeavour of 
normative inquiry in relation to modern international law.  As will be explained 
herein, the new classical theory provides the conceptual framework for articulating 
the notion of the international common good as the centrepiece of a normative theory 
of international law.  Additionally, new natural law theory facilitates a fuller 
appreciation in international legal thought of the idea that human flourishing, in its 
myriad dimensions, itself provides the foundation for identifying normative criteria 
for the development and evaluation of positive international law. 
This thesis adopts a conceptual approach to articulating a normative theory of 
natural law based on new natural law theory, taking as its starting point Finnis’s 
examination of fundamental concepts in political philosophy and jurisprudence in 
                                                 
81
 See e.g., Hall, supra note 70; Paolo Carozza, “The Universal Common Good and the Authority of 
International Law” (2006) 9(1) Logos 29; Dan Dubois, “The Authority of Peremptory Norms in 
International Law: State Consent or Natural Law?” (2009) 78 Nordic. J. Int’l L. 133. 
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Natural Law and Natural Rights.  The thesis features four core chapters examining 
the notions of the common good, authority and law, justice and human rights, and 
legal obligation.  In relation to each concept, the thesis outlines the new natural law 
understanding of the concept, and then seeks to identify the significance of this 
concept for advancing a normative interpretation of the nature and functioning of the 
international community and international law.  As the elements of the thesis’s 
normative claims are articulated and applied in each chapter, reference is made to 
instances of positive international law; in this regard, the thesis does not use positive 
international law as a source for developing the content of its normative claims, but 
rather draws examples from this body of law to illustrate the areas and ways in which 
such law gives effect to natural law principles, and more broadly to facilitate an 
appreciation of the idea that positive international law can and should be understood 
as having an underlying moral significance.  Each chapter also seeks to relate the 
normative account of international law based on the new classical theory to existing 
thought in international legal theory on the concept concerned, drawing upon 
examples of both normative and non-normative perspectives. 
Chapter 2 of the thesis, the first substantive chapter, is titled ‘New Natural 
Law Theory and the Idea of the Common Good in International Law’.  This chapter 
introduces the new natural law conception of the common good as described by 
Finnis, discusses criticisms of this conception and alternative understandings of the 
common good, and outlines the manner in which the new classical account of the 
common good relates to the theory’s interpretation of other core concepts in political 
and legal theory.  Proceeding from this, the chapter relates the idea of the common 
good to the international sphere; in particular, the chapter introduces the notion of an 
‘international common good’, defined as a set of supranational conditions that 
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facilitate human welfare and that require international cooperation in order to be 
realised.  The chapter provides an overview of the way in which the concept of the 
international common good provides a foundation for making normative claims 
regarding international authority, international law, and international legal obligation, 
as a prelude to the more detailed discussion of these concepts in subsequent chapters.  
The chapter also considers the implications of the notion of the international 
common good for understanding existing usages of the term ‘common good’ in 
international law and international affairs, as well as the general significance of this 
concept for international legal theory. 
Chapter 3, ‘Authority and Law in the International Sphere’, considers two   
foundational concepts in political and legal theory from the perspective of the new 
classical theory.  The chapter describes the new natural law conceptions of political 
authority and law, and also outlines Finnis’s account of the relationship between 
natural law principles and positive legal rules which is an elaboration of Aquinas’ 
thought on the relationship between natural law and positive law.  The chapter then 
considers the significance of the new classical interpretation of authority and law for 
understanding the concepts of international authority and international law.  In this 
regard, the chapter advances the idea that the purpose of both international 
institutional authority and international law is to further the international common 
good through addressing the coordination problems of states in their international 
relations.  The chapter further claims that natural law principles constitute a form of 
‘higher’ law that informs the content of positive international laws, and that the 
moral authority of these laws is derived from their consistency with such principles.  
The chapter compares the account of international authority and international law 
based on new natural law theory with the traditional ‘consent’ theory of the source of 
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international law’s authority, and with the more recent ‘service conception’ of 
authority used by Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas to explain the legitimacy of 
international law.  Finally, the chapter applies the new natural law conceptions of 
international authority and international law to a reflection on certain issues relevant 
to the international legal order, discussing in this regard the need for international 
institutional authority and the idea of ‘world government’, the status of custom in 
international law, and the significance of peremptory norms. 
Chapter 4, titled ‘Justice, Human Rights, and International Law’, examines 
the concepts that the new classical theory characterises as being fundamentally 
connected to the idea of the common good and as specifying its content.  The chapter 
outlines the new natural law conceptions of justice and human rights and describes 
the way in which these concepts relate to the notion of the common good.  
Proceeding from the new natural law claims that promoting the common good entails 
adhering to the requirements of justice, and that these requirements themselves entail 
demonstrating respect for human rights, the chapter articulates principles of justice 
for positive international law.  Two overarching principles are identified in this 
regard: first, that international laws should promote and respect human rights, 
specifically through remaining consistent with international human rights norms; 
second, that international laws should be consistent with the objective of promoting 
the international common good, given its instrumental significance for the enjoyment 
of human rights.  These principles, it is argued, should be regarded as supreme norms 
of the international legal order.  The final part of the chapter examines the justice-
based normative theory of international law expressed by a leading international 
legal scholar, Allen Buchanan, and compares Buchanan’s claims to a new natural 
34 
 
law interpretation of the relationship between international law and considerations of 
justice and human rights. 
Chapter 5, ‘International Legal Obligation’, considers the final concept that 
forms part of Finnis’s analysis of new natural theory in relation to political and legal 
theory.  The chapter describes the new classical conception of legal obligation, which 
Finnis describes as having a distinct ‘legal’ dimension but as being fundamentally a 
moral obligation.  Additionally, the chapter outlines the new natural law 
interpretation of the effect of injustice in law on legal obligation.  Based on this 
framework, the chapter seeks to articulate a normative account of international legal 
obligation.  The chapter claims that there is a general moral obligation to obey 
international law; this obligation is primarily based on the need for states to adhere to 
international legal stipulations in order to enable international law to be effective for 
its purpose of promoting the international common good, and is additionally 
grounded in the principle of fairness.  The chapter affirms that the moral obligation 
to obey international law is variable according to the substantive justice of the 
particular law concerned, and that unjust international laws do not generate any 
primary moral duty of compliance for states; at the same time, the chapter suggests 
that states may in certain circumstances have a ‘collateral’ moral obligation to obey 
an unjust international law.  The chapter discusses the theory recently advanced by 
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner that denies that states have a moral obligation to 
obey international law, assessing the arguments of these writers from the perspective 
of new natural law theory.  Finally, the chapter considers the implications of the new 
natural law account of international legal obligation, along with other aspects of the 
normative theory of international law outlined earlier in the thesis, for understanding 
certain concepts and issues in modern international law that relate to international 
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legal obligation; in this regard, the chapter discusses peremptory norms, obligations 
erga omnes, and conflicting international legal obligations. 
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Chapter 2 
New Natural Law Theory and the Idea of the Common Good in 
International Law 
 
In the fall of 2008, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-
moon, delivered an address at Harvard University entitled ‘Securing the Common 
Good in a Time of Global Crises’.  Speaking in the initial months of the global 
financial crisis, Mr. Ban drew attention to what he described as ‘common challenges’ 
facing the world community: the financial crisis, climate change, global health, 
terrorism, and disarmament.  The challenges, as Mr. Ban observed, share certain 
interrelated features: in Mr. Ban’s words, these challenges “endanger all countries… 
and all their people; they cross borders freely without respecting national geographic 
borders and are highly contagious; and they cannot be resolved without action by us 
all”.  Mr. Ban declared that “[i]n these times of crisis… we must put pursuit of the 
common good to the top of the agenda.”  According to Mr. Ban, pursuing the 
common good entails addressing these common challenges, which he further 
characterised as “global challenges that hold the key to our common future”.1 
Mr. Ban’s remarks represent a striking affirmation by the most senior official 
within the United Nations system of the significance of a concept that has long been 
a part of discourse in international affairs.  Particularly within the context of 
intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations and the European Union, 
reference to the ‘common good’ is, as it were, a commonplace, and it appears that the 
concept is receiving increased attention in the face of certain contemporary global 
challenges.  Examination of the many invocations of the term in international fora, 
                                                 
1
 Ban Ki-moon, “Securing the Common Good in a Time of Global Crises” (Speech delivered at the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 21 October 2008), online: UN News 
Centre < http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=349>. 
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however, indicates that no single understanding of the common good is at play.  It 
may be reasonably asked how pursuit of the common good is to be prioritised by the 
world community when considerable heterogeneity exists regarding the very 
meaning of this concept.  Further, assuming that international law is to play a role in 
addressing the global challenges cited by Mr. Ban, what is the significance of the 
concept of the common good for international law?  Surprisingly, although 
references to the term ‘common good’ appear in a number of international legal 
instruments, the concept has received little attention from contemporary international 
legal theorists. 
This chapter seeks to articulate a definitive conception of the common good 
relevant to a normative understanding of the world community and its international 
legal and political affairs by drawing on the description of the common good 
contained in new natural law theory.  New natural law theorists characterise the 
common good as a set of conditions that enables individuals to pursue basic human 
goods for themselves, and that accordingly justifies the collaboration of individuals 
in a community.
2
  Applying this concept to the global sphere, this chapter makes two 
fundamental claims.  First, it affirms that there is an ‘international common good’ 
that pertains to the international community of states; this common good is 
comprised of conditions that facilitate human pursuit of the basic values, and that 
because of their nature require international cooperation for their realisation.  
Second, it argues that the new natural law conception of the common good applied to 
the global sphere provides the foundation for positing normative claims regarding the 
purpose of international law and international institutional authority, the moral 
                                                 
2
 See discussion at 45-46 below. 
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requirements for the content of positive international law, and the nature of 
international legal obligation. 
The chapter proceeds in four parts.  The first part surveys the manner in 
which the term ‘common good’ is currently employed and understood in 
international law and international affairs.  This survey reveals that there are at least 
three existing interpretations of the concept of the common good in international 
discourse; as shall be suggested in the analysis, none of these interpretations appears 
to fully embody the sense in which Mr. Ban refers to the common good in his 
address.  The second part of the chapter describes the new natural law conception of 
the common good as articulated by John Finnis, and identifies the manner in which 
this concept informs the jurisprudence and political philosophy of the new classical 
theory.  This section also considers the main objections that have been raised to 
Finnis’s account of the common good, and compares Finnis’s description to another 
natural law interpretation of the common good presented by Mark Murphy that is 
similar but also distinct in important respects.  Through discussion of these criticisms 
and alternative conceptions of the common good, the section identifies what are 
considered to be the strengths of Finnis’s characterisation.  The third part of the 
chapter applies the new natural law conception of the common good in articulating a 
theory regarding the nature of the world community and its common good, 
identifying the dimensions of a putative universal community of persons and an 
international community of states, and introducing the concepts of the universal 
common good and the international common good.  Proceeding from this, the section 
outlines the normative claims regarding international law that are thought to derive 
from the new natural law analysis.  The final section discusses the implications of the 
new natural law conception of the common good in its global application for 
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understanding and assessing the current interpretations of the common good in 
international discourse, and also considers the significance of this concept for 
contemporary international legal theory. 
 
I.  The Common Good in Contemporary International Discourse 
 
The idea of a ‘common good’ has a long history in multiple fields of 
scholarly inquiry including theology, ethics, and political theory.  It can be traced at 
least as far back as the classical era, to the writings of Aristotle on political 
community and the good life.
3
  The concept has particular resonance in the history of 
Catholic thought, being influential in the elaboration of Aquinas’s political 
philosophy and also forming an important part of the later development of Catholic 
social teaching.
4
  More recently, notions of a common good have featured 
prominently in the work of political theorists such as Amitai Etzioni and Michael 
Sandel.
5
 
Given its varied pedigree, the common good has long been the subject of 
multiple interpretations.  In the face of this conceptual diversity, it is a curiosity that 
the term ‘common good’ is often used in discourse in international law and 
international affairs as though a single definitive understanding of the concept exists.  
A recent opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee, for example, 
describes the European Union as “a community of 27 nations joined together for the 
common good”; the Committee does not elaborate on this obiter remark and thus 
                                                 
3
 See generally Aristotle, Politics in Ernest Barker, ed., The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Ernest Barker 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946); see also infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
4
 For commentary, see generally, Jean Porter, “The Common Good in Thomas Aquinas” in Patrick D. 
Miller & Dennis P. McCann, eds., In Search of the Common Good (New York: T&T Clark, 2005) 94; 
Dennis P. McCann, “The Common Good in Catholic Social Teaching: A Case Study in 
Modernization” in In Search of the Common Good, ibid., 121. 
5
 See e.g., Amitai Etzioni, The Common Good (Oxford: Polity, 2004); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism 
and the Limits of Justice, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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appears to assume that its meaning is understood.
6
  Even Mr. Ban in his address 
exhorting the world community to prioritise the common good, while indicating that 
pursuit of the common good entails addressing certain global challenges, does not 
directly define the concept that is central to his message. 
There is evidence that the meaning of the common good has been considered 
at the institutional level within the United Nations.  The background materials to the 
first meeting of the International Forum for Social Development in 2002 included 
two paragraphs dedicated to discussing the concept; here, it was noted that the notion 
of a common good “assumes that peoples of the world share a common humanity, 
have common basic values, and a future in common”.7  While noting that the 
common good “has political, philosophical and religious connotations”, the 
background document provides no references for the description of the concept it 
presents.
8
  Moreover, the document’s cautious use of the word ‘assumes’ signals that 
even here, the common good is not actually being defined: an affirmation that the 
common good assumes other concepts such as a common humanity, while insightful, 
still stops short of explaining what the common good itself is. 
A review of the manner in which the term ‘common good’ is used in 
contemporary international law and discourse in international affairs suggests that 
there are at least three prevailing interpretations of the concept.  All of these appear 
to characterise the common good as ‘that which is good for everyone’, but they do so 
by means of different conceptual emphases that render each interpretation worthy of 
separate description. 
                                                 
6
 EC, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 19 January 2012 on “The role of 
the European Union in peace building in external relations: best practice and perspectives” [2012] 
O.J. C68/04 at para. 5.4.1. 
7
 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Background Notes to the International 
Forum for Social Development, New York, 7 February 2002, online: United Nations: 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ifsd/backgroundpaper.pdf> at 4. 
8
 Ibid. at 3. 
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A first set of usages suggests that the common good signifies mutual benefit.  
For example, the 1995 treaty between Canada and Russia concerning audio-visual 
relations, in establishing a Joint Commission on Audio-Visual Relations, indicates 
that one of the Commission’s purposes is to recommend treaty modifications 
“intended to develop co-operation for the common good of both countries.”9  
Similarly, the Preamble to the 1971 Agreement of Cooperation between the United 
Kingdom and Qatar affirms that the parties seek to strengthen their ties of 
cooperation with each other “in relation of their common good and mutual 
interests.”10 
A second form of usage suggests that the common good entails the 
maximisation of welfare.  This usage is exemplified in a 1976 agreement between 
Spain and the United States, containing rules governing the medical services of the 
American forces based in Spain.  The agreement indicates that in the event of a 
natural disaster in Spain affecting a large number of people, Spanish and American 
facilities and health services “will cooperate to the greatest extent practicable and 
they will be used jointly in the common good.”11  A further and more explicit 
example is seen in the recent decision of the European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union concerning a framework programme for research and technological 
development in the European Community; here, the European Parliament and 
Council comment that “[n]ow that life sciences and technologies have clearly 
demonstrated their societal role, a more precise vision must be developed of where 
                                                 
9
 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation 
Concerning Audio-Visual Relations, 5 October 1995, 2026 U.N.T.S. 431, Art. XI. 
10
 Agreement on Cooperation Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the State of Qatar, 19 June 1976, 1032 U.N.T.S. 171, 
Preamble. 
11
 Agreement in Implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between Spain and the 
United States of America of January 24, 1976, Procedural Annex VI, 31 January 1976, 1030 U.N.T.S. 
261, para. 11.  
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and how mankind should arrange its life for the greatest social and economic 
common good.”12 
The third usage of the common good witnessed in the international sphere 
indicates that this concept connotes a universally shared good, that is, a good that is 
not reserved for the benefit of a particular person or group.  This understanding of 
the common good was articulated by the former President of the United Nations 
General Assembly, Fr. Miguel D’escoto Brockmann, at the start of a United Nations 
conference on the global financial crisis in 2009.  Fr. Brockmann proclaimed the 
existence of “a community of common goods” which “cannot be appropriated 
privately by anyone and must serve the life of all in present and future generations”; 
these goods, he suggested, include the Earth itself, water, oceans and forests, and the 
Earth’s climate.13  A more abstract but ultimately similar signification of the 
common good is seen in the 1997 treaty between Bolivia and Spain for avoiding 
double taxation and preventing tax evasion.  A provision of this treaty grants a tax 
exemption to residents of Spain or Bolivia on income they earn from conducting 
research while temporarily residing in the territory of the other party to the treaty, in 
circumstances where they are invited by an educational institution in that country to 
do research there; the provision stipulates, however, that the exemption does not 
apply “if the research is undertaken not for the common good, but primarily for the 
private benefit of a particular person or persons.”14 
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 EC, Decision No 1110/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 April 1994, 
concerning the fourth framework programme of the European Community activities in the field of 
research and technological development and demonstration, [1994] O.J. L 126/1, Annex III, Sec. 4. 
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 H.E. Fr. Miguel D’escoto Brockmann, “Address” (Delivered at the United Nations Conference on 
the World Financial Crisis and its Impact on Development, New York, 24 June 2009), online: United 
Nations <http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/statements/pga_opening_en.pdf>. 
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 Convention Between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of Bolivia for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 30 June 
1997, 2050 U.N.T.S. 255, Art. 21(2). 
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Absent a defined point of reference, it is difficult to make the judgment that 
any of the three cited usages of the term ‘common good’ in international law and 
international affairs represents an incorrect or incomplete understanding of the 
concept.  It may be noted, however, that none of these significations of the common 
good appears to adequately capture the sense in which Mr. Ban used the term in his 
2008 address.  The idea that the common good signifies ‘mutual benefit’ arguably 
does not approximate the depth of meaning that is conveyed by Mr. Ban’s claim that 
pursuing the common good entails addressing global challenges that are fundamental 
to the common future of humanity.  Furthermore, it is evident that Mr. Ban does not 
call for ‘maximisation’ but rather prioritisation of the common good; this, as he 
indicates, requires collective action to be taken in relation to a number of disparate 
objectives.  Finally, Mr. Ban’s discussion of the concerns relevant to securing the 
common good appears to focus not merely on the significance of certain goods as 
universally shared goods, but also on the nature of certain challenges as having 
severe actual or potential effects upon human welfare, and on the need to address 
these challenges for the sake of human well-being.
15
 
Particularly in relation to this last point, Mr. Ban’s discussion of the common 
good appears to share certain thematic parallels with the manner in which this term 
has been used in recent years by the Holy See and its representatives in relation to 
international affairs.  For example, in a statement to the General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in 2007, the Holy See representative Msgr. 
Dominique Mamberti declared that a sense of responsibility for the common good 
makes it incumbent upon all to encourage the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
                                                 
15
 Mr. Ban asserts, for example, that climate change has become “an imminent threat to all humanity”, 
and in relation to global health, he notes that if not controlled effectively, diseases and pandemics “can 
have devastating impacts”; regarding the global financial crisis, he characterises the relevant objective 
as “ensuring global financial stability as an intentional first step toward prosperity for all people”.  See 
Ban, supra note 1. 
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and the promotion of progressive nuclear disarmament; the implementation of these 
objectives, he added, constitutes “one of the principal instruments… in the concrete 
realization of a culture of life and of peace capable of promoting in an effective way 
the integral development of peoples”.16  Meanwhile, Pope Benedict XVI, addressing 
the United Nations General Assembly in 2008, observed that there is a need in the 
context of international relations to recognise “the higher role played by rules and 
structures that are intrinsically ordered to promote the common good, and therefore 
to safeguard human freedom.”17 
It is suggested that the reflections on the common good expressed by Mr. Ban 
and by representatives of the Holy See point the way towards a ‘fourth’ interpretation 
of the common good, one that finds its fullest expression in new natural law theory.  
This interpretation affirms the idea that the common good is ‘that which is good for 
everyone’, but its more precise claim is that the common good is that which furthers 
everyone’s good.  The following section will explain how the new classical theory 
constructs this claim. 
 
II.  The Conception of the Common Good in New Natural Law Theory 
 
For new natural law theorists, the common good is indeed something that is 
'good', in the specific natural law sense that it contemplates the flourishing of persons 
through their pursuit of the basic values, and that is 'common', in that it contemplates 
the flourishing of members of a community on a common rather than particular 
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 H.E. Msgr. Dominique Mamberti, “Address” (Intervention by the Holy See at the 51st Session of the 
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 17 September 2007), online: 
The Holy See <http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/2007/documents/rc_seg-
st_20070917_51-iaea_en.html#top> [emphasis added]. 
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 His Holiness Benedict XVI, “Address” (Delivered at the United Nations General Assembly, New 
York, 18 April 2008), online: The Holy See 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit_en.html> [emphasis added]. 
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basis.
18
  At the same time, the full manner in which the new classical theory 
understands the idea of the common good is not captured simply by this concept’s 
constituent terms.  This section will examine the new natural law conception of the 
common good as articulated by John Finnis, identifying the defining characteristics 
of Finnis’s account and additionally outlining Finnis’s interpretation of Aquinas’s 
thought regarding the common good of the political community.    The section will 
discuss primary criticisms of Finnis’s description of the common good, and will also 
consider an alternative description of the common good provided by another 
contemporary natural law theorist, Mark Murphy; in relation to both of these 
endeavours, an effort will be made to justify and explain the relative merits of 
Finnis’s account.  Finally, the section will describe the manner in which the common 
good informs the jurisprudence and political philosophy of new natural law theory. 
1.  Finnis’s Description of the Common Good 
 
Finnis's account of the common good in Natural Law and Natural Rights 
begins with an explanation of the concept of community.  Community, according to 
Finnis, is a form of unifying relationship between human beings.
19
  While Finnis 
posits the existence of multiple dimensions of unity in human community, such as 
the unity among persons that is a function of their common physical and biological 
characteristics, his particular concern relative to the concept of the common good is 
with the unifying relationship between persons that arises through common action.
20
  
Community in this regard is said to exist wherever there is a coordination of activity 
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 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
[Finnis NLNR] at 164. 
19
 See ibid. at 136. 
20
 See ibid. at 136-38. 
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by persons over time with a view to a shared aim.
21
  Finnis notes that there are 
different forms of community of varying degrees of intensity, ranging from the 
community of a business relationship (in which participants have private objectives, 
but have a common interest in the pursuit of certain conditions that facilitate the 
pursuit of their respective objectives) to that of friendship (in which the collaboration 
of each person is at least partly for the sake of the other person, and the common 
objective is the mutual realisation of individual goals).
22
  All such forms of 
community, according to Finnis, are characterised by a sharing of some objective 
among the members of the community that explains their ongoing collaboration.
23
 
Finnis indicates that the common good denotes the shared objective of the 
members of a community.  He describes the common good as “a set of conditions 
which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable 
objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which 
they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a 
community.”24  Finnis notes that this signification of the common good is related to 
two other senses of the concept: first, the idea that the basic values are commonly 
good for any and all persons qua human beings, and second, the idea that each of the 
basic values is itself a form of ‘common good’ in that each good can be pursued in an 
infinite variety of ways and occasions by an unlimited number of persons.
25
   
According to Finnis, promoting the common good of one's communities is a 
thoroughgoing requirement of practical reasonableness that is to guide individual 
pursuit of the basic values.  Since each of the basic goods is as good for any other 
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 See ibid. at 152.  Finnis’s use of the term ‘coordination’ is synonymous with collaboration or co-
operation, and includes circumstances of mutual non-interference (‘negative co-ordination’): ibid. at 
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 See ibid. at 139-44. 
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 See ibid. at 153. 
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person as it is for oneself, fully rational pursuit of the basic values by an individual 
cannot be done in manner that considers only one's personal well-being: rather, this 
pursuit must be attentive to the ideal of 'integral human fulfilment', the flourishing of 
all persons in all the basic goods.
26
  The requirement to promote the common good 
is, as Finnis notes, a restatement of the 'master principle of morality' (that is, that all 
one's choices and other forms of willing should be open to integral human fulfilment) 
as this applies to one’s conduct in the context of community life, and is relevant to 
any pursuit of the basic values that depends upon communal cooperation.
27
 
In articulating this ‘conditions-based’ conceptualisation of the common good, 
Finnis draws on Aristotle’s writings regarding the nature and purpose of community, 
and additionally has reference to Aquinas’s treatises invoking the concept of the 
common good in the Summa Theologiae.
28
  His definition bears clear parallels to the 
description of the common good found in contemporary Catholic social teaching, 
most notably that seen in the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes issued in 1965.
29
  
Finnis’s characterisation of the common good also shares a measure of similarity to 
that offered by John Rawls, who in A Theory of Justice describes the common good 
as comprising “certain general conditions that are in an appropriate sense equally to 
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 See ibid. at 456-57. 
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everyone’s advantage”;30 while Rawls’s definition draws attention to the 
‘commonness’ of the benefit conferred by the conditions concerned (without saying 
more about this benefit), Finnis’s definition is distinguished by its claim that the 
conditions constituting the common good are prerequisites for the pursuit of human 
fulfilment. 
Two aspects of Finnis’s ‘conditions-based’ description of the common good 
may be noted.  First, the description is distinctly instrumental in its flavour: 
according to this characterisation, the significance of the common good is that it 
facilitates the pursuit of flourishing in all its myriad forms by members of a 
community.  Finnis underscores this point in observing that this understanding of the 
common good does not suggest that all members of a community must have the same 
objectives, only that there is some set of conditions that must be present if these 
persons are to be able to realise their respective objectives.
31
  It should nevertheless 
be noted that Finnis resists an interpretation of the common good in strictly 
instrumental terms, and acknowledges that the common good includes the 
intrinsically desirable flourishing of a community as a whole and not only the 
particular flourishing of individuals or groups within that community.
32
  Second, 
Finnis’s description of the common good is itself an account of the significance of 
collaboration by members of a community.  The common good, according to 
Finnis’s definition, constitutes the rationale for the collaboration of persons 
comprising a community: this collaboration is required for the sake of a shared 
objective, that is, the realisation and maintenance of those conditions that will enable 
                                                 
30
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) at 246; see also 
ibid at 233. 
31
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 See ibid. at 459. 
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individuals and groups within a community to pursue the objectives relevant to their 
integral fulfilment.   
Two additional concepts are important to Finnis' description of the common 
good, and should be introduced here.  The first is that of 'complete community'.  The 
notion of complete community has its origins in classical thought, having been 
associated by Aristotle with the Greek polis.
33
  According to Finnis, the desirability 
of complete community arises due to the inability of other forms of community, 
including family and friendship, to adequately provide for all aspects of human 
flourishing.
34
  For Finnis, the concept of complete community is fundamentally 
linked to that of the common good, since its objective is to secure "the whole 
ensemble of material and other conditions, including forms of collaboration, that tend 
to favour, facilitate and foster the realization by each individual of his or her personal 
development."
35
  Finnis considers the common good of a complete community to be 
the paradigmatic description of the common good; he further affirms that the 
political community is, at least in principle, representative of complete community.
36
   
The second important concept is the principle of subsidiarity.  This principle, 
which received its first formal articulation in Catholic social teaching in the early 
twentieth century, asserts that the purpose of human association is to assist 
individuals within the association in realising for themselves the objectives that they 
can accomplish through their own effort.
37
  The principle is more commonly known 
for its related affirmation that larger associations should not usurp functions that can 
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be carried out by smaller associations.
38
  In its characterisation of association as 
being fundamentally oriented towards helping individuals to achieve their objectives 
for themselves, the principle of subsidiarity bears an obvious parallel to Finnis's 
description of the common good as that which facilitates individual pursuit of the 
basic values.  Finnis raises the subsidiarity principle in the context of describing the 
common good as a means of emphasising that the common good, which is ultimately 
the good of individuals, cannot be properly achieved where the opportunities for 
persons to constitute themselves through individual initiatives become supplanted 
entirely by common enterprises.
39
  While Finnis does not elaborate on the principle's 
related claim regarding the need for an appropriate division of labour between larger 
and smaller associations, it may be suggested that this dimension of the subsidiarity 
principle is also important for understanding the common good, since the principle in 
this regard addresses the structural requirements for the proper functioning of a 
complete community.
40
 
Since the time of first articulating his conception of the common good in 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis has subsequently developed a more 
extended account of the common good of the political community considered as a 
complete community, doing so through an exegetical discussion of Aquinas’s 
writings on the function of state authority and law.   Finnis affirms that according to 
Aquinas, there is a common good that is specific to the political community, known 
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39
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as the ‘public good’.41  The specifically political common good, according to Finnis, 
is distinct from the ‘private’ goods of individuals and families within the political 
community, and is comprised of inherently interpersonal goods, namely justice and 
peace.
42
  The significance of the public good, as Finnis further explains, lies in the 
fact that it provides “an indispensable context and support” for the pursuit and 
realisation of private goods.
43
  Finnis rejects a reading of Aquinas that equates the 
political common good with communal virtue – that is, the complete fulfilment of all 
members of the political community – and that suggests that political authority and 
law should aim at inculcating complete virtue in community members.
44
  Instead, 
Finnis claims, the public good is properly understood as being limited and 
instrumental in nature, and the proper role of government and law is to preserve 
justice and peace – conditions that individuals and families cannot adequately secure 
on their own – in order that members of the community can pursue the virtuous life 
themselves.
45
 
2.  Criticisms of Finnis’s Description of the Common Good  
 
The new classical account of the common good has been the subject of  
commentary and criticism on a number of fronts, the main lines of which may be 
considered here.  Finnis’s ‘conditions-based’ conception of the common good has 
been questioned for the manner in which it characterises the relationship between 
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 See John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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individuals and community.  Additionally, Finnis’s account of the political common 
good has been challenged for its claims regarding the instrumental nature of this 
good, the relationship between the public good and the pursuit of virtue, and the role 
of state authority and law relative to this pursuit.  
As already seen, Finnis affirms that the common good, construed as a set of 
facilitating conditions, enables members of a community to pursue for themselves 
the objectives that are constitutive of their fulfilment.  This characterisation of the 
common good, however, has been criticised as advancing an impoverished view of 
the relationship between individuals and the communities to which they belong.  
Ernest Fortin, for example, argues that Finnis’s conception of the common good 
negates the notion of persons being united in common dedication to a common end: 
Fortin claims that under Finnis’s account, human beings are not ‘parts’ of a 
community but “atomic wholes, open to others and often in need of them, but 
nonetheless free to organize their lives or devise their ‘life-plans’ as they see fit, 
provided they do not interfere with the freedom of others.”46  This, Fortin suggests, is 
a departure from Aquinas’s understanding of persons as being parts of a complete 
community to which individual members are ordained as imperfect to perfect.
47
 
Finnis’s description of the political common good has proven controversial, 
particularly due to Finnis’s claim that his account accurately reflects Aquinas’s own 
understanding of the concept.  While Finnis argues that Aquinas’s public good is 
instrumental, being ultimately ordered towards the private good of individuals and 
families, some writers affirm that for Aquinas, the political common good consists in 
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the virtuous life of the political multitude, or what Aquinas calls ‘communal 
happiness’.48  These writers suggest that Aquinas is clear in stating that persons have 
a natural inclination to life in political society and can only achieve their fulfilment 
through participation in political community, and they maintain in this regard that 
political community must be understood as being an intrinsic good rather than 
merely an instrumental means for persons’ private pursuit of flourishing in the basic 
goods.
49
  Furthermore, while Finnis asserts that the role of political authority and law 
is only to provide the justice and peace necessary for persons to pursue the good life 
themselves, a number of scholars claim that for Aquinas, the primary purpose of law 
and government is to lead persons towards virtue.  John Goyette, for example, notes  
that Aquinas points to the significance of human law not only for restraining the 
unruly, but also for helping those who are well disposed to grow in virtue by making 
the precepts of the natural law more specific; Goyette reads Aquinas as affirming that 
law’s ultimate end is to produce virtue in persons; with maintaining peace being an 
intermediate purpose.
50
  Other writers similarly argue that Aquinas states in 
unequivocal terms that a ruler is responsible for leading his subjects to the fullness of 
virtue, and not simply for promoting the limited extent of virtue required in persons 
for the sake of preserving the public goods of justice and peace.
51
 
Some remarks in response to these criticisms are appropriate.  First, as noted 
earlier, Finnis affirms that apart from conceptualising the common good as a set of 
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conditions that facilitate the flourishing of members of a community, the common 
good may also be properly understood as signifying the flourishing of a community 
as a whole, encompassing the fulfilment of all of its members; Finnis describes this 
as the ‘all-inclusive common good’.52  Inasmuch as Finnis acknowledges that there is 
a sense in which integral human fulfilment is genuinely communal, and that a 
person’s full flourishing occurs in part though instances of mutual self-realisation 
such as authentic friendships,
53
 it is arguably incorrect to claim that Finnis’s 
understanding of the common good is based on a characterisation of persons as 
‘atomic wholes’.  It is nonetheless true that while Finnis regards persons as parts of a 
complete community, he does not regard that community as making persons whole in 
terms of their essential ability to participate in the basic human goods: for Finnis, 
individuals and families directly instantiate the basic values, and the significance of 
complete community as ‘complete’ relates to its ability to provide individuals and 
groups within the community with all of the conditions and resources – that is, the 
‘instrumental goods’ – that are necessary for them to pursue the basic goods.54 
Second, it is evident that much of the dispute over Finnis’s description of the 
political common good stems from disagreement between Finnis and his critics over 
the proper construal of Aquinas’s writings.  As many of these same scholars have 
acknowledged, several of the relevant parts of Aquinas’s texts are susceptible to 
varying interpretations, and discrete passages may be found across Aquinas’s works 
that appear to provide support for the arguments advanced by both Finnis and his 
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detractors.
55
  Conflicts in textual interpretation aside, however, it should be noted 
that Finnis’s approach to describing the public good coincides with his overall 
understanding of the autonomy and responsibility of persons in relation to the 
objective of human flourishing.  Finnis is concerned not merely to observe that 
Aquinas’s public good is properly understood as being instrumental in character, but 
also to affirm that persons enjoy a fundamental domain of both freedom and 
responsibility for the pursuit of virtue in the basic goods, and that in this regard 
neither the political community nor the organs of state government and law can 
substitute or override the responsibility of individuals and families for pursuing their 
own fulfilment.
56
 
Finally, the various criticisms of Finnis’s account of the common good do not 
detract from the compelling idea that is contained within his description, namely that 
there are certain conditions that are indispensable for human pursuit of the basic 
values.  This insight remains cogent regardless of whether life in political community 
is characterised as an intrinsic or an instrumental good, or whether law and political 
authority are construed as having a partial or all-encompassing role in relation to the 
development of virtue in persons.  Finnis’s conditions-based characterisation of the 
common good is significant for the manner in which it highlights the contingency of 
human flourishing, and the importance of collaboration by members of a community 
for securing the conditions that facilitate their overall  welfare. 
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3.  ‘Instrumentalist’ versus ‘Aggregative’ Conceptions of the Common Good 
   
Another contemporary natural law theorist, Mark Murphy, offers an 
alternative description of the common good.  Murphy advances an ‘aggregative 
conception’ of the common good, which he describes as “that state of affairs in 
which all the members of a political community are fully flourishing.”57  The 
aggregative conception begins from the premise that the state of affairs in which a 
person is flourishing provides a fundamental reason for political action within that 
person’s political community.58  According to Murphy, the state of affairs in which 
more than one person is flourishing constitutes an even stronger reason for political 
action, since it includes the goods of all those persons and thereby encompasses more 
than the goods corresponding to the state of affairs in which only one person is 
flourishing.
59
  The ideal of the aggregative common good, Murphy concludes, is a 
logical extension of this line of reasoning about the common good, and includes all 
the goods of all the members of a political community.
60
   
In certain respects, Murphy’s conception of the common good is not radically 
different to that of Finnis.  In describing a state of affairs in which all persons are 
fully flourishing, the aggregative common good mirrors the ideal of integral human 
fulfilment that Finnis identifies as the guiding objective of the first principle of 
morality; the requirement to promote the common good, it will be recalled, is 
described by Finnis as being a specification of this master moral principle
 61
  It may 
also be noted that for both theorists, the full flourishing of persons is understood not 
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so much as an attainable objective as an ideal that is to guide human pursuit of the 
basic values.
62
  Nevertheless, an important distinction is to be noted in Murphy’s and 
Finnis’s respective characterisations of the common good.  Under Finnis’s 
conditions-based account, the common good is a pathway towards integral human 
fulfilment: the common good is described as the set of conditions that facilitates 
pursuit of this ideal.  Murphy accordingly characterises Finnis’s description of the 
common good as ‘instrumentalist’.63  For Murphy, meanwhile, the aggregative 
common good is the state of affairs in which all members of a political community 
are fully flourishing; put another way, Murphy’s conception equates the common 
good with the ideal of integral human fulfilment.   
Murphy asserts that the aggregative conception of the common good is 
superior to the instrumentalist conception since, in relation to explaining both the 
rationale for allegiance to the common good and the sense in which this good is 
‘common’, the instrumentalist conception ultimately depends upon the aggregative 
conception for its normative coherence.  According to Murphy, the explanation for 
why persons are bound to promote the common good of their communities, which is 
described by Finnis as a requirement of practical reasonableness, cannot be found in 
the concept of the common good itself if this is nothing more than an instrumental 
good, since practical rationality is not reasonably governed solely by considerations 
of instrumental good.
 64
  The requirement to promote the common good, Murphy 
claims, only makes sense if it can be related to the intrinsic goods to which the 
common good is instrumental; for Murphy, this entails having regard to the full 
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flourishing of persons in community as described under the aggregative conception.
65
  
Murphy further argues that under the instrumentalist conception, the common good 
is not genuinely ‘common’: since, according to Murphy, the instrumental common 
good is valued by each person as a means to the pursuit of his or her own particular 
objectives, it follows that persons are not actually engaged in the pursuit of a 
common end, but are only interested in that aspect of the common good that is good 
for each person individually.
66
  Murphy posits that the instrumental common good 
can only be genuinely common if it is related to the objective of realizing the full 
flourishing of all persons in a community, the state of affairs described by the 
aggregative common good.
67
 
As noted earlier, Finnis has affirmed the sense in which the common good 
can be understood as signifying the intrinsically desirable flourishing of a 
community; as such, his conception of the common good is not exclusively 
instrumentalist as Murphy suggests.
68
  Nevertheless, to the extent that Finnis's 
conditions-based description of the common good is indeed instrumental in 
character, the substance of Murphy's critique remains pertinent.  In responding to 
Murphy's claims, the issue of 'commonness' may be dealt with first.  As already seen, 
Finnis describes the common good as a shared objective, the rationale for the 
collaboration of persons in a community.
69
 The shared objective is a set of conditions 
that facilitates the flourishing of the members the community; it is a common reality 
for all of these persons that this set of conditions must be present in order for each of 
them to pursue his or her personal development.  It is thus not apparent that under 
Finnis's characterisation of the common good, individuals are engaged in pursuit of 
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an objective that is not genuinely common: on the contrary, the objective is common 
in the sense that it is shared, and it is of common significance to the members of the 
community relative to their respective pursuits of individual fulfilment.  The 
aggregative conception of the common good does not appear to add anything to the 
authentic 'commonness' of Finnis's common good as described. 
This leaves for consideration Murphy's argument regarding the normative 
force of the common good.  In asserting the inability of the instrumentalist 
conception to explain why persons are required to promote the common good, 
Murphy emphasizes that practical reason is only governed by reference to intrinsic 
goods to which the instrumental goods are instrumental.
70
  Murphy’s claim is that the 
aggregative common good is capable of exerting normative influence in relation to 
practical reason since it is itself characterised as an intrinsic good, comprised of the 
flourishing of all persons in all the basic goods.  It is not apparent, however, that 
acknowledging the fundamental status of intrinsic goods as guides to human conduct 
entails diminishing the significance of instrumental goods in the process of practical 
reasoning.  As Finnis notes, practical reasoning, which is a process of responding to 
the directiveness of the ends that are the basic goods, crucially involves the exercise 
of determining the relationship of these ends to each other as well as the means for 
realizing them.
71
  It may be thus be affirmed that instrumental goods do possess an 
ancillary normative significance to practical thought: instrumental goods themselves 
constitute reasons for acting, since they are  means towards the realisation of the 
basic values.
72
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This observation brings to light the strength of Finnis's conception of the 
common good, and the reason why it is here taken to be preferable to the aggregative 
conception.  The characterisation of the common good as a set of conditions that 
facilitates human pursuit of the basic values, rather than as a state of affairs that itself 
denotes the full flourishing of persons, allows for a better appreciation of the 
significance of instrumental goods in relation to human fulfilment and practical 
reasoning.  This point may be illustrated by considering the notion of security within 
a political community.  National security is not itself a basic human good, but has 
obvious implications for the ability of members of a political community to carry out 
their various life plans.  Murphy's characterisation of the common good affords little  
room for highlighting the significance of national security as an instrumental good: 
this conception describes a state of affairs in which all persons in a community are 
fully flourishing, without acknowledging the conditional nature of human flourishing 
and the factors that are necessary to realising the envisaged state of affairs.  By 
contrast, under Finnis's conditions-based conceptualisation, the concept of 
safeguarding members of a political community against internal or external threats to 
their safety can be appreciated for its role in contributing to a community 
environment in which persons are able to pursue the basic values, and can thus be 
readily described as an important component of the community’s common good to 
be pursued for the sake of human well-being. 
4.  Significance of the Common Good in New Natural Law Theory 
 
The concept of the common good comprehensively informs new natural law 
jurisprudence and political philosophy.  The new classical theory interprets the 
concepts of authority, law, and obligation in terms of their relationship to the 
objective of securing the common good of the political community.  The theory 
61 
 
further characterises justice and human rights as fundamental aspects of the content 
of the common good, and claims that both authority and legal obligation are 
contingent upon the extent to which law and political authority further the common 
good.  Each of these claims will now be briefly described. 
New natural law theory explains the concept of authority as a function of the 
needs of a complete community for its common good.  According to Finnis, life in a 
political community is characterised by a need for coordination of the multiple 
pursuits of individuals and groups within that community, and the resolution of 
‘coordination problems’ which typically requires the selection of a particular course 
of action from a plurality of reasonable options.
73
  Finnis claims that the basis of 
authority is the opportunity it provides to further the common good of a community 
by resolving that community’s coordination problems.74  As Finnis further explains, 
the principle that authority is necessary for the common good is fundamental to the 
ability of a ruler to be regarded by members of a political community as providing 
exclusionary reasons for complying with the ruler’s dictates.75  
According to the new classical theory, 'law' in its focal meaning signifies 
rules made by a determinate authority for a complete community, and directed to 
reasonably resolving the community's coordination problems for its common good.
76
  
As with the concept of authority, law is described in terms of its purpose, namely 
furthering the common good of a political community.  The characteristics of legal 
order, according to the theory, are themselves also relevant to the aim of realising the 
common good.  As Finnis explains, legal order and the requirements of the Rule of 
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Law (stipulating for example that laws should be purely prospective, clear, 
promulgated, and relatively stable) bring greater clarity and predictability to patterns 
of human interaction and protect individuals against certain forms of exploitation by 
those in authority in a community; these benefits in turn enhance the ability of 
individuals to constitute themselves as they see fit.
77
   
New natural law theory affirms that legal obligation proceeds from the 
principle that the common good requires that members of a community comply with 
legal stipulations laid down as authoritative solutions to the community's 
coordination problems.
78
  The theory’s characterisation of legal obligation thus 
dovetails with its explanation of authority, with both concepts being explained by 
reference to the needs of the common good.  New natural law theory further asserts 
that, because of its relationship to furthering the common good, legal obligation is 
fundamentally a form of moral obligation.  According to Finnis, the complex 
coordination and regulation of community life for the common good that is sought 
through law can only be successfully achieved if members of the community take 
their legal obligations seriously, and afford these obligations priority over any 
contrary personal objectives or preferences.
79
     
Finally, the new classical theory claims that the authority of rulers and that of 
legal rules are crucially contingent upon whether such rulers and laws promote the 
common good, in particular through respect for considerations of justice and human 
rights.  Finnis describes justice as a relational concept, concerned with the 
specification of rights and duties between persons and with the determination and 
maintenance of appropriate equilibrium in interpersonal relationships.
80
  According 
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to Finnis, the requirements of justice are the implications of the requirement of 
practical reasonableness stipulating that persons should promote the common good 
of their communities.
81
  These requirements are principles that must be universally 
observed if members of a community are to be able to pursue their respective 
objectives without undue interference from others; they may thus be described as 
collectively forming part of the content of the common good, a component of the set 
of conditions that facilitate individual flourishing.  New natural law theory further 
identifies human rights as giving particular expression to the requirements of justice, 
specifying the multiple aspects of individual well-being that are to be respected by 
others in the context of community life.
82
  The preservation of human rights, as 
Finnis affirms, is an essential dimension of the common good.
83
 
Since, according to new natural law theory, authority is premised upon the 
opportunity it provides for promoting the common good, authority is fundamentally 
deficient where it is exercised in a manner contrary to the common good.  Focusing 
on legal rules, Finnis specifies that the presumptive moral authority of laws is 
compromised where laws are unjust: injustice arises, for example, where laws further 
private or partisan advantage, impose an unfair distribution of benefits and burdens 
among different individuals or groups within a community, or violate individual 
human rights.
84
  The new classical theory further claims that where laws do not 
promote the common good, this has attendant negative consequences for the moral 
obligation to obey them: Finnis indicates that unjust laws do not of themselves create 
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any moral duty of compliance, even though they may remain binding in formal legal 
terms.
85
 
 
III.  Applying the New Natural Law Conception of the Common Good to the 
Global Sphere 
Having identified the characteristics and significance of the new natural law 
conception of the common good, it remains to consider the relevance of this 
conception for deriving a normative understanding of the world community, its 
objectives, and the international legal and political mechanisms pertinent to these 
objectives.  This section begins to address this task, applying the new natural law 
conception in the articulation of a theory regarding the nature of the world 
community and the common good of this community, and outlining the putative 
normative implications of the new classical conception of the common good for 
international law.   
1.  Universal Human Community and International Community 
  
As Finnis demonstrated, the notion of a common good presupposes the 
existence of a community.  It is accordingly appropriate to begin the present 
discussion by considering the existence and nature of the community that is the 
subject of the themes addressed in this thesis, namely the world community.  This 
community, it is suggested, has two dimensions.  The first dimension is comprised of 
the universal community of human persons.  This community, as Finnis affirms, is 
defined by a number of features, including the shared physical and biological 
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characteristics of human beings, their shared resources of knowledge and culture, and 
their unity in the practical pursuit of various shared objectives.
86
   
Consideration of the political realities of the world community suggests the 
existence of a second dimension of community, namely a universal community of 
sovereign states.  This community, which may also be called the international 
community of states, exists as a distinct political overlay to the universal community 
of persons and is the primary community that is governed by international law.  
Although it necessarily does not manifest all the hallmarks of unity witnessed in the 
universal human community, international community is notably characterised by the 
collaboration of states in the pursuit of shared goals. 
If the idea of an international community of states is to be reconciled with 
new natural law theory, which does not contemplate community in non-human terms, 
it appears that the concept of an international community must be understood as 
being importantly linked to that of a universal community of persons.  The latter 
community may be described as subsisting notionally as the community that 
expresses the essential unity of all human persons; in actual terms, this community is 
divided through circumstances of geography, culture, history and individual agency 
into the multiplicity of political communities that are characteristic of contemporary 
global life.  Thus construed, the universal community of persons may be said to 
constitute the substratum of the international community of states. 
It is relevant at this juncture to consider the relationship between the world 
community and the idea of ‘complete community’ commonly invoked by new 
natural law theorists.  As Finnis and other new natural law theorists have observed, 
the state is not actually a complete community, since no state is able to independently 
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secure all of the conditions for facilitating the flourishing of its inhabitants.
87
  Noting 
the multiple ways in which human association transcends state boundaries, Finnis 
suggests that it now appears that individual human welfare can only be fully secured 
in the context of what he calls ‘international community’.88  While Finnis in using 
this term does not distinguish between persons and states, his later work makes clear 
that he is referring to human community, or what is here being called the universal 
community of persons.
89
  Robert George likewise affirms the emerging significance 
of the ‘international community’ as a complete community, noting that the 
collaboration of states and the related activity of international institutions are 
enabling this community to function as a community “whose politics, law and 
common good are paradigmatic and focal”.90  Expressing a contrary view, Paolo 
Carozza  maintains that the world community is not likely to replace more local 
communities as the paradigmatic complete community; among other arguments, 
Carozza observes that the universal community of persons exists only indirectly 
through states rather than being a real, effective community, and that persons regard 
more local communities as their primary avenue for securing their overall well-being 
because of their various historical, cultural and other ties to such communities.
91
 
It may be suggested that a proper understanding of the manner in which the 
world community connects to the concept of complete community lies somewhere 
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between the accounts of Finnis and George on the one hand and Carozza on the 
other, and indeed requires a reinterpretation of the latter concept.  Given the 
contemporary interconnectedness of the universal human community across national 
boundaries, manifested in particular by the complex collaborative activities of states 
within the international community, it is evident that the state cannot be regarded as a 
paradigmatic instance of complete community.  At the same time, it must also be 
acknowledged that neither the universal human community nor the international 
community of states can be seen as meeting the definition of complete community.   
The existence of the universal community of persons, as already noted, is 
importantly mediated by the state framework; while Finnis may claim that this 
community is in principle capable of becoming a perfecta communitas, it is difficult 
to see (absent the dissolution of all states into a single global political community) 
how this would be realised in practice.  The international community, meanwhile, 
does not in fact seek to function as a complete community: rather, this community 
appears to collaborate to achieve objectives that cannot be achieved by states acting 
individually.  Its activity in this regard indeed seems consistent with the principle of 
subsidiarity: it is precisely the objectives that cannot be achieved by a lower level of 
association – that is, within national political communities – rather than the 
objectives that can be dealt with at the national level, that are sought to be addressed 
through international collaboration. 
The seeming conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that there is 
indeed no paradigmatic instance of ‘complete community’.  This invites 
reconsideration of the notion of complete community itself, which appears to involve 
the questionable assumption that such a community is possible – that is, that it is 
actually possible to have a single, all-encompassing association that can secure all 
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the conditions necessary for human flourishing, and that can coordinate all the 
activities of individuals and intermediate associations towards this end.  Arguably, 
the notion of complete community is itself what Finnis describes as a ‘central case’ 
concept: the term in its focal meaning describes a community possessing all relevant 
characteristics of a complete community, but it can also be used to describe 
communities that display these characteristics to a lesser degree.
92
  It may be further 
suggested that there is little apparent practical significance to resolving the debate 
over whether the national or universal community constitutes the paradigmatic 
instance of complete community.  The real value of the idea of complete community, 
implicit in Finnis’s writings, is its utility as an explanatory tool in relation to the 
concepts of authority and obligation: a community that is capable of realising all of 
the conditions necessary for our well-being is, in principle, a community which 
merits our full allegiance.
93
   
The concept of complete community, it appears, is accordingly best 
understood as an ideal which existing communities approximate to a greater or lesser 
degree.  Using this characterisation of the concept, it may be suggested that the world 
community does not constitute the central case of complete community, but rather 
contributes to pursuit of the ideal of complete community.  In particular, the 
international community of states may be seen as complementing the activity of 
national political communities and contributing to the ideal of securing all aspects of 
human flourishing, by seeking to attend to certain dimensions of human welfare 
through international cooperation. 
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2.  The Universal Common Good and the International Common Good 
   
Having outlined the nature and characteristics of the world community, it is 
necessary to articulate a conception of the common good of this community.  If the 
world community is considered strictly as the community of all human persons, then 
it seems that Finnis’s general conditions-based characterisation of the common good 
can be taken as itself describing the common good of this community: the overall set 
of conditions that enables members of the universal human community to carry out 
their own objectives can be understood as constituting what may be called the 
‘universal common good’.94  Since, however, the world community is here being 
posited as being both a community of persons and a community of states, it appears 
relevant to suggest a further, more specialised conception of the common good that is 
a subset of the universal common good and pertains particularly to the international 
community of states.  Proceeding from Finnis’s conditions-based description, this 
‘international common good’ may be defined as follows: a set of supranational 
conditions that facilitates the ability of members of the universal human community 
to pursue the basic values for themselves, and that accordingly justifies the 
collaboration of those persons, such collaboration occurring primarily through the 
framework of states in the international community.  This definition of the 
international common good reflects the new natural law affirmation that the common 
good is fundamentally the good of persons – namely, the individuals, families, and 
other groups comprising the universal human community who either singly or 
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collectively seek their fulfilment in the basic human goods – while simultaneously 
indicating that pursuit of the conditions comprising the international common good 
specifically entails international collaboration, in particular the collaboration of 
governments as representatives of the interests of persons residing within states.   
The conditions comprising the international common good, like those 
comprising the universal common good, are conditions that are instrumental to the 
pursuit of human flourishing.  These conditions are however distinguished by their 
supranational quality and the corresponding fact that they require specific forms of 
international cooperation for their realisation.  Certain conditions relevant to human 
welfare are inherently matters that are beyond the ability of any single political 
community to achieve and require collective action on the part of states.  While non-
state actors such as corporations, non-governmental organisations, and individuals in 
their private capacities may also contribute to the realisation of these supranational 
conditions, national governments have a particular responsibility in this regard due to 
the comprehensive authority they enjoy over their respective national communities, 
their responsibility for promoting the common good of these communities, and their 
ability to effectuate the forms of international collaboration that the pursuit of 
supranational conditions entails. 
The international common good is certain respects analogous to the idea of 
the ‘public good’ as described by Finnis, inasmuch as it is comprised of instrumental 
goods that provide essential support for pursuit of the basic values by persons 
residing within states.  These instrumental goods, however, are identified by having 
regard to the needs of the world community as a whole rather than those of persons 
within a discrete national political community; as supranational conditions, 
furthermore, they are goods that cannot be properly secured by any state acting in 
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isolation, apart from being beyond the capacity of individuals and groups within 
states to achieve by themselves.  These conditions, it is suggested, notably include 
international peace, or the absence of political, military, economic or other forms of 
hostility between states, and international security, or the protection of national 
political communities against external acts of aggression by other states or non-state 
actors.  Other important components of the international common good are a global 
environment that can sustain human life, entailing the preservation of the earth’s 
natural resources and atmosphere, and the availability to all populations worldwide 
of the range of global resources and commodities needed for human flourishing, 
entailing specific forms of international collaboration such as trade.  Finally, the 
international common good may be said to encompass the supranational mechanisms 
and institutions that are themselves valuable for securing these instrumental goods, in 
particular international authority and international law. 
It should be noted that there is no hierarchy of value among the conditions 
cited.  Just as the basic human goods are, according to new natural law theory, all 
equally fundamental,
95
 it may be affirmed that the supranational conditions 
comprising the international common good are equivalent in their instrumental 
significance to the ability of persons within states to pursue the basic human values.  
At the same time, it may be suggested that just as persons can reasonably give 
priority to pursing some basic goods over others in their own lives (without thereby 
suggesting that the goods they choose not to pursue are less important),
96
 the 
international community can reasonably prioritise the pursuit of certain supranational 
conditions over others, through specification of the manner in which these conditions 
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are to be pursued, where such prioritisation would itself be beneficial to the objective 
of furthering universal human welfare.
97
   
It may additionally be observed that there cannot be conflicts between the 
components of the international common good.  All of the conditions comprising the 
international common good are, in their instrumental character, similarly 
complementary to the objective of facilitating human flourishing; as between these 
conditions, then, a conflict cannot arise unless one of the conditions is understood as 
being detrimental rather than beneficial to human welfare.  Properly understood, 
situations involving an apparent conflict between the conditions comprising the 
international common good are situations in which the conflict relates to some 
dimension of the pursuit of these conditions in specific contexts.  For example, there 
may be a conflict in the operation of two international laws that are related to distinct 
aspects of the international common good, if each of these laws has not been 
formulated in a manner that contemplates and addresses its potential impact on the 
functioning of the other law.  Similarly, states may find themselves faced with 
‘conflicting obligations’ relating to two international norms that concern different 
dimensions of the international common good, in circumstances where inadequacies 
in the formulation of international norms or the structural features of the international 
legal order entail that it is impossible for states to comply with one norm without 
breaching another international legal obligation.
98
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3.  The International Common Good as the Basis of Normativity in International      
     Law 
 
Just as the concept of the common good comprehensively informs new 
natural law jurisprudence and political philosophy, the idea of the international 
common good may be posited as the foundation for the articulation of normative 
propositions regarding the purpose of international authority and international law, 
the moral criteria for the content of positive international law, and the nature of 
international legal obligation.  These will be briefly outlined below. 
First, it may be suggested that international authority and international law 
have a moral purpose, namely to promote the international common good.  Like any 
national political community, the international community of states faces a complex 
set of coordination problems.  These problems, such as managing the appropriation 
by multiple states of shared earthly resources or determining the appropriate terms of 
international commercial trade, relate directly or indirectly to the supranational 
conditions affecting the welfare of persons comprising the universal human 
community, and require definitive resolution through international cooperation in 
order that they do not become obstacles to human flourishing.  The moral objective 
of international institutional authority is to further the international common good by 
stipulating definitive solutions to the international community’s coordination 
problems.  International law should likewise be understood as having the moral 
purpose of promoting the international common good: international law is itself an 
instrument for the authoritative resolution of the abovementioned coordination 
problems, possessing specific legal characteristics that are particularly beneficial for 
facilitating coordination within the international community.
99
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Second, in order to fulfil its purpose of promoting the international common 
good, the content of international law should be in accordance with the requirements 
of justice.  In particular, this entails that positive international law should further and 
protect human rights, since such rights specify the basic aspects of human welfare 
that are to be respected as a matter of justice.  This also entails that positive 
international law should promote and safeguard the conditions comprising the 
international common good, since these conditions are necessary in order for persons 
to be able to enjoy their human rights.
100
 
Third, the obligation to obey international law should be understood as a form 
of moral obligation that is primarily explained by its relationship to furthering the 
international common good.  State compliance with international legal stipulations is 
necessary to facilitate the effectiveness of international law in addressing the 
coordination problems of the international community.  Thus construed, the 
adherence of states to their international legal obligations contributes to realising the 
supranational conditions that are instrumental to human flourishing.
101
 
 
IV.  Significance of the New Natural Law Conception of the Common Good as 
Applied to the Global Sphere 
1.  Relevance for Understanding Contemporary International Discourse 
 
The new natural law conception of the common good, as employed herein in 
articulating a normative theory about the world community and its international legal 
and political structures, may be seen as providing a touchstone for understanding and 
assessing the usages of the term ‘common good’ in modern international law and 
international affairs.  Having regard to the three usages of this term in international 
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discourse identified earlier, it may first be suggested that the common good should 
not be understood as signifying the ‘maximisation’ of human welfare.  According to 
the new classical theory, the objective of human flourishing that the common good 
facilitates is a multifaceted concept that is realised through countless varied forms of 
human participation in the basic goods; furthermore, the basic goods themselves are 
regarded under new natural law theory as having equal value and being incapable of 
commensuration.
102
  While, therefore, it is plausible to conceive of optimising the 
conditions that favour human flourishing – that is, to consider optimising the 
common good as this term is understood in new natural law theory – it is impossible 
from the perspective of the new classical theory to coherently specify a notion of 
promoting the greatest ‘net welfare’ of persons, whether as members of a particular 
state or grouping of states or as members of the universal human community. 
Second, it may be observed that the new natural law conception of the 
common good as applied to the global sphere is compatible with the characterisation 
of the common good as connoting a ‘mutual benefit’ or a ‘universally shared good’, 
but remains distinct in its explanatory character as compared to either of these 
interpretations.  As utilised in international discourse, the notions of mutual benefit 
and especially that of universal (rather than private) good tend to emphasise the  
‘commonness’ of the good involved; the significance of the common good as ‘good’ 
is largely assumed.  The interpretation of the common good based on new natural 
law theory affirms the ‘common’ dimension of this common good, inasmuch as it is 
premised on an understanding that the basic human goods are commonly good for all 
persons; at the same time, the new natural law conception provides an explicit and 
specific interpretation of the ‘goodness’ of the common good, describing the 
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universal common good and international common good as denoting instrumental 
goods that further human flourishing. 
It may be further suggested that the new natural law conception of the 
common good considered in its global application allows for a normative 
reinterpretation of the features of existing positive international law, illuminating the 
extent to which international law can be understood as being already framed in terms 
that correspond to the notion of the international common good.  The Charter of the 
United Nations, for example, indicates that the United Nations serves as “a centre for 
harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of… common ends”; among the 
ends the Charter cites are maintaining international peace and security, developing 
friendly relations among nations, and achieving international cooperation in solving 
international problems and promoting human rights and freedoms.
103
  The 1972 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment affirms 
that “[t]he protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue 
which affects the well-being of peoples… throughout the world; it is the urgent 
desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments.”104  In the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 2000, States reaffirm their support of the “universal aspirations for 
peace, cooperation and development” and their determination to achieve these 
“common objectives”.105  These international instruments may all be seen as 
articulating elements of the concept of the international common good.  The Charter 
and the Millennium Declaration highlight the themes of common ends and 
international cooperation, and they identify some of the shared objectives that have 
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been described herein as being components of the international common good.  The 
Stockholm Declaration identifies another one of these common objectives, namely 
the preservation of the global environment, and expressly recognises the link 
between this objective and human well-being. 
As articulated in relation to the global sphere, the new classical conception of 
the common good arguably also provides the best conceptual framework for 
interpreting the remarks of the United Nations Secretary-General cited at the outset 
of this chapter.  It is evident that Mr. Ban’s overview of certain current global 
challenges identifies concerns that are directly and indirectly relevant to human life, 
health, and multiple other dimensions of human flourishing.  In calling for collective 
action to be taken to address these challenges for the sake of our ‘common future’, 
Mr. Ban signals that the point of securing the common good is indeed to secure the 
welfare of humanity against those things that threaten it.  The notion of the 
international common good based on new natural law theory explicitly affirms this, 
drawing attention to the supranational conditions that comprise this common good 
and highlighting their instrumental significance for pursuit of the basic values by 
members of the universal human community.  
2.  Significance for International Legal Theory 
 
A conception of a universal common good formed part of the earliest 
articulations of international law doctrine in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries.  Both 
Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez expressed in varying terms the idea that 
international law exists for the sake of the common good of all persons; Suárez 
further specified that the common good of humanity is paramount to the particular 
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interests of states.
106
  Today, while the common good remains a significant concept 
within disciplines such as political philosophy and ethics, it is largely absent from 
discourse in international legal theory.
107
  While the bulk of scholarship in 
international legal theory is not explicitly normative, it may be noted that the curious 
neglect of the common good in this field extends even to the contemporary 
normative theories of international law, which affirm that international law should 
further moral objectives such as justice and the protection of human rights but which 
generally do not discuss the idea of a common good.
108
   
The new natural law conception of the common good articulated in this 
chapter is significant for drawing attention to an idea that not only has antecedents in 
international legal thought, but is also clearly alive in the vocabulary of international 
law and international affairs and accordingly merits consideration within 
international legal theory.  The foregoing account of the nature and importance of the 
common good of the world community supports an affirmation that pursuit of the 
international common good should be understood as a primary moral objective of 
international law.  Such a claim, which entails an assertion that international law’s 
proper aim is to secure the conditions that facilitate human welfare, presents a 
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University Press, 1999) at 62ff.  However, what Rawls means by the ‘common good’ in The Law of 
Peoples is not entirely clear, since the term is ensconced within the broader ‘common good idea of 
justice’ and never receives attention in its own right, and it is indeed the concept of justice rather than 
the common good that forms the centrepiece of Rawls’s theory of international relations. 
108
 See generally e.g., Allen Buchanan, Justice Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Fernando Tesón, A 
Philosophy of International Law (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998). 
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counterpoint to theories of international law that characterise the significance of this 
law in terms of its role in furthering the interests of states.
109
  At the same time, this 
claim introduces a new dimension to normative international law discourse regarding 
the ends that international law should further: while an interpretation of international 
law based on the new classical theory affirms that international law should promote 
justice and the protection of human rights, it also identifies a dynamic relationship 
between these goals and the objective of promoting the international common 
good.
110
 
A final point to be made regarding the new natural law notion of the common 
good for international legal theory is that, consistent with the centrality of the 
common good in the new natural law interpretation of fundamental concepts in legal 
and political theory, the concept of the international common good is foundational 
for deriving a normative understanding of the concepts of law, authority, and 
obligation in the international sphere.  The relationship between the international 
common good and these concepts has been outlined herein by way of introduction, 
and will be considered in further detail in subsequent chapters. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary global challenges have brought into sharp relief the 
interdependence of the universal human community and the need for international 
cooperation to address the threats to the welfare of present and future generations.  
This chapter has suggested that the new natural law conception of the common good 
provides the precise vocabulary for articulating the task at hand for the international 
community and for international law.  As has been explained herein, securing the 
                                                 
109
 See Chapter 5 at 208-16 below for further discussion. 
110
 See generally Chapter 4 for further discussion. 
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common good of the world community entails promoting and preserving the 
conditions that are essential to the ability of human beings to pursue the myriad 
dimensions of their self-development.  The importance of the international common 
good for human flourishing is what makes it the defining consideration in describing 
the moral purpose of international law. 
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Chapter 3 
Authority and Law in the International Sphere 
 
In the previous chapter, it was suggested that the idea of the international 
common good constitutes the starting point for articulating normative claims under 
new natural law theory regarding international law.  Building on this view, this 
chapter begins an exploration of the concepts that are central to new natural law 
theory in its political and legal dimensions and that are themselves related to the 
notion of the common good, with a view to identifying a normative account of the 
significance of the legal and institutional mechanisms of the international 
community.  The first two concepts to be considered in this regard are authority and 
law, distinct yet related concepts that are both relevant under the new classical theory 
to advancing the common good of a community.  
In relation to the notions of authority and law in the international sphere, this 
chapter makes three main claims.  First, it affirms that the moral purpose of authority 
in the international sphere is to further the international common good through 
addressing the coordination problems faced by the international community.  Second, 
it posits international law as a salient mechanism for addressing the coordination 
problems of the international community, and thus for furthering the international 
common good.  Third, it suggests that rules of positive international law give effect 
to natural law principles, and that these rules derive an important dimension of their 
authority, namely their moral authority, from their relationship to these principles.  
The new natural law account of authority and law in the international sphere, as this 
chapter further argues, provides an illuminating reference point for considering 
existing thought in international legal theory regarding these concepts; this account 
also appears to suggest certain implications concerning the responsibility of the 
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international community for the development of international law and institutions, 
and the forms that such development should take. 
The chapter begins with a description of the concepts of authority and law as 
these are understood in new natural law theory.  Proceeding from this, the chapter 
attempts to articulate a new natural law conception of authority and law specifically 
applicable to the international sphere, focusing on the three abovementioned claims 
regarding the purpose of authority in the international community, the significance of 
international law for this community, and the manner in which natural law principles 
exist as ‘higher’ law informing the content of positive international norms.  The third 
section of the chapter compares the putative claims of the new classical theory 
regarding international law and authority to two existing schools of thought within 
international legal theory: first, the traditional view that the authority of international 
law is based on state consent, and second, the ‘service conception’ of authority 
expressed by Joseph Raz and recently used by some normative international legal 
theorists to account for the legitimacy of international law.  Finally, the chapter 
briefly considers some implications of the new natural law account of international 
law and authority.  In this regard, the chapter discusses the need for international 
authority and the possible forms of such authority, the status of international custom 
in relation to the development of the international legal order, and the nature and 
authority of peremptory norms. 
 
I.  The New Natural Law Conception of Authority and Law 
 
1.  Authority 
 
According to Finnis, ‘authority’ connotes the presence of good and sufficient 
reasons, among persons subject to authority, for acting in accordance with that which 
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authority decrees.
1
  Finnis notes that authority is significant for its particular impact 
on practical deliberation: according to Finnis, the existence and exercise of authority 
gives rise to an ‘exclusionary reason’, that is, “a reason for judging or acting in the 
absence of understood reasons, or for disregarding at least some reasons which are 
understood and relevant and would in the absence of the exclusionary reason have 
sufficed to justify proceeding in some other way.”2 
The purpose of authority, according to Finnis, is to coordinate the activities of 
members of a community for its common good.  As already seen, new natural law 
theory maintains that the common good – the set of conditions that facilitates human 
pursuit of the basic values – constitutes a shared objective for members of a political 
community.
3
   Pursuit of the common good, however, may be reasonably done in a 
variety of ways, and members of a political community may arrive at divergent 
conclusions in this regard: there may be multiple plausible options, for example, for 
ensuring the security of the community against external threats, or for catering to the 
health needs of its ageing members.  The plurality of possibilities for realising the 
common good gives rise to what Finnis describes as ‘coordination problems’ – 
situations in which there is more than one reasonable manner of proceeding to 
address a particular issue, and where one of the available options must be selected in 
order to achieve progress.
4
  The need accordingly rises for definitive selection of a 
course of action that puts an end to deliberation within the community regarding 
other possibilities, and is recognised by the community as articulating the course of 
                                                 
1
 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
[Finnis NLNR] at 233-34. 
2
 Ibid. at 234 [footnote omitted, emphasis in original].  Finnis here adopts the conception of authority 
articulated by Joseph Raz: see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) at 35-48, 58-73. 
3
 See discussion in Chapter 2 at 45-46 above. 
4
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 1 at 232.  Finnis notes that his conception of a ‘coordination problem’ 
is analogous but not identical to the similarly-named concept that appears in the context of game 
theory: see ibid. at 468; John Finnis, “Law as Co-ordination” (1989) 2(1) Ratio Juris 97 [Finnis “Law 
as Co-ordination”] at 97-100.  
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action which is thenceforth to be universally followed for pursing the common good.  
Authority, according to Finnis, is the only means (apart from unanimity, which is 
practically impossible to achieve) for realising such resolution of coordination 
problems in a political community.
5
 
The foregoing account brings to light the extent to which new natural law 
theory interprets the significance of authority in terms of its relationship to the 
common good.  The common good, which is essential to furthering human 
fulfilment, requires that the coordination problems of a community be solved.  The 
new classical theory accordingly locates the basis of authority in the opportunity that 
authority presents for promoting the common good by resolving these problems.
6
  It 
may also be noted that by the terms of the new natural law characterisation of the 
common good, authority may itself be understood as being part of the common good: 
the resolution of a community’s coordination problems, and the means for resolving 
such problems, are themselves components of the set of conditions that facilitate 
human flourishing.   
Finnis, in discussing the authority of rulers, affirms that authority in a 
community “is to be exercised by those who can in fact effectively settle co-
ordination problems for that community.”7  This affirms the significance of a ruler's 
capacity to govern in justifying a claim to authority.
8
  According to Finnis, the 
principle that authority is a necessary good for the common good, and the fact that 
the dictates of a given person or body will be ‘effective’ for a particular community, 
                                                 
5
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 1 at 232-33. 
6
 See ibid. at 244. 
7
 See ibid at 246. 
8
 See Leslie Green, "The Duty to Govern" (2007) 13 Legal Theory 165 at 169. 
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together create the exclusionary reason that justifies a claim to and recognition of 
authority in relation to that person or entity.
9
   
The relatively limited criteria for the emergence of authority are to be 
distinguished from those that are necessary for the continued existence of authority.  
As Finnis asserts, a claim to authority based on the fact of effectiveness is defeasible: 
where a ruler issues decrees contrary to the requirements of practical reasonableness, 
this action may itself negate the existence, among the subjects of authority, of an 
exclusionary reason for compliance with the ruler’s dictates.10  The manner in which 
new natural law theory characterises the contingency of authority itself reaffirms the 
extent to which the theory links the concept of authority to the objective of furthering 
human well-being. 
2.  Law 
 
Finnis affirms that ‘law’ in its focal meaning refers to: 
[R]ules made, in accordance with regulative legal rules, by a determinate and 
effective authority (itself identified and, standardly, constituted as an institution by 
legal rules) for a ‘complete’ community, and buttressed by sanctions in 
accordance with the rule-giving stipulations of adjudicative institutions, this 
ensemble of rules and institutions being directed to reasonably resolving any of 
the community’s co-ordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regulating, 
or overriding co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or sources of 
norms) for the common good of that community, according to a manner and form 
itself adapted to that common good by features of specificity, minimization of 
arbitrariness, and maintenance of a quality of reciprocity between the subjects of 
the law both amongst themselves and in their relations with the lawful 
authorities.
11 
 
As with the concept of authority, Finnis’s description of law affirms that law’s 
essential function is to further the common good of a community through resolution 
                                                 
9
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 1 at 246. 
10
 See ibid. 
11
 Ibid at 276-77.  In relation to this definition of law, Finnis uses the terms ‘focal meaning’ and  
‘central case’ to express the idea that his definition describes the characteristics of law when all of its 
component elements are fully present, while simultaneously acknowledging that the term ‘law’ may 
also be used in relation to legal rules and systems that do not display these features to the fullest 
possible degree:  see ibid. at 10, 277. 
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of the community’s coordination problems.  Law’s particular value in relation to this 
objective derives from the ways in which it shapes and promotes patterns of 
coordination.  Law, according to Finnis, possesses specific characteristics that bring 
clarity, certainty, and predictability into human interactions.
12
  These characteristics 
enable a community to articulate the solutions to its coordination problems in a form 
that is clear and enduring, equally applicable to all members of the community, and 
not susceptible to change except through recognised legal procedures.   
In virtue of its formal features, as Finnis points out, law plays an important 
role in protecting individual autonomy and ensuring the preservation of justice in the 
coordination of life in community.  Underlying the notion of ‘coordination problems’ 
is the reality that persons’ interests may not only coincide, but also come into conflict 
as they pursue their individual life-plans.  For new natural law theorists, law is 
integral to upholding, in the context of community life, the requirement of practical 
reasonableness that forbids arbitrary self-preference in the pursuit of the basic 
values.
13
  Law and legal order, by this account, help to create a check on both 
individual members of a community and those in authority who may seek to pursue 
their own good at the expense of the welfare of others: law, in Finnis’s words, serves 
as “a fair method of relating benefits to burdens, and persons to persons” in relation 
to a vast and varied set of human interactions over time.
14
   
                                                 
12
 Finnis in this regard cites five ‘main features’ of legal order: these include the stability of legal rules 
(i.e., the fact that legal rules, once validly created, remain in force until otherwise altered by a valid 
act of repeal or amendment), and the enduring authoritativeness of juridical acts (i.e., the fact that past 
acts of legal enactment, amendment etc., continue to be valid for governing current and future 
practical deliberation). See ibid at 267-69.  According to Finnis, the criteria identified by other writers 
as requisites for a healthy legal system (the ‘Rule of Law’) – stipulating, for example, that rules 
should be prospective not retrospective, promulgated, and relatively stable – are themselves more 
detailed descriptions of qualities that instantiate the main features of legal order.  See ibid at 270-73; 
cf. e.g., Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), Chs. 2 & 5. 
13
 Finnis thus suggests that the authority of law “depends on its justice, or at least its ability to secure 
justice”: Finnis NLNR, ibid  at 260; cf. ibid at 106-8, 164. 
14
 Finnis “Law as Co-ordination”, supra note 4 at 102 [emphasis added]. 
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3.  Relationship Between Natural Law and Positive Law 
 
The new classical theory’s conceptualisation of law and legal order is 
complemented by an account of the relationship between natural law principles and 
positive law.  This reveals the theory’s multifaceted approach to accounting for the 
‘force’ of positive laws, bringing into play a distinction between legal and moral 
authority. 
For Aquinas, positive law may be derived from natural law in two ways, first, 
“as a conclusion from premises”, and second, “by way of determination of certain 
generalities”.15  Finnis retains Aquinas’s twofold characterization of the way in 
which positive law can be derived from natural law principles, but offers his own 
more detailed interpretation of this phenomenon.  First, Finnis affirms that there are 
some rules (such as the law of murder) that, in their content, bear close affinity to the 
principles of practical reason: these rules reflect conclusions derived from the 
combination of a principle affirming a basic good (for example, life) with one of the 
requirements of practical reasonableness (for example, the requirement that one is 
not to act directly against a basic value).
16
  Finnis suggests, however, that even in 
situations where the content of law closely corresponds to natural law principles, the 
actual process of translating these principles into legal rules – conforming to the 
features of law, suited to a particular branch of law and integrating coherently with 
the set of interrelated rules in a legal system – often requires a legislator to engage in 
                                                 
15
 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre 
Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981), Vol. 2, I-II, q. 95, a. 2.  The translation of the Summa Theologiae 
quoted by Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights states that rules are derived from natural law 
“like conclusions deduced from general principles” or “like implementations [determinations] of 
general directives”: see Finnis NLNR, supra note 1 at 284. 
16
 See ibid. at 282.  
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exercises of ‘determination’ of natural law principles rather than mere ‘deduction’ 
from them.
17
 
This leads to consideration of the second manner of deriving positive law 
from natural law principles, the idea of ‘determination’ that is applicable to the 
majority of rules within a legal system.  As Finnis notes, there may be multiple 
reasonable options for the formulation of a legal rule, and in this regard a legislator 
enjoys a significant   measure of freedom - it is up to her to choose what the precise 
formulation will be.
18
  Nonetheless, Finnis suggests that in settling upon the precise 
formulation of law, a legislator is in fact both implementing and being guided by 
principles of practical reason.  First, even though natural law principles do not 
directly specify what the content of the law is to be, the content of the chosen law 
demonstrates a rational relationship to objectives that are themselves implications of 
natural law principles prescribing the pursuit and preservation of basic human 
goods.
19
  Second, Finnis asserts that the process of formulating the law is itself 
governed by a range of formal and substantive principles of law that are themselves 
inferred from the principles of practical reason.
20
 
The assertions of new natural law theory regarding the influence of natural 
law principles in shaping positive law are echoed in the theory’s approach to 
interpreting the source of law’s authority.  Finnis, following Aquinas, affirms that a 
legislator’s act of choosing the particular form of a law is itself significant: in an 
important sense, the ‘force’ of law does indeed derive from the fact that it has been 
                                                 
17
 See ibid. at 282-84. 
18
 See ibid. at 285. 
19
 Finnis uses the example of a speed limit: such a limit furthers the objective of traffic safety, which 
as an objective follows from the principle that human life and bodily integrity is a good that is to be 
preserved.  See ibid. 
20
 Among the examples Finnis cites in this regard are the desiderata of the Rule of Law, and general 
principles of law such as pacta sunt servanda and the principles of natural justice: see ibid. at 286-89. 
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chosen and posited by the legislator.
21
  The authority of a particular legal stipulation 
may in this regard be seen as a subset of the broader authority of legal order, which 
derives from its salience as a mechanism for the resolution of a community’s 
coordination problems.
22
  In addition, however, to this formal, ‘legal’ authority of a 
given rule, Finnis indicates that there is a further relevant dimension of authority to 
be considered, namely authority ‘in reason’ or ‘moral’ authority.  The basis of the 
moral authority of a given rule, according to Finnis, is its consistency with natural 
law principles.
23
  For new natural law theory, in considering the ‘authority of law’ as 
this relates to the practical deliberation of the subjects of law, it is law’s moral 
authority that has ultimate significance.
24
 
 
II.  A New Natural Law Account of Authority and Law in the International 
Sphere 
 
The preceding description of new natural law theory’s conceptualisation of 
authority and law provides the framework for a rearticulation of these concepts in 
relation to the international sphere.  Three main points may be suggested in this 
regard.  First, authority in the international sphere should be understood in terms of 
its role in furthering the international common good.  Second, international law is a 
‘salient coordinator’ for resolving the coordination problems of the international 
community, and thus for promoting the international common good.  Third, the 
principles of practical reason inform the content of positive international law, and the 
authority of this law is importantly influenced by the quality of its relationship to 
these principles.  
                                                 
21
 See Aquinas, supra note 15; Finnis NLNR, supra note 1 at 285, 289.  
22
 See Finnis “Law as Co-ordination”, supra note 4 at 101-02. 
23
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 1 at 289. 
24
 This claim is explored further in Chapter 5 in relation to legal obligation. 
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1.  International Authority and the International Common Good 
 
From the perspective of the new classical theory, it is suggested, the moral 
purpose of ‘international authority’ – taken here as denoting a supranational 
institution having authority over states in relation to their international affairs, or in 
relation to the implementation of international norms – is to further the international 
common good through resolving the coordination problems of the international 
community of states.  States have multiple objectives pertaining to the interests of 
their populations that often both overlap and conflict with the equivalent or distinct 
objectives of other states.  This may be illustrated by reference to the dynamics of 
international trade.  The desire of a state to increase national revenue through 
exporting a particular natural resource may coincide with the need of several other 
states to import that same resource to support their respective national communities; 
at the same time, a state’s export objectives may come into competition with those of 
other states that similarly seek to export the same type of product to the same global 
markets.  Both of these scenarios give rise to a need for various forms of 
coordination.  There may be a need, for example, to standardise the terms (such as 
price and frequency of supply) on which various exporting countries provide a given 
natural resource to other countries, in order to avoid the incidence of arbitrary 
variations in these terms and thereby promote stability in trading relationships.
25
  
There may also be a need for ‘negative coordination’ such as introducing rules for 
trade to ensure that states are not impeded in achieving their export objectives due to 
                                                 
25
 The mission statement of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is 
illustrative. OPEC indicates that its role is “to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its 
Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic 
and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on 
capital for those investing in the petroleum industry”.  See OPEC, “Our Mission” online: Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm>; cf. 
OPEC Statute, online: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/OPEC_Statute.pd
f>, Art. 2. 
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an unfair advantage being afforded to a particular exporting state by a particular 
importing country.
26
 
The important contribution of new natural law theory to an understanding of 
international authority lies not merely in its claim that this form of authority exists to 
solve the coordination problems of the international community, but also in its more 
fundamental claim that such coordination is necessary to secure the international 
common good.  This latter claim, it should be noted, entails an understanding of the 
purpose of international authority that focuses ultimately on its relationship to the 
welfare of persons rather than that of states: for new natural law theory, international 
authority serves to coordinate states’ pursuits of their various objectives and resolve 
conflicts that may arise, and this endeavour assists in realising the supranational 
conditions that are favourable to the flourishing of members of the universal human 
community residing within states.  International authority, which plays an 
instrumental role in furthering human fulfilment, may itself be described as a 
component of the international common good. 
As already seen, Finnis maintains that authority uniquely influences practical 
deliberation among the subjects of authority by providing an exclusionary reason for 
acting in accordance with the content of an authoritative dictate.  This claim also has 
relevance for understanding the impact of international authority once it is accepted 
that practical deliberation is regularly exercised within the international community, 
and that this is done not by states but by persons.  The subjects of international 
authority, states, are governed by human rulers who possess practical reason and who 
themselves represent communities of practically reasonable persons within their 
                                                 
26
 Finnis affirms that coordination includes ensuring mutual non-interference and striving to avoid 
‘collisions’ in the pursuit of the common good by members of a community: see Finnis NLNR, supra 
note 1 at 138-39, 468.  An example of such negative coordination is seen in the ‘Most Favoured 
Nation’ principle in international trade law, which articulates a general rule of non-discrimination in 
trade.  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, Art. I:1. 
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respective territorial domains.  The phenomenon of ‘state consent’, on this account, 
may be described as being ultimately traceable to discernible decisions by specific 
persons within the governmental apparatus of national political communities, who 
have the authority to enter into international agreements on behalf of these 
communities and to implement the necessary steps within their respective countries 
for complying with such agreements. 
In the international sphere, it is suggested, the acquiescence of states to 
having their activities and interactions regulated by international authority may be 
interpreted as indicating that the governments of these states recognise the existence 
of sufficient reasons for treating a given international institution as authoritative.  
From the perspective of new natural law theory, the fundamental moral reason that 
should influence a state’s decision in this regard is the principle that authority in the 
international sphere is necessary for realising the international common good.  The 
decision by states to submit to international authority may also be interpreted as 
manifesting an acknowledgement on the part of national governments that such 
authority has the capacity to effectively settle coordination problems in a given area 
for the international community.  To the extent that such authority exists in the 
international sphere, it may be suggested that the presumption by states that a 
particular international authority can be effective for the international common good 
is at least partially explained by the fact that states themselves confer a supranational 
body with its power to settle coordination problems, invariably through concluding a 
multilateral instrument that establishes this body and defines its mandate.
27
 
                                                 
27
 The establishment of authority in the international sphere through conferral of capacity may be 
contrasted to the sheer ‘taking’ of power that has often characterised the initial emergence of authority 
in national political communities: see Finnis NLNR, supra note 1 at 251; John Finnis, “Natural Law: 
The Classical Tradition” in Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1 [Finnis “Natural 
Law: The Classical Tradition”] at 53. 
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2.  International Law as Salient Coordinator for the International Common Good 
 
The new classical theory affirms that law, because of its qualities, is a salient 
mechanism for the resolution of a community’s coordination problems.  This general 
claim regarding law has significance for deriving a normative understanding of the 
role of international law.  The international community of states, as already 
discussed, has a need for coordination of the multiple interactions of its state 
members as each state pursues a variety of endeavours aimed ultimately at securing 
the welfare of its inhabitants.  International law, it is suggested, both defines and 
fosters patterns of coordination through establishing legal frameworks and rules for 
the interactions of states.  Through these frameworks and the specific international 
norms they contain, states obtain clear guidance for determining the scope of 
permissible conduct in their interactions with other states or in their activities that 
may affect other states; this clarity enhances stability and predictability in inter-state 
relations, and thereby contributes to realising the supranational conditions that are 
beneficial to the flourishing of persons residing within states.   
The normative significance of international law as a salient coordinator may 
be illustrated by considering the emergence of the international rule regarding 
territorial waters, enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.
28
 Since at least the seventeenth century, states have sought to exercise 
jurisdiction over an area of water adjacent to their coastlines, an area that has become 
known as the ‘territorial sea’.29  The state practice of claiming territorial sea, a 
departure from the pre-existing ‘freedom of the seas’ doctrine that characterised the 
sea as common to all and incapable of being appropriated, arose primarily due to 
                                                 
28
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396 [Law of 
the Sea Convention]. 
29
 See Donald Rothwell & Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010) at 4, 59. 
94 
 
states’ need to secure their coastlines against foreign naval attacks; additionally, 
states became increasingly concerned with safeguarding the fish supplies in their 
coastal waters in the face of growing exploitation of these resources by foreign 
fishing vessels.
30
  Prior to the Law of the Sea Convention, there was significant 
variation in state practice regarding the breadth of a state’s territorial waters.  A 1960 
United Nations report on this issue indicated that 22 states at the time claimed a 
territorial sea area of three nautical miles;
31
 however, a total of 29 states claimed 
territorial sea areas in varying sizes of between 4 and 12 nautical miles, and one state 
had claimed a territorial sea area of 200 nautical miles.
32
   
Unsurprisingly, the great variations in states’ claims to territorial sea proved 
to be a source of uncertainty and growing conflict, manifested in overlapping 
territorial sea claims and disputes among states over access to coastal fish stocks and 
the valuable natural resources of the seabed that were increasingly discovered and 
extracted in the 20
th
 century.
33
  There was evident need for states to achieve common 
agreement regarding the scope of territorial waters; still, although codification of 
various aspects of the law of the sea progressed from 1958 onwards through a series 
of United Nations conferences, attempts at arriving at a rule on territorial sea limits 
                                                 
30
 See ibid. at 3-4. 
31
 The practice of claiming a territorial sea of three nautical miles evolved from the so-called ‘cannon-
shot’ rule articulated in the 18th century by the jurist Cornelius van Bynkershoek; this rule stipulated 
that a state was entitled to exercise sovereignty over its coastal waters up to the extreme range of a 
cannon shot from the shore.  See generally Wyndham L. Walker, “Territorial Waters: The Cannon 
Shot Rule” (1945) 22 B.Y.I.L. 210; see also Rothwell & Stephens, ibid. at 60-61. 
32
 See Synoptical table concerning the breadth and juridical status of the territorial sea and adjacent 
zones, Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Annex, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.19/4 (1960), online: United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1960/docs/english/vol1/a_conf-
19_4_ANNEXES.pdf>; Rothwell & Stevens, ibid at 67. 
33
 See generally United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (a historical perspective), online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Histori
cal%20Perspective>.  An example of such disputes is the ‘Cod Wars’ between the United Kingdom 
and Iceland in the 1950s, precipitated by Iceland’s progressive expansion of its territorial sea area 
from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles: see generally Hannes Jónsson, Friends in Conflict: The 
Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982), Chs. 3 & 4. 
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for all states were repeatedly unsuccessful.
34
  Finally, at the conclusion of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982, the Law of the Sea 
Convention was adopted.  This wide-ranging treaty includes a provision defining the 
maximum limit of territorial waters as 12 nautical miles;
35
 additional provisions 
specify areas beyond the territorial sea over which states may exercise certain forms 
of jurisdiction.
36
  Unofficial United Nations data indicates that as of 2011, 141 states 
have claimed a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, with a further two states claiming 
a territorial sea of less than 12 nautical miles; overall, 143 out of 150 states with 
proclaimed territorial sea areas have limits that are in compliance with the treaty.
37
 
The articulation of a legal rule regarding the territorial sea limit is regarded as a 
highly important contribution to the development of the law of the sea; more broadly, 
it has been observed that the Law of the Sea Convention “has provided a considerable 
measure of stability and predictability in the conduct of States with regard to marine 
activities.”38 
The foregoing account demonstrates the relevance of international law as a 
salient coordinator for the international common good.  Prior to the adoption of the 
Law of the Sea Convention, states asserted claims to territorial waters for the sake of 
achieving various objectives: foremost among these were ensuring national security, 
increasing national revenue, providing food and other resources for their own 
populations, and protecting the livelihoods of particular segments of their 
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 See Rothwell & Stephens, supra note 29 at 6-9. 
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 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 28, Art. 3.  The Convention also defines the normal coastal 
‘baseline’ from which the breadth of the territorial sea is to be measured: see ibid., Art. 5. 
36
 See ibid., Art. 33 (specifying the ‘contiguous zone’) and Parts V and VI (specifying the ‘exclusive 
economic zone’ and ‘continental shelf’’ respectively). 
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 See generally United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Table of claims to 
maritime jurisdiction (as at 15 July 2011), online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claim
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 L. Dolliver M. Nelson, “Reflections on the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea” in David 
Freestone, Richard Barnes & David Ong, eds., The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006) 28 at 29. 
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populations.  In the absence, however, of a universal rule governing the assertion of 
territorial sea claims, states’ pursuits of their respective objectives came into conflict 
with each other.  The unresolved coordination problems of states in relation to the 
territorial sea impaired the international common good: this impairment, reflected in 
the instances of inter-state aggression and the unregulated exploitation of sea 
resources, threatened the very objectives that states sought to achieve through their 
assertion of territorial sea claims, objectives that were themselves instrumental to 
furthering the flourishing of individuals and communities within their respective 
populations.  The Law of the Sea Convention provided the necessary framework for 
resolving these coordination problems, establishing a rule that sets clear parameters 
for the assertion of territorial sea claims and the exercise of sovereignty rights 
beyond the territorial sea area.  The rule establishing the territorial sea limit is 
equally applicable to all contracting parties and cannot be changed at the whim of 
any particular state.  It is not merely the fact that the territorial sea limit has been 
defined, but also the fact that it has been articulated as a treaty rule – in a form that is 
clear, impartial, and enduring – that explains the rule’s special value as a response to 
the coordination needs of states. 
The territorial sea rule is also useful in illustrating how international law in its 
coordination role assists in safeguarding autonomy and justice in the international 
community of states.  The territorial sea limit crucially satisfies a need for negative 
coordination: the rule affirms the full sovereignty of every state over a defined area 
of water beyond its territorial land mass, and thereby signals that other states have 
duties of non-interference in relation to this area.  This rule thus ensures the ability of 
states to act freely in relation to their territorial waters, allowing the governments of 
states to use and authorise the use of these waters as they see fit to achieve their 
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particular objectives.  At the same time, the positing of a uniform limit for all states 
puts an end to the arbitrariness that was once prevalent in states’ territorial sea 
assertions, a situation that lent itself to substantial variations in the size of territorial 
sea claims and a corresponding inequality among states in their opportunities for 
enjoyment of the strategic and economic benefits provided by the assertion of 
territorial sea jurisdiction.
39
  
It will be recalled that Finnis’s ‘central case’ definition of law contemplates a 
multifaceted matrix of substantive legal rules, procedural legal rules, legislative and 
judicial authority, and sanctions.
40
  Finnis has in this regard noted the extent to which 
international law lacks the features of this focal definition: in particular, he observes  
that there is no legislative, executive, or judicial institution having authority over the 
entire international community of states, due in part to the fact that “states tacitly 
concur in judging that no existing or envisageable authority could be relied upon to 
act with an effective justice sufficient to merit a general transfer or subordination of 
state jurisdiction to it.”41  Given the paradoxical nature of international law, which 
seems to operate as an authoritative legal order without any comprehensive 
corresponding institutional authority, Finnis concludes that international law 
“remains both descriptively and morally a relatively undeveloped, non-central case 
of law.”42  
The lack of a central political authority governing the entire international 
community, a general legislature for this community, and a court with jurisdiction 
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 This is not to suggest, of course, that a uniform territorial sea limit enables all states to enjoy the 
same strategic and economic benefits from their territorial waters, since the actual benefits for states 
will vary based on factors such as their geographic location and the particular fauna and natural 
resources present in their territorial waters.  The treaty rule does nevertheless go some way towards 
mitigating the possibility of injustice that arises if, for example, substantial differences exist between 
the territorial sea areas enjoyed by adjacent states due simply to the differing capacities of these states 
to claim and defend a territorial sea area. 
40
 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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 Finnis “Natural Law: The Classical Tradition”, supra note 27. 
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 Ibid. 
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over all states, as well as the absence of general sanctions for non-compliance with 
international law emanating from and enforced by a central authority, are the key 
respects in which international law is distinct from more conventional forms of legal 
order such as municipal law.  In virtue of these differences, international law has at 
times been described as a ‘primitive’ legal system.43  Some writers have of course 
gone further than this: John Austin famously described international law as ‘positive 
morality’ rather than law, while more recent neo-realist scholars, noting the 
pervasive influence of global political dynamics in the functioning of international 
law, have sought to characterise international law as being essentially political rather 
than legal.
44
 
Lest the atypical character of international law be thought problematic in the 
context of the present discussion, a few observations may be made regarding both the 
characteristics of modern international law and the issue of non-focality.  First, it 
may be noted that while Finnis affirms that international law is not a central case 
instance of law, he also suggests that international law should not be regarded as 
merely a primitive legal system, observing in this regard that international legal 
processes are, to an extent, “sophisticated applications” of general principles of law 
and legal doctrine.
45
  Arguably, one manifestation of the relative sophistication of the 
international legal system is the way in which the functioning of international treaties 
compensates to some extent for the lack of international institutions enjoying 
comprehensive authority, such a deficiency being one of the aspects of the non-
focality of international law.  It is evident that once a treaty enters into force, the 
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 See e.g. Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, Vol. 1 (London: Longman, Green & Co., 
1905) at 7; see also Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933) at 405 for discussion. 
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 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 1832) at 132, 
146-47; Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) at 201-02. 
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treaty itself becomes a primary source of authority for the states parties to the treaty, 
since the treaty terms themselves serve to coordinate the interactions of these parties.  
As already illustrated earlier in this section, the formal characteristics of treaties as 
legal instruments entail that treaties can be particularly beneficial to facilitating 
coordination.  It may also be noted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides states with a procedural framework for the creation, modification 
and termination of treaties;
46
 the fact that inter-state treaties are regulated in their 
functioning by a formally established and widely respected set of rules itself 
enhances the authority of treaties as instruments for addressing the coordination 
needs of states.  Thus, to the extent that treaties, while being laws, also function as a 
form of de facto political authority in the international community in the absence of a 
central institutional authority, it may be argued that this feature of the international 
legal order attenuates the degree of its non-focality.    
It should also be noted that while international law is non-focal, not all 
international law is non-focal to the same extent.  As is well known, the international 
legal system is not susceptible of simple description as a legal order: the term 
‘international law’ in fact encompasses differing sources of law (in particular, 
treaties and international custom), as well as a range of distinct legal regimes 
governing multiple aspects of inter-state relations.  Some of these ‘sub-regimes’ of 
international law themselves demonstrate a significant level of affinity to the central 
case of law.  One field in which this is seen is international trade law, in the 
functioning of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’).  Established in 1995, the 
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 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 [Vienna 
Convention].  While the Vienna Convention has not been ratified by all states, it is regularly treated as 
an authoritative guide to treaty creation and modification even by non-party states: see Anthony Aust, 
“Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, online: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
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WTO constitutes a comprehensive institutional framework for the coordination of the 
multilateral trade system and implementation of the norms of trade liberalisation 
contained in the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and related WTO 
agreements.
47
  The WTO system includes a defined body of treaty norms for 
international trade, an institutional forum for supervising international trade and 
promoting trade liberalisation, and a sophisticated dispute settlement mechanism for 
the resolution of trade disputes between WTO member states.
48
  The international 
trade law regime of the WTO may be described as one of the sectors of international 
law that goes furthest in embodying the features of the focal definition of law.   
Finally, notwithstanding the above considerations suggesting the need for a 
nuanced understanding of the idea that international law is non-focal, it is important 
to observe that the non-focality of international law is not an obstacle to the 
articulation of normative claims regarding international law.  Finnis emphasises that 
his purpose in employing the concept of the central case in relation to law is not to 
expel non-central cases to another discipline as ‘non-law’, but to identify the features 
of law in its fully instantiated form and thereby allow for differentiation between 
more and less fully developed forms of legal order.
49
  For new natural law theorists, 
then, the fact that international law is a non-focal instance of law does not entail that 
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 The WTO is an important advance over its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
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101 
 
it is not to be regarded as ‘law’.  Nor is it the claim of new natural law theory that 
only focal instances of law serve moral ends: rather, the theory characterises law as a 
response to moral needs (specifically, the need for coordination in a community) and 
affirms that law serves such needs in a particularly useful way in virtue of its formal 
features, a claim which implies that instances of law possessing more or less of these 
features may serve those moral needs with greater or lesser effectiveness.  It may 
thus be affirmed that precisely because international law is indeed ‘law’ from the 
perspective of the new classical theory, it remains a fully eligible candidate for 
discussion of its coordination function construed in relation to its ascribed moral 
purpose of promoting the international common good.  While many formal features 
of international law, and the regular vulnerability of international law to assertions of 
sovereignty and state interest in the international sphere, combine to render this legal 
order different in several respects from the central case of law, this fact does not in 
itself preclude consideration of the normative importance of international law as a 
salient coordinator.  The utility for normative purposes of the notion of the central 
case of law is that it can be used as a reference point for analysing the existing 
features of the international legal order, with a view to identifying the ways in which 
international law might be structured differently in order to better promote the 
international common good. 
3.  Natural Law Principles as Higher Law in the International Sphere 
 
As seen earlier, new natural law theory not only presents its own account of 
the concepts of authority and law, but also claims that all positive law is to some 
degree linked to natural law principles and that the authoritativeness of positive law 
is contingent upon its consistency with the principles of practical reason.  It is 
accordingly appropriate to consider the theory’s implications for understanding the 
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relationship between natural law principles and the norms of positive international 
law.  In this regard, it may be suggested that, as with positive law in the domestic 
context, the principles of practical reason constitute a form of ‘higher’ law that 
informs the formulation of positive international law, and that natural law principles 
have an important bearing upon the authoritativeness of international rules. 
An example of the influence of natural law principles in the determination of 
positive international law is seen in the norm prohibiting the use of aggressive armed 
force in inter-state relations.  Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations states 
that all Member states “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”50  
This prohibition is complemented by Article 2(3) of the Charter, which directs that 
Member states “shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”  The 
Charter does not eliminate the right of states to use force, but limits it to 
circumstances of individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack.
51
  
Outside these circumstances, as Chapter VII of the Charter provides, only the United 
Nations itself through its Security Council is entitled to authorize and implement the 
use of force against a state, for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international 
peace and security.
52
 
While like most rules of positive international law, Article 2(4) of the Charter 
does not demonstrate an express relationship to the principles of practical reason, it 
undeniably gives effect to these principles.  This rule demonstrates a rational 
relationship to furthering a number of objectives of the international community – in 
particular, the maintenance of international peace and security – that are themselves 
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 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI [Charter], Art. 2(4). 
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 See ibid., Art. 51. 
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 See ibid., Arts. 39, 41 & 42. 
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implications of natural law principles requiring the pursuit and preservation of basic 
human goods.   Repeated instances of international aggression throughout history 
have demonstrated that violent inter-state conflict gives rise to myriad negative 
consequences for human welfare, including loss of human life, physical injury and 
mental trauma for both combatants and civilians, separation of families, disruption of 
economies and livelihoods, and environmental pollution.  Furthermore, since states’ 
economic and military resources differ, their capacities for both initiating and 
resisting armed attacks vary considerably, increasing the likelihood that the 
availability of resort to force will give a significant advantage to certain states while 
leaving others vulnerable to exploitation.  The overall impact of international 
aggression may be restated with reference to the international common good: it is 
evident that employment of aggressive armed force in the international sphere 
detrimentally affects the supranational conditions that enable states to achieve their 
respective goals for the welfare of their populations, and that enable individuals and 
communities within states to realise the basic values for themselves.   
Article 2(4) of the Charter constitutes a formal determination by the 
international community that, among the various options available to states for 
resolving their coordination problems, aggressive armed force is not to be used save 
in certain defined and exceptional circumstances.  In minimising the availability of 
resort to force and the various consequences for community life that follow upon the 
incidence of international aggression, the rule implements natural law principles  
which prescribe in general terms that those things that impair the possibilities for 
human flourishing are to be avoided.
53
  By restricting the circumstances in which 
states may unilaterally use armed force, the rule limits the possibilities for powerful 
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states to pursue their own objectives at the expense of weaker states and their 
populations, and thereby upholds the requirement of practical reasonableness 
prohibiting arbitrary self-preference in the pursuit of the basic goods.
54
  In enhancing 
the prospects for peace and stability in inter-state relations, the prohibition on the use 
of force gives effect to the natural law requirement that persons promote the common 
good of their communities, in this case the international common good.  All this is 
done, furthermore, through a rule that is articulated within a treaty mechanism; the 
latter is underpinned by fundamental principles of law, most notably pacta sunt 
servanda, that themselves follow from the principles of practical reason. 
It is hardly likely that the rulers and representatives of states made a 
conscious and explicit effort to adhere to the abovementioned natural law principles 
and requirements of practical reasonableness at the time of formulating Article 2(4) 
of the Charter.  What can be suggested, however, is that the rule prohibiting the use 
of force is an outcome of what Finnis describes as the ‘deep structure’ of practical 
thinking that is informed by the principles of practical reason.
55
  Article 2(4) 
manifests a collective affirmation by states that international aggression is 
undesirable for the international community: only a characterisation of aggression in 
such terms can explain the collective determination of states that resort to force 
should not be a primary method of international dispute resolution, that it should 
generally not be exercised by states outside a defined regulatory framework, and that 
peaceful dispute resolution is to be preferred wherever possible.  The characterisation 
of international aggression as undesirable is itself a normative judgment that is only 
fully intelligible if aggression and its consequences are viewed in relationship to 
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human considerations, namely the basic aspects of human well-being and the 
requirements for human flourishing. 
Apart from playing a guiding role in the determination of international norms, 
natural law principles also appear to be important to a full understanding of the basis 
of the authority of positive international law.  The norms of positive international law 
may indeed be properly understood as deriving their formal legal authority from the 
law-determining acts of states: states confer international institutions with the 
capacity to issue authoritative stipulations for coordinating the international 
community, they define and consent to the norms that become authoritative rules in 
international treaties, and they establish the practices that may subsequently become 
recognised as authoritative international custom.  Notwithstanding this, the new 
natural law account of law and authority suggests that there is a further dimension of 
authority, namely moral authority, that is integral to the overall authority of positive 
international law and that does not have its source in the positive acts of states.  This 
dimension of authority, from the perspective of the new classical theory, depends on 
the conformity of positive international law with natural law principles. 
The claim that moral authority is an essential component of the overall 
authority of positive international law has two aspects.  First, it affirms that the 
conformity of a particular international rule with natural law principles is an 
important factor in the creation of an exclusionary reason for states to comply with 
that rule.  This, to return to the example of the international law prohibition of the 
use of force, translates into a claim that the authority of this rule derives not simply 
from the fact that states have collectively posited it as a treaty rule in the Charter, but 
also from the fact that the rule implements the principles of practical reason directing 
the preservation of the basic values and the international common good.  Second, it 
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suggests that positive international laws that are not consistent with natural law 
principles lack moral authority, and that as a result such laws will not of themselves 
provide states with an exclusionary reason for complying with them.  The 
significance of new natural law theory for understanding the relationship between the 
moral authority of international norms and the obligations of states in the 
international sphere is a topic that will be considered further in Chapter 5. 
   
III.  New Natural Law Theory and Existing Thought in International Legal 
Theory Regarding Authority and Law 
Contemporary international law scholarship has paid increasing attention to 
issues surrounding the authority of international law, with many writers 
demonstrating particular interest in the concept of legitimacy and in identifying the 
criteria for the legitimacy of  international law and institutions.
 56
  Among the various 
lines of inquiry that have been pursued in recent years, particularly by normative 
international legal theorists, two may be highlighted.  The first is the traditional 
‘consent’ theory of international law and the manner in which this has been critiqued 
by some writers as providing an inadequate account of the legitimacy of international 
law.  The second is an interpretation of the legitimate authority of international law 
based on Joseph Raz’s ‘service conception’ of legal authority, which has been 
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 Representative works in this regard include: Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
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articulated in separate works by Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas.
57
  Both of 
these topics will be considered below, in an effort to identify their relationship to the 
claims of the new classical theory regarding law and authority in the international 
sphere. 
1.  The Consent Theory of International Law  
 
It is a longstanding principle of international law that the binding rules of 
international law emanate from the free will of states.
58
  The theory that international 
law is binding because states consent to be bound by it is rooted in nineteenth 
century positivist doctrine, and retains potency as an affirmation of the sovereignty 
and autonomy of states.  It has long been suggested, however, that the theory fails to 
provide a fully satisfactory account of the binding force of international law, due in 
part to its factual incongruence with various aspects of the international legal order 
including the functioning of international custom and the existence of general 
principles of law.
59
 
The critiques regarding the limitations of consent theory have recently been 
complemented by the observations of some normative theorists who claim that 
consent is inadequate as a basis of the legitimacy of international law.  Allen 
Buchanan raises three issues regarding the authenticity and integrity of state consent.  
First, Buchanan suggests that the consent of states may sometimes be less than fully 
voluntary, due to the vulnerability of weaker states to the pressures exerted on them 
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by stronger states.
60
  Second, he notes that international law is increasingly made by 
a variety of global governance institutions; although these institutions are created by 
states, their ongoing governance activities, including law-making, do not themselves 
involve the consent of states.
61
  Third, Buchanan observes that many states do not 
represent all of their people; given this fact, he argues that state consent cannot be 
construed as making international law legitimate, for to do so is to treat states “as if 
they were moral persons in their own right, rather than merely being institutional 
resources for human beings.”62   
Samantha Besson echoes an aspect of Buchanan’s last argument in her own 
comments on the manner in which states are characterised under consent theory.  
According to Besson, the consensualist view of international law, which affirms that 
states make laws as individuals enter into contracts, regards states in their 
international law-making activity as individuals rather than as officials.
63
  This, 
Besson maintains, misconstrues both the nature of states and that of international 
law: Besson claims that international law recognises states not as being themselves 
the bearers of ultimate value, but as “trustees for the people committed to their care”, 
and suggests that “[u]ltimately, international law is oriented to the well-being of 
human individuals, rather than to the freedom of states.”64 
It is beyond the scope of the current discussion to explore the intriguing 
question arising from Buchanan’s last argument, namely whether democratic 
governance within national political communities is a necessary condition for the 
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legitimacy of the international legal order.
65
  What can be noted, however, is the way 
in which Buchanan’s and Besson’s remarks regarding the nature of states resonate 
with the claims of new natural law theory concerning the purpose of authority and 
law in the international sphere.  As already considered, new natural law theory 
regards states as instrumental to furthering human welfare; it similarly maintains that 
international authority and international law exist to promote the international 
common good, and thereby to foster and secure the conditions that are favourable to 
human flourishing.  A new natural law evaluation of consent theory would 
accordingly affirm, alongside theorists such as Buchanan and Besson, that locating 
the legitimacy of international law in the sheer fact of state consent perpetuates a 
distorted view of the significance of states. 
More may be said, however, about the manner in which the new classical 
theory would critique consent theory, by having reference to the theory’s own 
characterisation of the authority of international law and institutions.  Viewed 
through the interpretive lens of the new natural law account of authority, the 
assertion that the authority of international law is a function of state consent is 
tantamount to a claim that acts of state consent themselves constitute exclusionary 
reasons for states to comply with these rules.  As described earlier, however, new 
natural law theory claims that the exclusionary reasons that underpin state consent to 
international authority derive from the principle that authority is necessary for the 
international common good, combined with the fact that a given authority can be 
effective in furthering that common good;
66
 in relation to international law, this 
effectiveness is said to be rooted in international law’s specific qualities as ‘law’ that 
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make it normatively salient for resolving the coordination problems of the 
international community.
67
  New natural law theory would accordingly contest the 
hypothesis that state consent itself constitutes an exclusionary reason for states to 
comply with international law; instead, the theory would characterise consent as a 
response to the exclusionary reasons for action described above, an affirmation by 
states of the desirability of resolving their coordination problems and realising the 
international common good though cooperation with the mechanisms of international 
institutional authority and international law. 
The foregoing claims, it should be noted, do not entail a suggestion that state  
consent is a juridically insignificant feature of international law.  As already noted, 
the new classical theory affirms that laws derive an important dimension of their 
force from the sheer fact of having been promulgated;
68
 in the case of international 
law, this translates into an acknowledgement that the consent of states is fundamental 
to the formal legal validity and prima facie authority of significant portions of 
international law, above all international treaties.  At the same time, new natural law 
theory maintains that the ultimate basis of the authority of positive norms of 
international law lies in their concordance with the principles of practical reason.  
The theory will accordingly assert that where state consent is relevant in establishing 
international rules, it gives these rules only a defeasible claim to authority. 
2.  Razian ‘Service Conception’ of Legal Authority Applied to International Law 
 
According to Raz, a person has authority over another when his directives 
constitute content-independent and pre-emptive reasons for action for the subject of 
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authority.
69
  Such authority is said to be justified (that is, legitimate) if, in part, it 
satisfies what Raz calls the ‘normal justification condition’, namely that the subject 
of authority would likely better conform to the reasons for action that apply to her if 
she tries to be guided by the authority’s directives than if she does not.70  Raz 
describes the service conception of authority as a means of understanding the manner 
in which authority furthers individual autonomy, since it claims that authority is 
legitimate in circumstances where subjects’ exercise of their own rational capacities 
leads them to recognise and conform to authority.
71
 
Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas have both recently used Raz’s service 
conception of authority as a basis for elaborating their own accounts of the 
legitimacy of international law.  While the claims of Besson and Tasioulas differ in 
certain respects, Besson’s account may be taken as illustrative.  Besson observes that 
law’s ability to facilitate coordination is one of the main content-independent reasons 
for action that satisfies the Razian normal justification condition.
72
  According to 
Besson, democratic coordination, which respects the basic political equality of 
persons, constitutes the most legitimate manner of coordination in situations of 
pervasive reasonable disagreement over matters of justice.
73
  Proceeding from these 
claims, Besson asserts that a democratic coordination-based justification of authority 
provides a convincing account of the legitimate authority of international law.  One 
of the reasons for this, Besson suggests, is that this justification of authority 
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corresponds to the need for international regulation in circumstances involving a 
diversity of views and disagreement among the subjects of authority in the 
international sphere.  Besson notes that states face both ‘classic’ coordination 
problems
74
 as well as what she calls ‘conflict and partial conflict’ coordination cases, 
the latter being “cases where there is disagreement about issues of justice and 
common concern, and where it is better that all co-ordinate over the same set of 
international norms rather than acting individually (even correctly) according to their 
own reasons.”75  Besson maintains that given the significant variations in the beliefs 
and practices witnessed in the international legal order, democratic coordination 
provides one of the best justifications of authority “to escape irreducible substantive 
controversies.”76 
It is evident that the accounts of Besson and Tasioulas and the new natural 
law account provided in this chapter converge in their affirmation that the authority 
of international law is importantly related to law’s role in facilitating coordination in 
the international community.  Under the new natural law account, international law’s 
capacity to be a salient coordinator for the international common good constitutes the 
primary basis of its authority; in Besson’s and Tasioulas’s interpretations of the 
service conception of authority, the effectiveness of law in enabling international 
coordination is one of the main reasons that satisfies the normal justification 
condition for determining legitimacy. 
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At the same time, it may be suggested that the accounts of the legitimacy of 
international law based on the service conception of authority leave certain questions 
unanswered.  Reference may again be had to Besson’s analysis, beginning with her 
characterisation of ‘conflict and partial conflict’ coordination cases.  In describing 
these cases as involving disagreement over issues of ‘common concern’, Besson 
relies on Jeremy Waldron’s definition which indicates that a question is of common 
concern for a group of persons if “it is better for a single answer to be accepted by 
them than for each person to deal with the question on his own.”77  This definition, 
however, does not really assist in identifying the distinguishing characteristics of 
issues that would make them issues of ‘common concern’ to a group; instead, it 
contains an assertion regarding the appropriate response of group members when 
faced with a question of common concern.  The normative claim that is implicit in 
this definition is itself  question-begging: why is it ‘better’ for members of group to 
accept a common solution on issues of common concern, rather than attempting to 
derive and abide by their own individual solutions? 
Further and more fundamental questions arise in relation to the overall 
explanatory force of Besson’s account, considered as a version of the Razian service 
conception of legitimate authority.  As noted earlier, the service conception of 
authority is ultimately concerned with demonstrating how authority facilitates 
individual autonomy.
78
  Besson, in adapting this conception to the context of 
international legal order, argues that the autonomy of states is a function of the 
autonomy of the individuals that comprise it rather than being an independent 
phenomenon, and suggests that sovereign autonomy depends upon the state 
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respecting the autonomy of its subjects.
79
  Notwithstanding Besson’s insights, her 
discussion of the relationship between authority and autonomy in the international 
sphere raises the same question that might be raised in relation to the service 
conception of authority generally: why is autonomy important?  Besson defines the 
concept of autonomy rather than explaining its significance, affirming that autonomy 
means “having and exercising the capacity to choose from a range of options”80; 
more recently, she has proposed that a person is autonomous “if his freedom is 
complete for the purposes of leading a good life.”81  Yet this latter definition invites 
its own line of inquiry, for what, indeed, does ‘leading a good life’ mean? 
The questions raised by Besson’s reinterpretation of the service conception of 
authority are arguably questions that can only be adequately answered by having 
reference to new natural law theory.  The new natural law account presented herein 
posits human pursuit of the basic values as the ultimate objective that accounts for 
the authority of international law.  International law, in furthering the common good 
of the international community of states, assists in safeguarding the autonomy of 
persons within this community that enables them to seek integral human fulfilment – 
the ‘good life’ – through their freely chosen pursuit of the basic goods.  The 
coordination problems that arise among states, whether construed as pertaining to 
shared or disparate objectives of these states, are problems that impact upon the 
ability of states to achieve their objectives and, by implication, impair the ability of 
persons within national political communities to pursue their ends.  The definitive 
resolution of these problems is indeed a shared objective of states in the international 
community, for without such resolution, everyone’s ability to realise their particular 
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objectives is compromised; this is why it is appropriate to describe the subject-matter 
of coordination problems as being issues of common concern, and why it may be 
affirmed that the welfare of the international community and its populations is 
furthered if states agree upon common solutions to their coordination problems 
through international law.
82
 
 
IV.  Implications of the New Natural Law Account of International Authority 
and International Law 
1.  The Establishment and Form of International Authority 
 
According to the new classical theory, it is a requirement of practical 
reasonableness that persons promote the common good of their communities.  This 
requirement, considered in conjunction with the significance of authority in the 
international sphere for promoting the international common good, suggests that 
there are certain responsibilities incumbent upon the rulers and governments of states 
as caretakers of both the international community of states and of their respective 
national political communities.  First, they should collaborate to establish 
authoritative international institutions to the extent necessary for addressing the 
coordination concerns of the international community.  Second, they should 
recognise the authority of international institutions where these exist and comply 
with the dictates of such institutions, based on the presence of sufficient exclusionary 
reasons for doing so.  State submission to international authority may itself be seen 
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as a form of cooperation within the international community that is relevant for the 
international common good.
83
 
The array of international institutions cited throughout this chapter, 
exercising various legislative, executive and judicial functions affecting the entire 
international community or specific portions thereof, demonstrates that the need to 
establish international institutional authority is already recognised and realised to a 
significant degree in the international sphere.  In this regard, it may be suggested that 
the new natural law account is instructive for characterising the international 
institutional landscape in normative terms, interpreting the existence of international 
institutions as not merely a response to practical necessities but also as flowing from 
the responsibilities of state governments for the welfare of their human populations. 
It may be asked whether the new natural law account entails any more 
specific claims concerning international institutional authority, apart from advocating 
the need to establish such authority.  At least one new natural law theorist, Robert 
George, has argued that it does, claiming that new natural law theory supports the 
institution of a central political authority or ‘world government’ for the international 
community.
84
  According to George, such an authority “would attend to the common 
good of mankind through, for example, avoiding (or at least limiting) war, protecting 
the physical environment, preventing starvation and other forms of misery, 
promoting economic development, and protecting human rights.”85  George further 
suggests that in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, a new natural law 
conception of world government would envisage this institution as complementing 
existing state governments rather than supplanting them, and as only exercising 
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authority in relation to problems that could not be effectively addressed by regional, 
national or local authorities.
86
 
George describes the envisaged world government as “the central authority of 
a complete community”.87  In this author’s view, as previously noted, the notion of 
‘complete community’ relies on the questionable idea that it is possible to have a 
single, all-encompassing community that can ensure all the myriad conditions that 
are important for human flourishing.
88
  Yet even if this conceptual difficulty is set 
aside, George’s claim that the new classical theory supports the establishment of a 
central political authority itself warrants scrutiny.  It will be recalled that according 
to new natural law theory, sharing of aim is constitutive of community.
89
  Based on 
this understanding of community, it indeed seems reasonable to speak in general 
terms of a single international community of states, since all states have a number of 
shared objectives corresponding to the international common good and engage in a 
range of collaborative endeavours for the sake of achieving these objectives.  At the 
same time, it is evident that not all states share all the same objectives: circumstances 
of history, geography or culture, among other factors, may shape the identification of 
particular shared objectives among certain states to the relative exclusion of others.  
The existence of diverse subsets of shared objectives of certain states, within the 
general set of shared objectives of all states, suggests that the international 
community of states is perhaps best understood as a single conceptual entity and 
simultaneously as a ‘community of state communities’.   
George’s assertion that the international community needs authority to secure 
all aspects of the universal common good that cannot be secured by authority at the 
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regional, national or sub-national levels is entirely consistent with the new natural 
law account of authority presented herein.  At the same time, it is not evident that the 
new classical theory necessarily entails the creation of a single central political 
authority, since the theory is silent regarding the particular form that international 
authority should take.
 90
  The multiple dimensions of community witnessed within 
the international community, featuring a plurality of sets of shared objectives, has led 
to the emergence of multiple loci of authority in the international sphere, including 
regional institutions (such as the African Union and European Union) and subject-
specific institutions (such as the WTO) for addressing the coordination problems of 
states.  While George’s description of a putative world government appears to 
conceive of this as a singular institution coordinating the affairs of the international 
community in diverse areas, the new natural law account of authority in the 
international sphere seems equally compatible with the establishment of multiple 
international institutions as has in fact occurred.  This, it should be emphasised, is not 
tantamount to a rejection of the notion of world government as a plausible 
implication of the new natural law account; rather, it is a suggestion that the role to 
be filled by such an institution can conceivably be carried out by central political 
authorities in the international community, provided that these authorities can 
exercise comprehensive authority within their respective domains and can achieve 
the dimensions of coordination among themselves that may be necessary for their 
harmonious coexistence. 
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2.  International Custom and the Development of the International Legal Order 
 
The requirement of practical reasonableness that persons promote the 
common good of their communities, which entails that states should establish and 
submit to international authority, also suggests that states should have recourse to 
international law as a salient mechanism for resolving the coordination problems of 
the international community.  States should prioritise the development of the 
international legal order, including the formal articulation of international norms and 
the establishment of adjudicative bodies for settling international disputes according 
to determinate legal rules.  Practical reasonableness further requires that states 
comply with international law for the sake of advancing the international common 
good.  As with the concept of authority, the new classical theory characterises the 
obligation to obey the law as having a moral dimension; this idea and its implications 
for understanding state obligation in relation to international law will be considered 
in detail in Chapter 5. 
Over approximately the past seventy years, the international community has 
made significant advances in developing appropriate mechanisms for addressing its 
shared challenges, as manifested by the emergence of new international legal 
frameworks covering a wide spectrum of international affairs.  The Charter, Law of 
the Sea Convention, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are but a few 
prominent examples of contemporary international instruments that play an 
important role in furthering shared objectives of states such as the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the preservation of the earth’s natural resources, and 
the realisation of fair terms of international trade.  Through articulating rules 
providing clear guidance to states, and establishing institutions with the authority to 
monitor state compliance with international norms and resolve disputes, these legal 
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instruments serve to coordinate the activities of states in domains having 
considerable significance for the international common good. 
While these developments in international law are to be welcomed, the new 
natural law account of the significance of international law presented herein also 
invites critical reflection on certain continuing features of the international legal 
order.  Of particular concern in this regard is the status of international custom.  As 
noted earlier, the formal characteristics of treaties and the existence of a procedural 
framework for treaty creation and change in the Vienna Convention render treaties 
particularly valuable as a means of coordination in the international sphere.
91
  
International law, however, features a plurality of sources of international norms, and 
treaties are not regarded as having a privileged status among these sources; rather, 
international custom exists alongside treaties as a primary source.
92
   
Countless writers have analysed the phenomenon of international custom.
93
  
Finnis himself explores the concept at length in Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
using it as an example to demonstrate how an authoritative rule can emerge even in 
the absence of an authoritative legislator or an authorised law-creating framework.  
Finnis suggests that the international community has adopted custom-formation as an 
appropriate method of deriving authoritative rules because doing so enables the 
community to resolve its coordination problems, which is required for the sake of 
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this community’s common good.94  At the same time, Finnis observes that using 
custom-formation as a source of authority for the international community involves a 
number of potential difficulties, given the possibility for uncertainty and 
disagreement regarding the factors that will be used as evidence of the emergence of 
a particular custom.
95
  Such difficulties have indeed repeatedly manifested 
themselves as jurists have attempted to identify precise norms of customary 
international law and to rely on the concept as a source of authority in addressing 
particular international disputes.  While it is commonly understood that widespread 
and consistent state practice and opinio juris (the belief by a state that a particular 
practice is legally obligatory) are the necessary elements for demonstrating that a 
customary norm exists,
96
 there continues to be considerable debate over questions 
such as how much state practice is required to qualify this practice as ‘widespread’ 
and ‘consistent’, what sorts of state actions will qualify as state practice, and what 
forms of evidence will constitute acceptable indicia of opinio juris.
97
  
Notably, Finnis does not purport to equate custom with political authority and 
law as an ideal source of authority for a community; rather, his analysis of custom is 
a precursor to his discussion of these latter concepts.  Indeed, in his comments 
regarding the authority of rulers, Finnis observes that political authority is needed 
precisely because of “[t]he clumsiness of custom-formation” as a means of 
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generating authoritative solutions to coordination problems.
98
  As Finnis’s discussion 
indicates, the fundamental problem with custom as a source of authority is that it 
affords considerable scope for uncertainty regarding whether a definitive solution 
exists for a given coordination problem.  This is particularly evident in the case of 
customary international law: the criteria for determining the existence of an 
international custom are articulated in broad terms and remain vulnerable to 
divergent interpretations, while the practices of states and their expressions of opinio 
juris may vary so significantly in their details that it may be difficult and require 
considerable time to ascertain a pattern of conduct that can be articulated in a precise 
way as constituting a customary norm.
99
 
Customary international law is undoubtedly an integral component of the 
international legal order.  It is a means for the development of international law 
outside the treaty-making framework, and offers a measure of flexibility to the 
process of norm creation in the international sphere that the latter context generally 
lacks.
100
  International custom also remains significant for the international 
community given the universal applicability of general customary rules
101
 and the 
corresponding fact that few treaties are ratified by all states: there is obvious value, 
for example, in the ability to use customary international law to enforce norms 
prohibiting torture and genocide against states that have not ratified the international 
conventions prohibiting these acts.  The relative merits of international custom, 
however, do not obscure the fact that custom, which involves an uncertain, 
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protracted, and often controversial process of generating international norms, is less 
effective than treaties in facilitating the coordination of the international 
community’s affairs.  Reference may be made in this regard to the concept of the 
focal meaning of law: inasmuch as this concept identifies the features of law that are 
particularly beneficial to community coordination, it may be said that international 
custom is further away from the central case of law than treaties are, and is 
accordingly a less ideal mechanism for promoting the common good of the 
international community. 
From a new natural law perspective, then, it is somewhat curious that 
international custom apparently continues to be regarded as an equivalent source of 
authority in international law alongside treaties.  It is suggested that given their 
superior utility for furthering the international common good, international treaties 
should be affirmed in international legal doctrine as the primary source of authority 
in international law, with custom being treated as a subsidiary source of authority.  
Furthermore, states should prioritise the elaboration of international law through 
treaty norms in areas where such norms are still lacking, in recognition of the  
particular value of treaties as instruments for the development of the international 
legal system.  There has long been a level of recognition within the international 
community of the benefits of codifying international custom, and within recent 
decades some advances have been made towards the codification of certain aspects 
of customary international law, most notably in the areas of international 
humanitarian law and the law of naval warfare.
102
  Notwithstanding the value of 
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these developments, it is suggested that the primary focus of efforts by states and 
international institutions to address the coordination problems of the international 
community should be on achieving the comprehensive articulation of this 
community's coordination norms in international conventions, and on ensuring that 
these treaties are ratified by all states to which they may be applicable. 
3.  Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) 
As described in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is “a norm accepted and recognised by 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character”.103  The Vienna Convention affirms that 
an international treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm is invalid.
104
  Since the 
doctrine of jus cogens is also understood to form part of customary international law, 
it is applicable to treaties regardless of whether the treaty parties are also parties to 
the Vienna Convention; it has additionally been argued that as a matter of 
international custom, the doctrine is now also pertinent to international laws other 
than treaties, such as the resolutions of international organisations.
105
  The doctrine 
of peremptory norms additionally finds expression in the law of state responsibility: 
as stipulated in the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, a state cannot invoke any of the recognised ‘circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness’ as a means of avoiding its responsibility for breaching an 
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international legal obligation, if the situation described by the state as corresponding 
to one of these circumstances itself involves the violation of a peremptory norm of 
international law.
106
 
The modern international law doctrine of jus cogens conveys divergent and 
seemingly contradictory messages about the nature of peremptory norms.  On the one 
hand, jus cogens appears to denote a category of ‘higher’ norms in international law 
that constitute a principled limit to the contractual freedom of states in the 
international sphere.  Thus construed, peremptory norms have often been associated 
with natural law doctrines.
107
  At the same time, the definition of jus cogens 
enshrined in the Vienna Convention indicates that peremptory norms are those norms 
‘accepted’ by the international community of states as peremptory, a description that 
paradoxically suggests that the peremptory status of these norms is crucially 
influenced by state consent.  The motley character of the jus cogens doctrine reflects 
the longstanding divergence of views among jurists and within the international 
community generally regarding the conceptual foundation of peremptory norms; in 
this regard, it may be noted that the doctrine of peremptory norms has at times been 
characterised as involving a conflict between voluntarist and non-voluntarist 
conceptions of international law, with some writers seeming to interpret the doctrine 
using either a consensual or non-consensual framework to the exclusion of 
alternative perspectives.
108
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It is suggested that the new natural law account of the relationship between 
natural law principles and positive law has relevance for understanding the nature of 
peremptory norms and the sources of their authority.  As was argued earlier in this 
chapter, rules of positive international law may be understood as determinations of 
natural law principles that have formal legal authority in virtue of being created 
though the law-determining acts of states, and that derive their moral authority from 
their conformity with these principles.
109
  The doctrine of jus cogens, which exists in 
positive international law both through its articulation in the Vienna Convention and 
in customary international law, may itself be described as a determination of natural 
law principles.  In furtherance of natural law principles requiring promotion of the 
international common good and preservation of the basic human values, the doctrine 
of jus cogens attaches specific legal significance to particular international norms 
that themselves implement natural law principles, and affirms that specific legal 
consequences will flow from the incompatibility of international laws with these 
norms.   
The international norms that are widely recognised as peremptory include the 
prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and torture, the prohibition of the use of force, 
the right to self-determination, the prohibition of racial discrimination, and the basic 
rules of international humanitarian law.
110
  From the perspective of new natural law 
                                                                                                                                          
International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) at para. 375, in which the observation 
is made that “[t]he historical background of jus cogens lies in an anti-voluntarist, often religiously 
inclined natural law, the presumption of the existence of ‘absolute’ norms on human conduct”; 
Gennady M. Danilenko, “International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making” (1991) 2 E.J.I.L. 42 at 44-
48 (discussing conceptual tensions in the doctrine of peremptory norms under the heading ‘Natural 
Law vs. Positivism’); Janis, ibid. at 360-62 (claiming that jus cogens “functions like a natural law” 
and contesting the view that peremptory norms may be related to customary international law); 
Michael Byers, “Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules” 
(1997) 66 Nord. J. Int’l L. 211 at 220-29 (interpreting jus cogens as emerging from the process of 
international custom, and arguing that peremptory norms cannot be based on natural law principles). 
109
 See the discussion at 101-06 above. 
110
 See State Responsibility, supra note 106 at 85, where the Commission discusses peremptory norms 
in its Commentary to Article 26 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility; see also Alexander 
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theory, these norms implement, in the context of international law, the principles of 
practical reason and requirements of practical reasonableness that affirm, for 
example, that life and all of its aspects (such as health and bodily integrity) is a basic 
human good, that there should be no intentional violation of the basic values, that 
persons should be treated as ends rather than means, and that the common good of 
one’s communities should be promoted and preserved.  It may be readily affirmed, 
then, that peremptory norms are related to natural law principles in terms of their 
content: natural law principles are, on this analysis, the source of the moral authority 
of international jus cogens rules.
111
   
The content of peremptory norms, however, is to be distinguished from the 
legal status afforded to these norms in international law.  In relation to this status, the 
new classical theory suggests that the doctrine of peremptory norms is properly 
understood as a positive law rather than natural law construct.  The doctrine of jus 
cogens not only affirms natural law principles indicating that objectives pertaining to 
the international common good and human flourishing are to be pursued and 
protected: it also serves to promote and safeguard these objectives in a specific way, 
by endowing the norms that correspond to these objectives with peremptory legal 
status.  In this regard, the doctrine constitutes a unique legal mechanism through 
which the international community may affirm the importance of the basic human 
values and of the supranational conditions that facilitate human well-being, as well as 
the importance of coordination within the international community for achieving the 
international common good.  The creation of a hierarchy of norms in positive 
                                                                                                                                          
Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 
50-65; Cassese, supra note 105 at 202-03. 
111
 For a comparable interpretation of the relationship between jus cogens and natural law principles 
using the framework of new natural law theory, see Dan Dubois, “The Authority of Peremptory 
Norms in International Law: State Consent or Natural Law?” (2009) 78 Nordic J. Int’l L. 133 at 159-
66. 
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international law, with defined legal rules governing cases of normative conflict, is a 
determination of natural law principles within the realm of positive law – it is a 
selection by the international community of a particular means of addressing its 
coordination problems for its common good, a means that is not itself specifically 
prescribed by natural law principles but that indeed gives effect to them.  While the 
moral authority of peremptory norms stems from their substantive consistency with 
natural law principles, the legal authority of peremptory norms qua peremptory 
derives from the fact that the international community has chosen to implement the 
jus cogens doctrine in international law, as manifested initially by the emergence of 
the doctrine in international custom and subsequently by its articulation in the Vienna 
Convention. 
One inference that may be drawn from the above considerations is that 
natural law principles are indeed relevant for articulating and developing the content 
of the category of jus cogens in international law.  As shall be argued in the next 
chapter, the doctrine of jus cogens can be a useful mechanism for giving practical 
effect to what may be described as ‘principles of justice’ for international law, 
considered as supreme principles of the international legal order.
112
  Additionally, 
while the voluntarist flavour of the Vienna Convention definition of peremptory 
norms suggests that jus cogens may in principle include any international norm that 
states recognise as being peremptory, the new natural law interpretation of the moral 
authority of jus cogens supports the view that this category should not include norms 
that in their content are inconsistent with natural law principles.
113
  It should also be 
                                                 
112
 See the discussion in Chapter 4 at 154-55 below. 
113
 For example, it has been argued that jus cogens includes a state obligation to assassinate enemy 
officials in particular circumstances: see Louis René Beres, “Prosecuting Iraqi Crimes Against Israel 
During the Gulf War: Jerusalem’s Rights Under International Law” (1991) 9 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
337 at 358.  Since new natural law theory interprets jus cogens as furthering natural law principles, the 
theory will maintain that the category of peremptory norms should not include a norm requiring states 
129 
 
observed, however, that given its character as a positive law construct, the doctrine 
of jus cogens can only be made fully effective for the international common good if 
the international community takes further steps to elaborate and implement this 
doctrine in international law. This would appear to entail, at a minimum, a definitive 
articulation of which international norms currently constitute jus cogens, an objective 
which is admittedly challenging in the absence of an all-encompassing institutional 
authority for the international community, but one towards which some meaningful 
steps may nevertheless be taken.
114
    
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the new natural law conception of authority and 
law and has used it to interpret the normative significance of these concepts in 
relation to the international sphere.  It has argued that international authority and 
international law derive their authority from their respective roles in furthering the 
international common good through facilitating coordination within the international 
community.  Inasmuch as such coordination is essential to securing the conditions for 
human flourishing, the analysis has affirmed that the international common good is 
central to justifying the authority of international law and institutions.  This chapter 
has also suggested that natural law principles inform the determination of positive 
                                                                                                                                          
to perform an act that involves intentional infringement of the basic human good of life, contrary to 
the requirements of practical reasonableness. 
114
 States could, for example, agree upon a declaration of peremptory norms through the United 
Nations General Assembly, which could ultimately become recognised as part of customary 
international law in a manner similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  With a view 
towards such an objective, the initial endeavour of identifying a list of existing peremptory norms 
could presumably be carried out by the International Law Commission.  At the time of drafting of the 
provision on jus cogens in the Vienna Convention, the Commission opted not to specify a list of 
peremptory norms, leaving the content of jus cogens to be elaborated through state practice and in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals: see International Law Commission, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Eigtheenth Session, UN GAOR, 21
st
 Sess., Supp. 
No. 9, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966) at 248.  More recently, the Commission has provided examples 
of peremptory norms in its Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility: see supra note 
110 and accompanying text. 
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international law, and has introduced the notion of moral authority as an integral 
dimension of the authority of such law.  These propositions merit further 
explanation.  In particular, the claim that the authority of international law and 
institutions is contingent upon their conformity with natural law principles requires a 
specification of what conformity with these principles precisely entails, entailing an 
elaboration of what the new classical theory describes as ‘the requirements of justice’ 
and consideration of how these requirements apply in the international context.  A 
proper understanding of this claim also requires an examination of the new natural 
law conception of obligation, and an application of this conception to considering the 
dynamics of legal obligation in the international sphere.  These topics shall be 
addressed in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
Justice, Human Rights, and International Law 
 
The concepts of justice and human rights lie at the heart of new natural law 
jurisprudence.  Like the concepts of authority and law, justice and human rights are 
concepts that bear a fundamental relationship to the idea of the common good.  As 
seen in the preceding chapter, new natural law theory interprets the significance of 
authority and law as a function of their role in furthering pursuit of the common 
good.  Justice and human rights, meanwhile, are concepts that provide insight into 
the content of the common good; these concepts ‘pierce the veil’, as it were, of the 
common good concept and reveal what pursuing this objective precisely entails.   
This chapter examines the new natural law conceptions of justice and human 
rights and considers their significance for articulating a normative theory of 
international law.  The chapter seeks to identify principles of justice for international 
law and, by implication, for the international community.  The analysis in this 
chapter focuses on describing the requirements of justice for ideal norms of positive 
international law; in this regard, it is a discussion primarily concerned with providing 
an interpretation of what positive international law should be, not with outlining 
principles of justice for states in their international relations.
1
  At the same time, 
inasmuch as positive international law is primarily created by states, the principles of 
justice identified herein have obvious normative implications for the states and other 
                                                 
1
 The focus of this discussion is thus to be distinguished from that found in some recent notable works 
that are either partly or wholly concerned with articulating principles of justice for the constitution of 
the international community, even though these works also feature some discussion of international 
law principles.  See e.g., John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: with, “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Fernando Tesón, A Philosophy of 
International Law (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).  Both of these works in different ways 
highlight adherence to principles of justice and respect for human rights as important criteria for the 
membership of states in the international community, as distinct from criteria to be applied to the 
analysis of positive international law. 
132 
 
actors within the international community that are involved in the creation of 
international legal norms. 
It is suggested herein that there are two principles of justice for ideal 
international law that may be derived from the new natural law account of justice and 
human rights.  First, respect for and promotion of human rights should be the 
primary principle informing the content of positive international law.  In this regard, 
it is suggested that the norms of international human rights law constitute the primary 
contemporary criteria for the development and evaluation of international legal rules.  
Second, positive international law should be consistent with the objective of 
promoting and protecting the international common good, for the sake of the further 
objective of respecting and promoting human rights. 
This chapter proceeds in three parts.  The first section outlines the manner in 
which new natural law theory interprets the concepts of justice and human rights.  
This section describes the essential relationship between these concepts, the new 
natural law characterisation of human rights as being grounded in basic human 
goods, and the manner in which both justice and human rights relate to the common 
good.  Proceeding from this outline, the second section articulates and explains the 
two abovementioned principles of justice for ideal international law that are based on 
the new natural law framework.  As this section further argues, the principles of 
justice should be regarded as supreme norms of the international legal order,  a claim  
that has significance for defining the content of peremptory norms but that should 
principally be understood as advocating a prioritisation of the principles of justice in 
the development and evaluation of positive international law.  The final section 
explores the primary claims regarding justice and human rights expressed by a 
leading international legal theorist, Allen Buchanan, in his normative theory of 
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international law,
2
 and considers these claims from the perspective of the new 
classical theory.  The analysis in this section engages with Buchanan’s assertion that 
justice is a morally obligatory goal for international law, as well as his views 
regarding human rights and distributive justice.  In identifying areas of both 
similarity and divergence between Buchanan’s claims and the new natural law 
perspective on the issues Buchanan discusses, this section reveals some of the 
implications of the new natural law conception of justice and human rights for 
understanding specific dimensions of normative international legal theory. 
 
I.  The New Natural Law Conception of Justice and Human Rights 
 
1.  Justice 
 
The description of justice offered by new natural law theory is essentially 
Aristotelian in origin, and builds in particular on Aquinas’s analysis and 
reformulation of Aristotle’s conception of justice.3  According to Finnis, the concept 
of justice encompasses three elements, namely other-directedness, duty, and equality 
or proportionality.
4
  The concept of justice, Finnis explains, concerns a person’s 
interactions with other persons (thus, it is ‘other-directed’); it has as its subject the 
determination of what one person owes to another and what the other person is 
entitled to (thus, it contemplates ‘duty’); finally, in its attention to what persons are 
owed, the concept entails acknowledgement of the equal worth of persons and their 
equal entitlement to be regarded as subjects of justice (thus, it involves 
                                                 
2
 This theory is primarily set out in Allen Buchanan, Justice Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: 
Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) [Buchanan 
Justice]. 
3
 For Aristotle’s treatise on justice, see generally Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Christopher 
Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), V; for Aquinas’s discussion of justice, see Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: 
Christian Classics, 1981) [Summa Theologiae], Vol. 3, II-II, q. 57 et seq. 
4
 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
[Finnis NLNR] at 161-63.   
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considerations of ‘equality’).5  Finnis follows Aristotle and Aquinas in describing 
justice as a relational concept concerning what one person owes another, and 
correspondingly, what that other person is entitled to as a matter of right.
6
   
Finnis affirms that justice is a requirement of practical reasonableness, 
thereby synthesising the classical notion of justice with the vocabulary and 
conceptual framework of new natural law theory.
7
  The requirement of justice, Finnis 
specifies, is an ensemble of the requirements of practical reasonableness, and is 
effectively equivalent to the principle that persons should promote the common good 
of their communities.
8
  The requirement of promoting the common good, as Finnis 
notes, itself manifests the three abovementioned components of the concept of 
justice.  The requirement is inherently other-directed, since it concerns the common 
good of the community or communities to which a person belongs; it also inherently 
contemplates duty, since it exists as a ‘requirement’ of practical reasonableness.9  
Finally, the requirement entails attention to equality, both in the sense that it is 
directed to the common good of a community rather than the particular good of some 
of its members considered in isolation, and in the sense that the common good is 
                                                 
5
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 161-63, 460-61.  Finnis notes that the notion of ‘equality’ as raised in this 
context is not to be understood as entailing an affirmation that all persons are to be treated identically 
in every circumstance: ibid. at 177, 461. 
6
 See generally ibid. at 161-63 and 193, notes to section VII.1. 
7
 See ibid. at 161. 
8
 Ibid.  Finnis in the second edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights indicates that once the ‘first 
principle of morality’ is identified and articulated – that is, that one ought to choose only those 
possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will towards the ideal of integral human fulfilment – 
there is no need to treat the requirement of promoting the common good of one’s communities as a 
distinct requirement of practical reasonableness.  Consistent with this, Finnis in this edition observes 
that justice is a direct implication of the master moral principle.  See ibid. at 451, 456-57, 461.  It 
should nevertheless be noted that in acknowledging that the content of the common good principle is 
effectively subsumed under the master principle of morality, Finnis does not suggest that the principle 
is to be discarded: the requirement of promoting the common good, according to Finnis, is simply a 
restatement of the master principle of morality as applied to human conduct in the context of 
community life.  See ibid. at 456-57.  Thus, Finnis’s articulation of the master principle of morality 
does not affect the viability of considering justice in its relationship to the requirement of promoting 
the common good, as is done in the first edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights and in the present 
discussion. 
9
 See ibid. at 164. 
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ultimately related to the basic dimensions of human flourishing that are equally good 
for all persons.
10
 
In keeping with the Aristotelian conception of justice, Finnis identifies two 
overall senses in which the concept of justice may be considered, namely ‘general’ 
and ‘particular’ justice.11  According to Finnis, justice in its general sense denotes 
complete virtue, a thoroughgoing adherence to all the requirements of practical 
reasonableness and a constant disposition towards favouring the common good.
12
  
Particular justice, meanwhile, encompasses the elaboration of what adhering to the 
requirements of practical reasonableness entails in specific contexts.
13
  In the first 
edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis further followed Aristotle’s 
classification of the modes of justice and, consistent with Aquinas’s restatement of 
Aristotle’s framework, identified two species of particular justice, namely 
‘distributive’ and ‘commutative’ justice.  Finnis characterised distributive justice as 
involving the practically reasonable resolution of problems in which some essentially 
common subject-matter, such as the common resources of a community, needs to be 
appropriated to particular individuals for the sake of furthering the common good.
14
  
Commutative justice, meanwhile, was described as concerning the reasonable 
determination of rights and duties between persons in situations not directly 
involving the distribution of some common subject-matter.
15
  Finnis indicated that all 
problems of justice could be understood in terms of this classification framework; at 
the same time, he observed that the distinction between the two species of justice was 
an “analytical convenience”, and noted that many types of actions and legal rules 
                                                 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 See ibid. at 164-66. 
12
 See ibid. at 165.  Aristotle called this sense of justice ‘legal’ justice: see Aristotle, supra note 3, V, 1 
& 6. 
13
 See ibid. at 166. 
14
 See ibid. at 166-67. 
15
 See ibid. at 177-78. 
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simultaneously invoked considerations of both distributive and commutative 
justice.
16
 
More recently, Finnis has moved away from employing this classification of 
justice into different species, on the grounds that it yields “no really clear and stable 
analytical pattern” and does not significantly assist in highlighting the substantive 
issues of justice.
17
  Finnis now suggests that it is preferable to focus on ranges of 
issues of justice rather than forms of justice.
18
  While Finnis purports to abandon the 
distinction between distributive and commutative justice as an analytical tool, the 
discussion of justice in terms of these species remains commonplace in legal and 
political theory and it is not evident that consideration of justice by reference to these 
categories may be easily escaped.
19
  Nor is it apparent that the classification scheme 
is entirely unhelpful: at a minimum, it may be affirmed that Finnis’s descriptions of 
the characteristics of the coordination problems that he formerly distinguished using  
the classical framework remain relevant, as do his observations regarding the criteria 
to be considered in addressing these problems.  It is true, for example, that promoting 
the common good of a community often entails attending to the distribution of 
common resources among individual members of the community, and that one of the 
fundamental criteria that is invariably relevant to making a reasonable distribution of 
such resources is the relative need of community members.
20
  The substance of 
Finnis’s discussion of distributive justice will be used later in this chapter as a 
                                                 
16
 See ibid. at 166, 179-80. 
17
 See John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998) [Finnis Aquinas] at 188; see also Finnis NLNR, supra note 4 at 460. 
18
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. For examples of this modified approach, see generally Finnis’s discussion of 
Aquinas’s thought on the topics of property, contract, commerce, and compensation and punishment 
in Finnis Aquinas, ibid at 188-215. 
19
 It has been argued that Finnis himself continues to make distinctions in his work that correspond to 
the categories of distributive and corrective justice, even though he does not describe the ‘issues’ of 
justice using these labels: see Richard W. Wright, “The Principles of Justice” (2000) 75 (5) Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1859 at 1885-87. 
20
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 4 at 174. 
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reference point in describing and analysing the types of justice considerations that 
arise in the context of the international community and international law. 
In presenting the new natural law conception of justice, Finnis highlights the 
significance of justice as a ‘norm of action’, that is, as a principle for discriminating 
among potential courses of action and making an appropriate selection from the 
available options.
21
  It may be noted that Finnis also affirms the sense in which 
justice is to be understood as a virtue, a steady willingness to give persons that which 
is due to them.
22
  While Finnis admits to giving insufficient attention to discussing 
this dimension of justice in Natural Law and Natural Rights, he also maintains that 
his overall approach in that text consciously focuses on elaborating the content and 
normative significance of principles rather than virtues; as Finnis explains,  
principles have “logical and rational primacy” over virtues since the latter, as aspects 
of a person’s willingness to make good choices, manifest an affirmative response of 
the will to the propositional reasons for action identified in natural law principles.
23
       
2.  Human Rights 
 
For new natural law theory, the idea of ‘natural rights’, or human rights, is 
fundamentally linked to the existence of basic human goods.
24
  The basic values,  as 
Finnis affirms, indicate the objects in which human capacities for fulfilment are 
realised.
25
  According to Finnis, all persons have what he describes as “radical 
                                                 
21
 See ibid. at 459. 
22
 Finnis thus observes that general justice “as a quality of character, is… a practical willingness to 
favour and foster the common good of one’s communities”: ibid. at 165.  As Finnis observes 
somewhat belatedly in the second edition of Natural Law and Natural Rights, the notion of virtue is 
integral to Aquinas’s definition of justice: see ibid at 460; Summa Theologiae, supra note 3, II-II, q. 
58, a. 1 (“justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual 
will”). 
23
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 420-21, 460; see also Finnis Aquinas, supra note 17 at 124.   
24
 Finnis regards ‘natural rights’ and ‘human rights’ as synonymous terms, the latter being a 
contemporary variant of the former: see ibid. at 198. 
25
 See John Finnis, Collected Essays: Volume III. Human Rights and Common Good (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 4-5. 
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dynamic capacities” for flourishing in the basic goods, and the fact that persons share 
in these capacities is foundational to the concept of human rights.
26
 
The essential connection between human rights and the basic human goods 
provides the starting point for understanding the relationship between human rights 
and justice.  The concept of justice, as already noted, pertains to the determination of 
duties and entitlements between persons; to be concerned with justice is to be 
concerned with what persons are entitled to.  According to the new classical theory, 
human rights and the duties to respect them articulate the directiveness of the 
principles of practical reason in their interpersonal implications: I am directed, as a 
matter of practical reasonableness, to pursue my own fulfilment in the basic goods, 
and I am simultaneously required in practical reason to respect and promote the 
capacity of others to do the same.
27
  As Finnis notes, duties to respect human rights 
flow from the equality of persons and the ontological unity of the human race that is 
rooted in persons’ shared radical capacities for freely pursuing fulfilment in the basic 
goods: such duties affirm the fact that the basic goods, as human goods, are as good 
for every other person as they are for oneself.
28
 
The idea that human rights are importantly linked to the basic values also 
provides the basis for new natural law theory’s understanding of the relationship 
between human rights and the common good.  It will be recalled that the common 
good encompasses the set of conditions that enable members of a community to 
pursue the basic values for themselves; in this regard, the common good ultimately 
                                                 
26
 Ibid. at 5-6.  Finnis indicates that the ‘radical’ capacities that persons are born with eventually 
become active as persons mature: see ibid.  
27
 See ibid. at 6-7. 
28
 See ibid at 7.  Duties to respect and promote human rights are thus consistent with, and serve to 
implement, the master principle of morality requiring that one’s actions should be compatible with a 
will towards the fulfilment of all persons in all the basic goods.  Cf. Finnis NLNR, supra note 4 at 461. 
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concerns the flourishing of individuals and communities.
29
 For new natural law 
theory, human rights embody and specify the dimensions of human flourishing that 
are the objective of promoting the common good.  According to Finnis, formal 
articulations of a list of human rights such as those seen in national constitutions and 
in international human rights instruments constitute “a way of sketching the outlines 
of the common good, the various aspects of individual well-being in community.”30  
The modern language of human rights, Finnis notes, complements the common good 
principle by providing specific indicia of what promoting the common good of a 
community entails, doing so in a manner that affirms that each of the dimensions of 
human flourishing is commonly the right of every person.
31
  The new classical theory 
further maintains that respecting human rights is an integral component of promoting 
the common good.
32
  Respect for human rights, both by individual members of a 
community and by those having authority within the community, is itself part of the 
set of conditions that facilitate human flourishing. 
Having described the concepts of justice and rights, and identified their 
relationship to each other as well as their particular relationships to the common 
good, the interconnectedness of these three concepts may be affirmed and 
summarized.  The requirements of justice are the implications of the principle of 
practical reasonableness indicating that persons should promote the common good of 
their communities.  Human rights embody and identify the particular aspects of 
human flourishing that are the objective of promoting the common good; human 
rights and their correlative duties together provide the content for articulating the 
                                                 
29
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 155, 459; see also the discussion in Chapter 2 at 46 above. 
30
 Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 214 [emphasis in original]. 
31
 See ibid. at 214, 221.  In making this point, Finnis refers extensively to the human rights norms 
recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., 
Supp. No. 13, UN Doc.  A/810 (1948) 71 [Universal Declaration of Human Rights or UDHR].  See 
Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 214. 
32
 See ibid. at 214, 218; see also John Finnis, “Grounds of Law and Legal Theory: A Response” 
(2007) 13 Legal Theory 315 at 338. 
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requirements of justice in the context of community life.  Respect for human rights is 
a general requirement of justice; simultaneously, it is an important component of the 
set of conditions comprising the common good. 
Two other aspects of Finnis’s description of human rights may be noted.  The 
first of these is his characterisation of absolute human rights.  While Finnis claims 
that the modern grammar of human rights “provides a way of expressing virtually all 
the requirements of practical reasonableness”,33 his discussion of human rights in 
Natural Law and Natural Rights does not go far in describing the links between 
contemporary articulations of human rights norms and the various requirements of 
practical reasonableness (apart from the common good principle) outlined earlier in 
that work.  Finnis does, however, draw attention to one of these requirements – 
namely, the principle that persons must maintain respect for all the basic goods in 
their conduct, and not choose to act in a manner that directly impairs any of these 
goods
34
 – in order to affirm the existence of absolute human rights as a distinct 
category of natural rights.  According to Finnis, absolute human rights are corollaries 
of the exceptionless duties that follow from the requirement that persons refrain from 
acts that directly violate the basic goods; examples of such rights that Finnis cites 
include the right to life, the right to procreation, and the right not to be deliberately 
condemned on false charges.
35
  Finnis maintains that since the existence of absolute 
human rights is a direct implication of the requirements of practical reasonableness, 
the plausibility of claiming that such rights exist is not affected by the consideration 
that the inviolability of absolute human rights is scarcely recognised or observed in 
practice.
36
 
                                                 
33
 Finnis NLNR, supra note 4 at 198. 
34
 On this requirement, see ibid. at 118-23. 
35
 See ibid. at 225. 
36
 Ibid. 
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A second notable element of Finnis’s analysis is his discussion of the 
concepts of ‘public morality’ and ‘public order’.  These concepts are cited in a 
number of international human rights instruments as grounds for limiting the exercise 
of human rights.
37
  Finnis describes public morality and public order as “diffuse 
common benefits in which all participate in indistinguishable and unassignable 
shares”; as such, they are conceptually distinct from the individual human rights that 
they may limit.
38
  Finnis suggests that these concepts usefully affirm the idea that the 
secure enjoyment of human rights depends on the existence and preservation of an 
environment that is itself favourable to the exercise of rights.
39
  Finnis’s 
interpretation of public order is illustrative: this concept, he claims, concerns “the 
maintenance... of the physical environment and structure of expectations and 
reliances essential to the well-being of all members of a community, especially the 
weak.”40  According to Finnis, violations of public order not only affect the particular 
persons whose rights are directly infringed, but also detrimentally affect the 
environment of the entire community of persons seeking to enjoy their rights.
41
  The 
concepts of public morality and public order may thus be seen as identifying 
components of the common good that are not equivalent to human rights, but that 
nonetheless play an important enabling role in relation to the exercise of human 
rights. 
                                                 
37
 Finnis cites as an example Art. 29 of the Universal Declaration, which states that the exercise of 
individual rights and freedoms “shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law 
solely for the purpose... of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society”.  See ibid. at 211-12; see also e.g., International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights or ICCPR], Arts. 12(3); 19(3)(b); European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [ECHR], Arts. 9, 10. 
38
 Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 216. 
39
 See ibid. 
40
 Ibid. at 217. 
41
 For example, Finnis suggests that incitement of hatred not only infringes the rights of the persons 
hated, but also “threatens everyone in the community with a future of violence and of other violations 
of right, and this threat is itself an injury to the common good”: ibid. 
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II.  Identifying Principles of Justice for International Law Based on New 
Natural Law Theory 
The foregoing account of the new natural law conceptions of justice and 
human rights lays the groundwork for considering the possible implications of this 
conception for articulating principles of justice relevant to international law and, by 
implication, to the international community of states.  The discussion that follows 
takes the approach of identifying principles of justice for ideal positive international 
law – law that reflects, to the greatest degree possible, adherence to the requirements 
of practical reasonableness.
42
  These principles are addressed in the main to states, 
which remain primarily responsible for the creation and development of international 
legal norms.  International treaty norms and rules of international custom do not only 
regulate the conduct of state entities in their international relations, but also have 
impacts on the welfare of individuals and communities residing within states.  The 
discussion below considers the implications of the new natural law conception of 
justice for describing the duties of states towards persons in relation to the 
formulation and evaluation of international law: in this regard, it draws attention to 
the human rights of persons comprising the universal community of persons, as well 
as the instrumental significance of the international common good for the exercise of 
human rights.  ‘State’ duties, it may be reaffirmed, is here understood as signifying 
the duties to be observed by those persons who possess authority within a state and 
are primarily responsible for determining the course of the state’s conduct in 
international affairs: it is these persons who, in making decisions that shape the 
                                                 
42
 These principles are additionally relevant to international institutions inasmuch as these play an 
increasing role in the creation and evaluation of positive international law: cf. Allen Buchanan, “The  
Legitimacy of International Law” in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds., The Philosophy of 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 79 at 80.  Nonetheless, this discussion will 
maintain an emphasis in its wording on states, in accordance with their continuing predominant role in 
shaping the content of the international legal order. 
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content of international norms, are obliged to abide by the requirements of practical 
reasonableness.
43
 
It is suggested that there are two overarching principles of justice for 
international law that may be derived from the new natural law framework, and that 
themselves provide the basis for subsequent articulation of additional norms.  These 
principles are set out below. 
Principle 1.  Respect for and promotion of human rights should be the primary 
principle informing the content of positive international law. 
As already seen, new natural law theory characterises human rights as precise 
expressions of the requirements of justice: these rights identify the dimensions of 
human flourishing that are the object of the common good principle.  The new 
classical theory also maintains that law in its focal meaning is directed toward 
furthering the common good of a community through resolving the community’s 
coordination problems.
44
  The new natural law affirmation that law should further the 
common good of a community, considered in conjunction with the theory’s 
intersecting conceptions of the common good and human rights, entail a claim under 
new natural law theory that the content of ideal positive law should demonstrate 
respect for human rights.  This claim may be restated with specific reference to 
international law: laws seeking to address the coordination problems of the 
international community of states should do so in a manner that prioritises the 
promotion and preservation of the human rights of persons comprising the universal 
human community. 
The principle that the content of positive international law should promote 
and safeguard human rights is arguably an implied dimension of states’ obligations 
                                                 
43
 Cf. discussion in Chapter 3 at 91-92 above. 
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 See the discussion in Chapter 3 at 85-86 above. 
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to the international community as identified in the Charter of the United Nations.
45
  
It may be noted that by the terms of Article 55(c) and 56 of the Charter, states parties 
are obliged to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all” and to take “joint and separate action” in cooperation 
with the United Nations to achieve this goal.
46  
These provisions, which clearly 
contemplate the welfare of all persons in the universal human community and 
expressly require international cooperation, cannot be plausibly given full effect 
unless positive international law – which is itself largely the product of international 
collaboration and which has both direct and indirect impacts on human well-being – 
remains consistent with the objective of respecting human rights.  The obligation of 
states to promote and respect human rights can only be reasonably construed as a 
duty that applies to state conduct generally, encompassing both the domestic 
legislative activities of states and the law-creating acts of states in the international 
sphere.   
Contemporary international law features a set of norms that can be interpreted 
as giving detailed expression to the natural law principle that positive international 
law should further and protect human rights.  These norms are the principles of 
international human rights law.  The International Bill of Human Rights,
47
 which 
includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
48
 identifies the range of aspects 
of human flourishing that each person is entitled to pursue and that all persons and 
                                                 
45
 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI [Charter].  
46
 Charter, ibid., Arts. 55(c), 56. 
47
 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The International Bill of 
Human Rights’, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), online: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf>. 
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 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 
3 [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or ICESCR].   
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states are required to respect and promote.  The Universal Declaration affirms an 
extensive set of human rights over twenty-eight articles, including life, liberty, and 
security of the person, equal protection of the law, marriage, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, social security, work and just remuneration, and education.
49
  
These rights are restated and elaborated upon in the two Covenants, treaties that 
create legally binding obligations concerning the implementation and preservation of 
human rights for those states that ratify them.  Several of the human rights identified 
in the Universal Declaration and the Covenants are reaffirmed and considered in 
greater detail in a series of treaties and declarations that focus on specific issues and 
themes.
50
  Apart from the International Bill of Human Rights, human rights norms 
also find recognition in a number of regional human rights instruments, including the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.51 
As expressed in international and regional human rights instruments, human 
rights norms highlight, with varying degrees of directness, the fundamental human 
values that are of common significance to all persons in the universal community of 
persons, and they identify an initial set of general affirmations and proscriptions 
concerning individual and state conduct that follow upon the recognition of these 
basic human goods.  In this regard, international human rights norms may be 
described as bearing a close relationship to the principles of practical reason and 
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 See UDHR, supra note 31, Arts. 3, 7, 16(1), 22, 23(1) & (3), 26.  
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 See generally e.g., Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
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1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 [American Convention on Human Rights or American 
Convention]; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 
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requirements of practical reasonableness identified in new natural law theory.  The 
prohibition against torture, for example, draws attention to the value of security of 
the person, which under new natural law theory would be understood as an aspect of 
the basic good of life.
52
  This rule constitutes a specific application and translation 
into positive law of the natural law requirement that persons refrain from acts that 
directly infringe any of the basic goods; to the extent that torture may be employed 
for the sake of achieving some further objective, such as extracting information from 
the person tortured, the prohibition also gives effect to the requirement that persons 
be treated as ends rather than means.
53
  The right to education, meanwhile, affirms 
the natural law principle that knowledge is a basic value, and gives this principle 
specific directive force in relation to the provision of various levels of formal 
education by states.
54
  The non-discrimination principle, to cite a final example, gives 
effect to the requirement of practical reasonableness that there be no arbitrary 
preferences among persons; in doing so, the principle reflects the natural law 
affirmation that the basic goods are truly ‘common’ goods and that participation in 
the basic values is as good for any other person as it is for oneself.
55
 
A further feature of international human rights law that suggests a 
relationship between this body of norms and natural law principles is its recognition 
of absolute human rights.  While most human rights enshrined in international human 
rights instruments are susceptible to varying forms of limitation or qualification, a 
small number of human rights are affirmed as being inviolable under all 
circumstances: prominent examples of such rights in the Universal Declaration and 
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 See UDHR, supra note 31, Art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 37, Art. 7. 
53
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 4 at 111-12, 117, 121-22. 
54
 See UDHR, supra note 31, Art. 26(1); ICESCR, supra note 48, Art. 13(1) & (2); see also Finnis 
NLNR, ibid. at 60ff.  
55
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ICCPR include the right of persons not to be enslaved,
56
 the right not to be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
57
 and the right 
to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.
58
  Consistent with Finnis’s 
characterisation of absolute rights considered earlier, the articulation of exceptionless 
human rights norms in international law may be described as giving effect to the 
principle of practical reasonableness prohibiting acts that are aimed at directly 
infringing basic human goods. 
International human rights law has conventionally been understood as 
expressing universal standards for states to observe in their legislation, policies, and 
practices insofar as these affect their own citizens and other persons within their 
territorial domains.
59
  Apart, however, from constituting common standards for 
domestic legislation and other forms of state activity impacting upon human welfare 
at the domestic level, international human rights norms should also be seen as 
articulating principles of justice for international law.  The principle that the 
substance of positive international law should promote and preserve human rights 
entails that states, in determining and evaluating the content of international laws, 
should seek to ensure that these laws are consistent with respect for the basic human 
goods and the requirements of practical reasonableness as expressed in international 
human rights norms. 
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 See UDHR, ibid., Art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 37, Art. 8. 
57
 See UDHR, ibid., Art. 5; ICCPR, ibid., Art. 7. 
58
 See UDHR, ibid., Art. 6; ICCPR, ibid., Art. 16. 
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 See e.g., Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) at 
14-15. 
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Principle 2.  Positive international law should be consistent with the objective of 
promoting and protecting the international common good.   
Finnis suggests that the requirements of justice are explained “by referring to 
the needs of the common good at its various levels”.60  It is thus appropriate, in 
reflecting on the principles of justice for ideal international law, to consider the 
relationship between these principles and  the international common good, which is a 
distinct conceptualisation of the common good applicable to the international sphere.  
In this regard, the new natural law conception of justice and human rights suggests 
that positive international law should aim at furthering and preserving the 
international common good, as a corollary to the objective of promoting and 
respecting human rights.  
The international common good has been earlier described as a set of 
supranational conditions that facilitates the flourishing of persons within the 
universal human community, and that accordingly justifies the collaboration of states 
within the international community of states.
61
   As this definition suggests, the 
international common good, as an aspect of the common good that is instrumental to 
human flourishing, bears a tangible relationship to human rights.  The conditions 
comprising the international common good contribute to the creation of an 
environment that enables individuals and communities to pursue their integral 
fulfilment through pursuit of the basic goods – that is, to exercise and enjoy their 
human rights.  The instrumental significance of the international common good for 
the exercise of human rights is what supports the claim that promotion and 
preservation of the international common good is itself a principle of justice for 
international law. 
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 Finnis NLNR, supra note 4 at 210 [emphasis added]. 
61
 See the discussion in Chapter 2 at 69 above. 
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The idea of the international common good bears certain parallels to the 
concepts of public morality and public order which, as mentioned earlier, feature in 
several international human rights instruments as justifications for limiting the 
exercise of human rights.
62
  In a manner similar to these concepts, the international 
common good concerns the maintenance of a quality of mutual respect and 
cooperation between states and a supportive physical global environment, as factors 
that are important to the possibility of human flourishing.  Drawing on Finnis’s 
observations regarding public morality and public order, it may be further suggested 
that while the international common good is commonly to the advantage of all states 
and all persons, it is of particular significance to weaker states in the international 
community.  Given, for example, the substantial variations in the economic and 
military capacities of states, it is evident that violations of international peace may 
contribute to a state of affairs in which more powerful states are more likely to 
achieve their objectives in inter-state relations through means not available to weaker 
states; the increased vulnerability of weaker states in this regard may impair the 
ability of these states to achieve their own objectives, with consequent detrimental 
impacts on the ability of persons within these states to enjoy their human rights.  The 
value of maintaining peace to the international community as a whole, and especially 
to the less powerful states within this community, provides a compelling justification 
for limiting the freedom of states through, for example, introducing international 
rules restricting states’ ability to unilaterally resort to aggression.   Thus, promoting 
and preserving the international common good may be identified as an appropriate 
principle of justice for international law not only because of its instrumental 
relationship to the exercise of human rights, but also because of the relevance of this 
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principle for maintaining an environment that affirms the equality of all persons in 
the universal human community notwithstanding the de facto inequality of states. 
Several elements of international human rights law already give some 
expression to the idea of an international common good, its relationship to human 
rights, and the duty of states to promote and protect it.  Article 28 of the Universal 
Declaration affirms that every person is entitled to “a social and international order 
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized”, 
thereby outlining a concept that bears clear parallels to the description of the 
international common good presented above; significantly, in characterising this 
‘social and international order’ as itself being a right, Article 28 implies that there are 
correlative duties incumbent upon individuals and states to ensure that this right is 
realised and preserved.
63
  The Preambles to the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the 
American Convention on Human Rights commonly acknowledge that, to cite the 
wording of the ICCPR Preamble, “the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and 
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions 
are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his 
economic, social and cultural rights”.64 Additionally, both the American Convention 
in one of its additional protocols and the African Charter identify rights that, from 
the perspective of the new classical theory, correspond to conditions that comprise 
the international common good.  The African Charter affirms that all peoples have 
rights to “national and international peace and security” and to “a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development”.65  The Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
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 UDHR, supra note 31, Art. 28. 
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 ICCPR, supra note 37, Preamble [emphasis added]; substantially similar language is used in the 
Preambles to the ICESCR, supra note 48, and the American Convention, supra note 51. 
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See African Charter, supra note 51, Arts. 23- 24. 
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Cultural Rights similarly declares that every person has the right to live in a healthy 
environment and that states parties are obliged to “promote the protection, 
preservation and improvement of the environment”.66 
The principle that positive international law should promote and respect the 
international common good does not necessarily entail that the conditions comprising 
the international common good, such as international peace and security, should 
themselves be recognised as human rights.  According to a new natural law analysis, 
the components of the international common good are instrumental rather than 
intrinsic goods: they are conditions that facilitate pursuit of the basic values by 
persons, rather than themselves constituting these basic values.
67
  By the terms of this 
analysis, conditions such as international peace or a healthy environment cannot be 
properly understood as human rights since they do not identify ultimate objects in 
which the human capacities for fulfilment are made actual, unlike values such as life 
or knowledge.  This observation, however, in no way diminishes the need for 
positive international law to be articulated in a manner that demonstrates due regard 
for the international common good and its significance for human flourishing.  The 
practice of referring to particular components of the international common good 
using the grammar of rights may indeed be of some utility in relation to 
implementing this principle, inasmuch as it allows for specific identification of the 
supranational conditions that are essential to human welfare in a manner that engages 
the responsibility of states for attending to these conditions. 
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The Principles of Justice as Supreme Principles of International Law 
Taken together, the two described principles of justice for ideal international 
law provide the foundation for an approach to assessing positive international law 
that is consistent with the contemporary trend, itself facilitated by the emergence and 
growth of international human rights law over the past seventy years, to consider 
current global challenges and the range of responses to these challenges in terms of 
their relationship to human rights principles.  In relation to issues of significant 
global concern such as climate change and terrorism, states have come under 
increasing scrutiny for the impact of their domestic legislation and policies on human 
rights.
68
  The same human rights considerations that increasingly inform the 
evaluation of state conduct as it relates to these global challenges should also be seen 
as relevant to assessing the international legal frameworks that are developed to 
address the coordination problems of the international community.  For example, the 
importance of preserving the earth’s climate system, as a component of the 
international common good that is essential to continued human flourishing, should 
be a primary consideration in evaluating the adequacy of climate change regulation 
provisions that are currently operative in international law, such as the ‘emissions 
trading’ mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.
69
  Likewise, respect for the human rights of all 
persons, including those persons accused of terrorist acts, should be a fundamental 
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principle informing the assessment of international legal mechanisms devised to 
counter international terrorism, such as targeted sanctions regimes.
70
 
The claim that states should regard respect for human rights and protection of  
the international common good as the ultimate criteria of significance in creating and 
evaluating positive international law entails an assertion that the principles of justice 
for international law – and by implication, the international legal provisions that give 
them concrete expression – should be regarded as supreme norms of the international 
legal order.  The notion of normative hierarchy in international law is not new,
71
 and 
it may be noted that the idea that human rights norms have a special status in relation 
to international law has been increasingly expressed in recent years.  For example, 
the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its 
related bodies have affirmed the priority of human rights law over other international 
legal regimes such as those regulating trade and investment.
72
  A number of writers 
and international tribunals have gone further, declaring specific international human 
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rights principles or human rights norms generally to form part of the category of 
peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens.
73
 
It is submitted that the principles of justice for international law should 
indeed be construed as paramount norms of the international legal system, and 
should play a primary role in the determination and critical assessment of the content 
of positive international law in every field of international legal regulation.  This, it 
should be specified, is not tantamount to a claim that the abovementioned principles 
of justice should be regarded as jus cogens norms.  As noted in the previous chapter,  
the doctrine of jus cogens involves the creation of a hierarchy of norms in positive 
international law, in which specific international norms accepted by the international 
community as peremptory enjoy a superior legal status and invalidate other 
international laws in cases of conflict.
74
  The two principles of justice for 
international law, which restate natural law principles in the form of general 
normative criteria for the development and evaluation of positive international law, 
are not themselves ‘norms of general international law’ and as such are not 
appropriate candidates for characterisation as peremptory norms in terms of the 
Vienna Convention definition.  It may nevertheless be affirmed that the doctrine of 
jus cogens can be a useful mechanism for giving effect, within the domain of positive 
international law, to the idea that the principles of justice for international law should 
be regarded as supreme principles of the international legal order.  Without 
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embarking upon an extended discussion on the content of jus cogens, it may be 
suggested that if jus cogens is to play an effective role in relation to the principles of 
justice, then all international norms that in their substance implement the principles 
of justice should be understood as proper candidates for recognition as peremptory 
norms.  This would include the set of international norms that are already widely 
recognised as peremptory and that bear a discernible relationship to these principles, 
the corpus of norms of international human rights law,
75
 and norms that promote and 
safeguard the conditions comprising the international common good, such as 
international laws directed towards preservation of the global environment.     
Still, even if the doctrine of jus cogens is construed as an appropriate 
mechanism for promoting the primacy of the principles of justice in positive 
international law, it is worth emphasising that the above argument regarding the 
normative supremacy of the principles of justice for international law constitutes 
more than a claim that the international norms corresponding to these principles 
should be recognised as peremptory norms.  What is being advocated herein is an 
approach to the development and evaluation of positive international law that affords 
priority to principles mandating promotion of and respect for human rights, and 
promotion and protection of the international common good, regardless of whether 
the international norms expressing these principles are recognised as peremptory.
76
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Understood in relation to the new natural law framework, the principles of justice for 
international law and the international norms that give them concrete expression may 
be affirmed as supreme principles of international law in sheer virtue of the human 
rights to which they refer and the opportunities for human flourishing that they are 
intended to preserve and promote. 
 
III.  New Natural Law Theory and Existing Conceptions of Justice and Human 
Rights in International Legal Theory: A Comparison with the Theory of Allen 
Buchanan 
 Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a number of works in 
international legal theory that are concerned with the articulation of normative goals 
for international law.
77
  Allen Buchanan’s Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-
Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, published in 2004, has 
been heralded as the most systematic and comprehensive normative theory of 
international law produced to date. 
78
  Buchanan’s work is of particular interest in 
relation to the concepts considered in this chapter since he claims that justice should 
be a primary moral goal of international law, and that realising this objective entails 
respecting human rights.
79
  Following is an outline of Buchanan’s theory regarding 
justice and human rights and their significance for the international legal order.  The 
discussion will then focus on three particular aspects of Buchanan’s theory: 
Buchanan’s arguments in support of his claim that justice is a morally obligatory 
goal for international law, his characterisation and identification of human rights, and 
his arguments concerning distributive justice.  For each of these topics, an effort will 
be made to identify relevant areas of similarity or contrast between Buchanan’s 
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analysis and a consideration of these topics from the perspective of the new classical 
theory.  This comparative exercise will assist in situating the new natural law 
conception of justice and human rights in relation to existing normative international 
legal scholarship, and in revealing some of the implications of this conception for 
understanding particular topics within normative international legal theory. 
 Buchanan claims that justice, signifying respect for basic human rights, 
should be a primary moral goal of the international legal system and constitutes the 
fundamental criterion for evaluating the international legal order.
80
  Buchanan further 
claims that justice is a morally obligatory goal for international law; this claim is 
based primarily on what Buchanan calls the ‘Natural Duty of Justice’, the principle 
that everyone has a limited moral obligation to contribute to ensuring that all persons 
have access to institutions that protect their basic human rights.
81
  The definition of 
the Natural Duty of Justice signals the emphasis that Buchanan’s theory places on the 
role of institutions in safeguarding rights: for Buchanan, pursuit of the goal of justice 
in the international legal system not only requires an appropriate set of human rights 
norms, but also requires the presence of appropriate institutions for protecting human 
rights.
82
 
At the core of Buchanan’s justice-based theory of international law is his 
conception of basic human rights.  According to Buchanan, basic human rights 
correspond to interests that are common to all persons, and that constitute the 
conditions for living a decent human life.
83
  Buchanan posits a set of basic human 
rights that includes many of the human rights recognised in international human 
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rights law such as rights to life and liberty, freedoms of expression and association, 
and the right to resources for subsistence.
84
  Proceeding from the premise that the 
violation of basic human rights constitutes the most serious threat to a person’s 
ability to live a decent human life, Buchanan asserts that the protection of these 
rights should be the defining consideration in a moral theory of international law.
85
 
Buchanan does not purport to ground his theory of international law in a 
natural law conception of justice and human rights; indeed, Buchanan expressly 
states that his intention is to articulate a normative theory of international law 
“without embracing a naturalistic view of what international law is.”86  Since new 
natural law theorists do not claim to ascertain the validity of positive law by 
reference to criteria of practical reasonableness, Buchanan’s interpretation and 
eschewal of what he calls ‘the natural law view’ appears misplaced, at least in 
relation to new natural law theory and the classical natural law tradition from which 
it proceeds.
87
  It may indeed be noted that while Buchanan does not draw on natural 
law theory in articulating his normative theory of international law, certain features 
of his theory display significant parallels to the new natural law principles of justice 
for international law outlined in these pages.  Buchanan seeks to ground the 
international legal order in principles of justice, and he specifies the objective of 
justice as entailing respect for human rights; as already seen, the new classical theory 
similarly supports a claim that international law should demonstrate consistency with 
the requirements of justice, and that respecting and promoting human rights is the 
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specific means for realising this objective.  Both theories, then, reflect a 
conceptualisation of ideal international law that prioritises attention to safeguarding 
human rights.  Furthermore, Buchanan’s theory and new natural law theory share a 
broadly similar understanding of the significance of human rights, in that they both 
characterise human rights as identifying interests that are worthy of respect because 
of their relationship to human welfare.   
Certain aspects of Buchanan’s theory invite further consideration in light of 
the present chapter’s discussion of the new natural law conception of justice and 
human rights and its implications for international law.  These are examined below. 
1.  Justice as a Morally Obligatory Goal for International Law 
 
Buchanan claims that it is morally imperative that the international legal 
system be constructed in a manner that secures respect for basic human rights.
88
  His 
argument in support of this claim draws on what he describes as the Natural Duty of 
Justice, along with a premise about the role of international law in safeguarding 
human rights.  Buchanan explains that the Natural Duty of Justice is ‘natural’ in the 
sense that everyone is subject to this duty simply in virtue of being a human person, 
regardless of whether persons have any form of interaction with each other that 
might otherwise justify ascribing the existence of obligations in justice.
89
  The 
Natural Duty of Justice assumes that securing justice for all persons requires just 
institutions, and is further based on two moral premises: first, that all persons are 
entitled to equal respect and concern (the ‘Moral Equality Principle’); second, that 
treating persons with equal respect requires taking positive steps to help ensure that 
their rights are not violated.
90
  The Natural Duty of Justice, according to Buchanan, 
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entails that everyone has a limited moral obligation to help ensure that all persons 
have access to institutions that protect their basic human rights.
91
  Buchanan claims 
that this duty, considered in conjunction with the premise that international law can 
play an important role in ensuring that everyone has access to just institutions, 
supports the conclusion that justice is a morally obligatory goal of international 
law.
92
 
As will be evident from the earlier outline of the new natural law conception 
of justice and human rights and its implications for international law, Buchanan’s 
normative claim that international law should be aimed at realising justice is one that 
new natural law theorists would endorse.  It may be asked, nevertheless, whether 
Buchanan has provided a satisfactory justification for this claim.  As noted above, 
Buchanan’s argument that justice is a morally imperative goal for international law 
rests primarily on the Natural Duty of Justice, which crucially features the premise 
that persons have a duty not only to refrain from violating other persons’ basic 
human rights, but also to assist others in ensuring that their basic human rights are 
protected.  Perhaps recognising that the claim is contentious, Buchanan elaborates at 
length on its plausibility;
93
 nevertheless, his arguments appear inadequate in certain 
respects.  Buchanan affirms that the duty to help others to secure their basic human 
rights derives simply from “a proper recognition of what I owe you as a person”, 
even in the absence of any form of unifying relationship between persons; he further 
suggests that acknowledging a duty of non-interference regarding other persons’ 
basic human rights, without also affirming a positive duty of assistance to protect 
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those rights, would reflect “a laughably anemic conception of what it is to recognize 
the moral importance of persons”.94  These arguments, however, do not appear to 
cover the ground required in justifying the existence of a positive duty of aid: why, 
indeed, is it ‘anemic’ to do no more than avoid harming other persons’ human rights 
– particularly persons with whom one has no relationship whatsoever – and what is 
the basis for claiming that actively helping to protect their rights constitutes ‘proper 
recognition’ of their moral worth?  As an alternative means of arguing the point, 
Buchanan claims that recognising the importance of the interests that are protected 
by basic human rights implies that persons must not only refrain from violating 
others’ rights, but also be willing to bear some significant costs to ensure that those 
persons’ rights are protected.95  Again, however, Buchanan seems here to be merely 
asserting that the Natural Duty of Justice entails actively assisting others, rather than 
providing a thoroughgoing rationale for the claim that the duty requires something 
beyond non-interference.   
New natural law theory, it is suggested, provides a coherent justification for 
the basic claim that persons have a duty to assist others in securing their human 
rights.  From the perspective of the new classical theory, this duty has its foundation 
in the requirement of practical reasonableness that persons are to promote the 
common good of their communities.  The common good principle, as noted 
previously, is a restatement of the master principle of morality indicating that a 
person’s acts and choices must be consistent with a will towards the ideal of integral 
human fulfilment, the fulfilment of all persons in all the basic human goods.
96
  This 
ideal is itself made intelligible by the fact that the basic goods, as human goods, are 
as good for anyone else as they are for oneself.  Since the basic human goods are 
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‘commonly’ good – with the implication that all persons are tied together in the 
universal community of persons by their common humanity – a proper regard for 
others as human persons requires that just as an individual should avoid violating the 
aspects of human well-being as they relate to himself, he should also refrain from 
impairing the possibilities that other persons may have for achieving fulfilment in 
any of the basic values.  The commonality of the basic human goods and the bond of 
universal human community similarly suggest that an individual should promote the 
fulfilment of other persons in the basic goods, and the conditions that facilitate such 
flourishing, just as he would seek to further his own fulfilment.  The requirement to 
promote the common good can be implemented in myriad ways, and new natural law 
theory does not specify what concrete measures are required in order to foster the 
flourishing of other persons.   Nevertheless, it can be reasonably affirmed that 
assisting persons to protect their human rights, inasmuch as this contributes to the 
ideal of integral human fulfilment, is part of what is entailed in giving effect to the 
common good principle. 
A final point of interest regarding Buchanan’s claim that international law 
should have justice as its primary goal concerns the manner in which the claim is 
articulated, and the precise relationship between international law and the Natural 
Duty of Justice.  While Buchanan affirms that “justice is a morally obligatory goal of 
international law”, he also acknowledges that the Natural Duty of Justice (on which 
the claim regarding international law is based) applies to persons, not directly to 
institutions.
97
   Properly understood, Buchanan’s claim is not that international law 
itself is subject to the Natural Duty of Justice; rather, it is a claim that all persons are 
under a duty to contribute to the development of institutions that protect basic human 
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rights, including the international legal system.
98
  In this regard, a distinctive 
characteristic of new natural law theory to be noted is that it not only indicates that 
persons are required in reason to promote the common good (and thereby, to promote 
and respect human rights), but also specifically highlights the role of law in securing 
justice.  As described in the preceding chapter, the new classical theory affirms that 
law’s purpose is to further the common good of a community through resolution of 
the community’s coordination problems, and the theory further notes the value of 
law’s formal features in contributing to securing justice and safeguarding individual 
autonomy in the context of community life.
99
  Since the theory interprets the focal 
meaning of law as being intrinsically linked to the objective of justice, the normative 
claims made under new natural law theory regarding international law are claims that 
directly concern the institution of international law and its positive norms, apart from 
addressing the actors that are involved in shaping the international legal order. 
2.  Characterisation of Human Rights 
 
As noted earlier, Buchanan’s conception of basic human rights grounds his 
moral theory of international law.  Buchanan affirms that basic human rights identify 
fundamental interests that are shared by all persons and that are constitutive of a 
decent human life.
100
  For Buchanan, the importance of basic human rights for the 
ability to live a decent human life is what animates the claim that they should receive 
special institutional protection through international law.
101
 
Buchanan’s general claim that human rights correspond to common human 
interests that are essential to human well-being is one that resonates with the new 
natural law conception of human rights.  At the same time, the specific manner in 
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which Buchanan articulates this claim reveals an important point of divergence 
between his conception of human rights and that of new natural law theory.  
According to Buchanan, basic human rights identify conditions that are necessary for 
a “decent” or “minimally good” life.102  While Buchanan states that what constitutes 
a decent life “depends on what human beings are, and more importantly, what they 
are capable of”,103 he also indicates that outlining the conditions for a decent human 
life is not to be equated with identifying the best sort of life for human beings, and 
further asserts that affirming the existence of universal human rights does not entail a 
claim that everyone is entitled to either equality of treatment or of result as regards 
their well-being.
104
  The influence of Buchanan’s minimalist conception of human 
rights is seen in his criticism of certain norms enshrined in the International Bill of 
Human Rights, in particular the right to ‘the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health’:105 this, Buchanan claims, is not properly characterised as a 
human rights because it is not necessary for having the opportunity for a decent 
human life, even if it may help some people to have a better life.
106
 
Like Buchanan, new natural law theorists do not endorse the idea that it is 
possible to identify a particular form of life that is best for human persons; for new 
natural law theory, the basic human goods can be pursued in an infinite number of 
ways, and as such ‘the good life’ (to the extent that this term can be appropriately 
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used) is necessarily a pluralistic concept.
107
  The new classical theory does affirm, 
however, that human rights are essentially concerned with human flourishing: the 
requirements of practical reasonableness, which direct persons towards the pursuit 
and preservation of the basic human goods, are themselves principles for realising 
what Finnis describes as ‘fullness of well-being’,108 and human rights both identify 
the dimensions of human flourishing and give expression to the requirements of 
justice for the sake of furthering this objective.
109
  Thus, new natural law theory 
understands the significance of human rights as relating to an objective that is more 
dynamic than that suggested by the idea of a ‘decent’ or ‘minimally good’ life.   
From a new natural law perspective, then, it is not evident that the right to 
health as articulated in the International Bill of Human Rights constitutes a 
manifestation of ‘human rights inflation’ as Buchanan claims.110  Article 12 of the 
ICESCR, in recognising the right of persons to enjoy the highest possible standard of 
health, characterises the right in a manner that affirms the relationship between the 
basic value of health and the objective of human flourishing.
111
  For new natural law 
theory, the relationship between health and human flourishing is indeed what 
justifies the stipulation in Article 12 of state duties to take appropriate measures to 
safeguard and promote the right to health, including the creation of conditions that 
will ensure that all persons receive medical treatment in time of need.
112
  It should be 
further noted that while Buchanan’s minimalist theory of human rights appears 
particularly concerned with emphasising that a commitment to human rights does not 
mean that all persons are entitled to be treated the same way, it is not evident that 
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recognition of the right to health in the form employed in Article 12 of the ICESCR 
contributes to a misperception that all persons are entitled to enjoy the same standard 
of health care provisioning. Article 2 of the ICESCR indicates that states are required 
to take steps “to the maximum of... available resources” to achieve the “progressive 
realisation” of the rights identified in that Covenant.113  Thus, the ICESCR reconciles 
an affirmation of the right of persons to enjoy the optimum possible state of health 
with an acknowledgement that the actual realisation of this right will be qualified in 
part by the varying institutional and economic capacities of the states that persons 
inhabit. 
The new natural law conception of justice and human rights, it is suggested, 
does not support a minimalist approach to characterising human rights principles.  
For the new classical theory, the human rights norms identified in the International 
Bill of Human Rights articulate, in comprehensive fashion, the current state of 
understanding within the universal human community of the multiple dimensions of 
human flourishing and the requirements for realising the objective of integral human 
fulfilment.  While it is evident that individuals and communities will not all 
participate in human flourishing in the same way, the norms of international human 
rights law usefully indicate the breadth of considerations entailed in giving effect to 
the common good principle. 
3.  Claims Regarding Distributive Justice 
 
Buchanan asserts that an ideal moral theory of international law should 
recognise rights of distributive justice for individuals and for states.
114
   By ‘rights of 
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distributive justice’ Buchanan means social and economic rights that go beyond the 
right to the means of subsistence.
115
  According to Buchanan, an ideal moral theory 
of international law should include principles of ‘transnational justice’ (that is, 
principles of distributive justice that are commonly applicable to all states and 
concern the relations between the government of a state and the individuals 
governed, as well as relations between persons belonging to the same state), and 
principles of ‘international justice’ (that is, principles of distributive justice that 
apply to states in their international relations).
116
  Buchanan further claims, however, 
that the existing institutional incapacity of the international legal order means that 
international law can at present only play a limited role in advancing distributive 
justice.
117
  Buchanan suggests that notwithstanding current institutional incapacity, 
international law can and should at present play a largely indirect role in realising 
distributive justice; he identifies several ways in which this might occur, including 
the advancement of civil and political rights with socio-economic implications (such 
as the right against gender discrimination) and the development of the institutional 
resources needed for ultimately formulating and implementing principles of 
distributive justice for the international sphere.
 118
 
  Buchanan’s claim regarding institutional incapacity focuses on the lack of 
appropriate institutional structures in the international sphere for formulating, 
applying, and enforcing comprehensive principles of distributive justice.
119
  In this 
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regard, Buchanan suggests that the lack of institutional structures may in part be 
explained by a lack of consensus about exactly what distributive justice requires 
beyond a right to the means of subsistence.  As Buchanan notes, addressing questions 
of distributive justice entails adopting a position on various complex issues 
pertaining to “the roles of equality, need, merit, desert and responsibility”; 
furthermore, inasmuch as rights of distributive justice entail positive duties of 
assistance, resolving issues of distributive justice involves making difficult 
determinations about the extent to which persons are to incur costs to protect the 
human rights of others in the absence of any unifying bonds such as nationality or 
kinship.
120
 
A first observation to be made regarding Buchanan’s claims is that if the 
notion of distributive justice is considered using Finnis’s original description of this 
concept in Natural Law and Natural Rights, then rights of distributive justice should 
be understood as concerning more than merely social and economic rights.  It will be 
recalled that Finnis described distributive justice as pertaining to problems involving 
the allocation of some common subject-matter to particular individuals or groups 
within a community, for the sake of the common good; the required allocation may 
pertain to common resources, but can also relate to more abstract subject-matter such 
as responsibilities, benefits, and burdens.
121
  This understanding of distributive 
justice suggests, for example, that giving effect to the right to a healthy environment 
within a particular state – which may involve measures such as allocating a portion 
of municipal tax revenue towards establishing and running waste recycling facilities, 
or providing financial incentives to individuals for participating in recycling schemes 
– may entail making decisions that pertain to distributive justice, even though the 
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right to a healthy environment is not conventionally understood as a socio-economic 
right.
122
  Buchanan does note that disputes around distributive justice often occur “in 
areas whose connection to standard conceptions of human rights is unclear or at least 
indirect”, such as environmental regulation;123 still, since Buchanan does not himself 
establish the connection, his discussion of rights of distributive justice does not 
facilitate a full appreciation of how concerns of distributive justice can be related to 
international human rights norms. 
In his original discussion of distributive justice in Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, Finnis outlines a set of criteria of just distribution that is substantially similar 
to the factors Buchanan mentions as being relevant to articulating a conception of  
distributive justice: among the criteria Finnis cites are equality, need, function, 
capacity, and desert.
124
  While Finnis’s remarks on these criteria are brief, a notable 
feature of his discussion is that it clearly links the consideration of criteria of 
distributive justice to the objective of human flourishing.  Finnis describes need, for 
example, as a primary criterion of distributive justice because of its relationship to 
persons’ realisation of the basic goods: need, according to Finnis, concerns “the 
fundamental component of the common good.”125  Similarly, in discussing the 
criterion of equality, Finnis comments on the significance of economic inequality in 
a manner that relates such inequality to its impact on human welfare: Finnis argues 
that “what is unjust about large disparities of wealth in a community is not the 
inequality as such but the fact that... the rich have failed to redistribute that portion of 
their wealth which could be better used by others for the realization of basic values in 
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their lives.”126 Finnis’s discussion of criteria of just distribution is further significant 
for his observation that addressing problems of distributive justice is essentially an 
effort to determine what practical reasonableness requires of particular persons, 
which depends on the particular responsibilities that those persons have; in this 
regard, Finnis cautions against “demanding too much precision in ascertaining the 
demands of practical reasonableness.”127 
Applying these considerations to the international sphere, it may be suggested 
that an ideal moral theory of international law does not need to include 
comprehensive principles of international justice as Buchanan contemplates.  Even if 
it is conceded that the international legal order would benefit from having a more 
robust institutional framework for resolving questions of international justice, 
Buchanan’s claim that appropriate international institutions are necessary to 
formulate comprehensive, determinate principles of distributive justice appears to 
suggest that international law should be equipped with the sort of “precise and 
unqualified directives of reason” that Finnis describes as inappropriate for addressing 
problems of distributive justice.
128
  For new natural law theory, the requirements of 
practical reasonableness as conventionally expressed in the norms of international 
human rights law, and the principle that positive international law should respect and 
promote the international common good, constitute the necessary primary principles 
for addressing problems of distributive justice through international law.  These 
principles provide overarching standards for the task of addressing issues of 
international justice through international law, an endeavour of apportioning roles, 
responsibilities, benefits and burdens to states, international institutions, and other 
relevant actors in the international sphere that is determined by having regard to the 
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particular coordination problems that are to be resolved, the actual circumstances of 
states and their human communities, and the criteria of just distribution cited 
previously.   While this endeavour may in some instances give rise to the 
development of specific principles of distributive justice, these principles are best 
understood as secondary-level principles for giving effect to the requirements of 
practical reasonableness in the international sphere, not as constituting foundational 
principles themselves.      
The relationship between the requirements of practical reasonableness and 
specific principles of international justice may be illustrated by considering the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
129
  Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC 
indicates that state parties to the treaty “should protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities”.130  This provision affirms the principle that states should have differing 
roles and degrees of responsibility in relation to the objective of protecting the 
earth’s climate; a key implication of this principle, as the provision further stipulates, 
is that developed states should take a primary role in combating climate change.
131
  
Notably, before this principle of just distribution is articulated, Article 3(1) identifies 
an objective to be commonly pursued by states, namely the preservation of the 
earth’s climate system, and it also identifies the beneficiaries of the objective, 
namely the ‘present and future generations of humankind’.  As interpreted through 
the lens of the new classical theory, the provision in this regard highlights a 
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component of the international common good that is important to human well-being, 
and stipulates that this aspect of the international common good is to be protected for 
the sake of human welfare.  For new natural law theory, furthermore, underlying the 
provision’s generalised reference to ‘the benefit of present and future generations’ is 
the fact that human flourishing is multifaceted, and that protecting the earth’s climate 
is a means of facilitating and safeguarding the exercise of a host of human rights, 
including rights to life, food, and shelter.  It is because these aspects of human 
flourishing have to be promoted and protected that it is necessary to secure the 
international common good through preserving the earth’s climate, entailing that 
appropriate steps must be taken to combat climate change. 
Articulation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is 
one practically reasonable step towards realising this objective.  It may be noted that 
the idea that states have ‘differentiated’ responsibilities in relation to combating 
climate change is not a direct implication of the principles of justice stipulating 
respect for human rights and promotion of the international common good; rather, it 
is a determination of what is practically required in order to realise the objective of 
preserving the climate system, taking into account a range of contextual factors such 
as the historical contribution of developed states to current greenhouse gas emissions 
levels.
132
  The assertion that states have ‘common’ responsibilities for preserving the 
climate system, however, bears a manifest connection to the abovementioned 
principles of justice: the requirement to safeguard the international common good for 
the sake of human flourishing applies to the universal human community as a whole, 
in virtue of the common significance of the basic goods for all persons, and as such 
                                                 
132
 The Preamble to the UNFCCC notes that “the largest share of historical and current global 
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries”; it further notes that “per capita 
emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and [that] the share of global emissions 
originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and developmental needs”. 
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specific endeavours such as combating climate change are properly understood as the 
common responsibility of states in the international community.   
In addressing problems of international justice in and through international 
law, it is suggested, the international community does not need to achieve consensus 
on a set of comprehensive norms of distributive justice as a prerequisite to making 
substantial advances in addressing these problems.  Rather, the key challenge for the 
international community is to determine practical approaches to addressing these 
problems, including appropriate legal frameworks, without losing sight of the 
ultimate objective of promoting universal human flourishing and the related goal of 
safeguarding the international common good.  What is required, to use Finnis’s 
words, is for members of the international community to seek to resolve complex 
problems of distributive justice without succumbing to “the pull of unreasonable self-
preference, group bias, and lukewarmness about human good.”133 
   
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has identified primary principles of justice for positive 
international law based on the new natural law conceptions of justice and human 
rights.  As has been argued herein, respect for and promotion of human rights, and 
furtherance and protection of the conditions comprising the international common 
good, should be the primary considerations informing the content of positive 
international law.  Recalling the observations made in the preceding chapter 
regarding the authority of international law, it may be said that the moral authority of 
positive international law is contingent upon its conformity with these principles of 
justice.  The principles of justice for international law, considered in conjunction 
                                                 
133
 Finnis NLNR, supra note 4 at 177. 
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with the new classical theory’s interpretation of the relationship between natural law 
principles and the authority of positive international law, provide the principal bases 
for understanding the new natural law account of the significance of legal obligation 
in the international sphere, which will be examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
International Legal Obligation 
 
The final major jurisprudential concept of new natural law theory to be 
considered is legal obligation.  The notion of legal obligation is a counterpart to the 
previously examined concepts of authority and law, signifying a categorical duty to 
comply with authoritative legal stipulations based on the presence of exclusionary 
reasons for doing so.
1
  For the new classical theory, the basis of legal obligation, like 
the purpose of law itself, relates to the significance of such obligation for furthering 
the common good of a community.  The new natural law conception of legal 
obligation is, in this regard, fundamentally normative: while the theory affirms the 
sense in which the obligation to obey the law can be understood and described in 
strictly legal terms, its essential claim is that legal obligation is an implication of the 
requirement of practical reasonableness that directs persons to promote and preserve 
the common good. 
This chapter considers the new natural law conception of legal obligation and 
uses it as a basis for articulating a normative account of international legal 
obligation.  This account features two main claims.  First, the chapter asserts that 
states have a general moral obligation to obey international law.  This obligation is 
based primarily on the need for states to comply with international norms in order to 
facilitate the effectiveness of such norms in addressing the coordination problems of 
the international community and thereby furthering the international common good; 
the obligation is additionally grounded in the principle of fairness.  The moral basis 
                                                 
1
 Like the conception of authority, this description of legal obligation is based on the philosophy of 
Joseph Raz.  See Joseph Raz, “Promises and Obligations” in Peter M. S. Hacker and Joseph Raz, eds., 
Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) 210 at 
218-26; Leslie Green, “Legal Obligation and Authority” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
online: Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-obligation/>, sec. 
1; see also the discussion on authority in Chapter 3 at 82-83 above. 
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of international legal obligation, it is argued, is accentuated by the fact that 
international law is not an integral system of law and its effective functioning 
depends largely on the cooperation of the states that are subject to international legal 
stipulations.  Second, the chapter claims that the moral obligation to obey 
international law is presumptive and defeasible in relation to each international rule, 
and is contingent upon the substantive justice of the rule concerned.  In this regard, it 
is suggested that while injustice in a particular international law negates a state’s 
moral obligation to comply with it, states may in some circumstances have a 
secondary or ‘collateral’ moral obligation to obey the unjust law for the sake of 
preserving respect for other just parts of the international legal regime to which it 
belongs. 
The chapter begins with an overview of the new natural law conception of 
legal obligation.  This section considers the theory’s distinction between legal and 
moral senses of legal obligation, and the manner in which the latter is related to 
considerations of the common good and fairness.  The discussion in this section also 
highlights the theory’s emphasis on the role of the legal subject’s practical reasoning 
in explaining legal obligation, and outlines the theory’s interpretation of the effect of 
injustice in laws on legal obligation.  The second section constructs a normative 
account of international legal obligation based on the new natural law framework, 
elaborating on the claims concerning international legal obligation introduced above.  
The third section compares the new natural law account of international legal 
obligation with existing thought in international legal theory by considering the anti-
normative theory recently advanced by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, who claim 
that states have no moral obligation to obey international law.
2
  The section outlines 
                                                 
2
 See Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), Ch. 7.   
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the arguments provided by Goldsmith and Posner in support of their position and 
explains why, from the perspective of new natural law theory, these arguments do 
not suffice to refute the moral basis of international legal obligation.  The final 
section considers the implications of the new classical account of international legal 
obligation, along with other aspects of the normative theory of international law 
articulated in this thesis, for understanding particular aspects of modern international 
law relating to international legal obligation.  The section briefly discusses three 
topics in this regard, namely the concepts of peremptory norms and erga omnes 
obligations, and the issue of conflicting international legal obligations.  
 
I.  The New Natural Law Conception of Legal Obligation 
 
New natural law theory’s account of legal obligation may be said to have 
three distinguishing characteristics.  First, it posits the existence of distinct ‘legal’ 
and ‘moral’ senses of legal obligation.  The new classical theory provides an account 
of how legal order itself provides a basis for persons to act in conformity with the 
content of legal rules; the theory’s more fundamental claim, however, is that legal 
obligation is a form of moral obligation that derives its moral significance from its 
relationship to advancing the common good.  Second, the theory characterises legal 
obligation as a rational response by persons subject to obligation-imposing rules, 
manifesting persons’ cooperation with the endeavour of legal governance based on 
their apprehension of a relationship between the imposition of legal stipulations and 
promotion of the common good.  Third, new natural law theory claims that the moral 
obligation to obey individual laws is variable, and that injustice in particular laws 
may have a limiting effect on the extent of a person’s obligation to obey them.  Each 
of these aspects of the theory will be considered below. 
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1.  The Legal and Moral Senses of Legal Obligation 
 
Finnis, in explaining the nature of legal obligation, articulates a schema 
which he suggests is representative of the practical reasoning of persons subject to 
obligation-imposing laws.  According to the schema: 
I. We need, for the sake of the common good, to be law-abiding; 
II. Where x is stipulated by law as obligatory, the only way to be law-abiding is 
to do x; 
III. Therefore, it is obligatory for persons to do x where x has been stipulated by 
law as obligatory.
3
 
There is a limited sense in which the concept of legal obligation can be described by 
sole reference to the third statement in the cited schema: in formal terms, a particular 
pattern of conduct may be understood as being legally obligatory in sheer virtue of 
the fact that this pattern of conduct has been stipulated as obligatory by law.  Finnis 
however claims that the formal designation of specified conduct as being obligatory 
should be considered as but one element in the overall set of considerations that are 
important to understanding legal obligation.  In this regard, Finnis claims that there 
are distinct ‘legal’ and ‘moral’ senses of legal obligation that are both relevant to a 
full appreciation of the concept. 
In highlighting a ‘legal’ sense of legal obligation, Finnis seeks to explain how 
an obligation-imposing law itself provides, qua law, an exclusionary reason for 
acting in accordance with the obligation legally stipulated.  Finnis notes that legal 
obligation in its legal sense is invariant: the obligations imposed by laws are all 
identical in their formal binding force regardless of the content of the laws involved, 
and an obligation once imposed cannot be evaded, extinguished or superseded except 
                                                 
3
 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
[Finnis NLNR] at  316.  ‘x’ may be taken as signifying a particular pattern of conduct to be followed 
by persons, whether this be positive action or forbearance. 
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on terms provided for by the law imposing the obligation or by other relevant rules or 
institutions within a legal system.
4
  The legally invariant quality of legal obligation, 
Finnis suggests, relates fundamentally to the nature and purpose of law itself: law 
and legal order are intended to constitute a comprehensive and coherent source of 
authoritative coordination for a community, and towards this end a legal system 
functions as a ‘seamless web’, in principle forbidding persons from themselves 
determining whether and to what extent they are bound by particular legal norms.
5
  
According to Finnis, this characteristic of legal order entails that each individual law 
is to be obeyed as a component in the matrix of legal order: being a ‘law-abiding 
citizen’, on this analysis, requires adhering to the content of a legal system as a 
whole.
6
  Finnis thus suggests that the legally invariant force of legal obligation is 
grounded in the second premise in the schema of the legal subject’s practical 
reasoning: ‘where x is stipulated by law as obligatory, the only way to be law-abiding 
is to do x’.7 
The new classical theory goes further than this, however, in its account of the 
nature and justification of legal obligation.  Even if legal obligation is to be explained 
by reference to the nature of law and legal systems, a claim that legal obligation 
entails compliance with legal stipulations in order to be a ‘law-abiding citizen’ itself 
evidently presupposes, without further explanation, that is it indeed necessary to be 
law-abiding.  The required explanation for this claim, Finnis suggests, is provided by 
the putative first premise of the legal subject’s train of practical reasoning: ‘we need, 
for the sake of the common good, to be law-abiding’.  This premise, which Finnis  
                                                 
4
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 309-12.  
5
 In Finnis’s words, “each obligation-stipulating law is a member of a system of laws which cannot be 
weighed or played off one against the other but which constitute a set coherently applicable to all 
situations and which exclude all unregulated or private picking and choosing amongst the members of 
the set”: ibid. at 317; see also John Finnis, “Law as Co-ordination” (1989) 2(1) Ratio Juris 97 [Finnis  
“Law as Co-ordination”] at 101. 
6
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid.  
7
 See ibid. at 316. 
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describes as a ‘framework principle’ underlying the legal sense of legal obligation, is 
central to the new natural law claim that legal obligation has a moral dimension and 
is indeed a form of moral obligation.
8
  
For new natural law theory, the moral justification of legal obligation is 
correlative with that of authority: this justification, as seen in the earlier discussion of 
the new natural law account of authority and law, is rooted in the idea that promoting 
the common good of a community entails attending to the need for authoritative 
resolution of a community’s coordination problems.9  In the face of a plurality of 
reasonable ways for pursuing the common good in the context of community life, 
and given the possibility of reasonable disagreement among members of a 
community regarding which ways of pursuing the common good are to be adopted in 
particular circumstances, the essential role of authority is to make a definitive 
selection of a particular pattern of conduct for members of the community to follow.  
Yet this selection of particular solutions to coordination problems cannot be properly 
effective for its purpose of advancing the common good unless it is actually accepted 
by all members of the community as definitively settling the matter in relation to 
which the authoritative stipulation has been made, notwithstanding the fact that some 
community members may well have preferred a different decision.
10
  As seen earlier, 
the new classical theory affirms that law complements political authority in 
furthering the common good by providing solutions to coordination problems in a 
manner that promotes clarity and stability in human interactions.
11
  Nevertheless, the 
benefits of legal order cannot be fully realised unless persons subject to legal 
governance demonstrate ongoing compliance with legal precepts.  As Finnis 
                                                 
8
 See ibid. at 317-18.  
9
 See discussion in Chapter 3 at 83-84 above; see also John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and 
Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) [Finnis Aquinas] at 269. 
10
 See Finnis Aquinas, ibid. at 270. 
11
 See generally discussion in Chapter 3 at 85-86 above. 
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observes, noting the range and complexity of social interactions that law is intended 
to regulate, law can only succeed in the complex task of maintaining order in a 
community “inasmuch as individuals drastically restrict the occasions on which they 
trade off their legal obligations against their individual convenience or conceptions 
of social good.”12 
The new natural law account of the relationship between legal obligation and 
the common good is properly understood in conjunction with the theory’s claim that 
the common good is ultimately the good of individuals and communities.  As already 
seen, new natural law theory’s normative account of authority and law emphasises 
the significance of the coordination provided by authority and legal order for 
facilitating individual human flourishing.
13
  Similarly, the theory’s claim that legal 
obligation is necessary for the common good is essentially an affirmation that 
compliance with legal norms by all persons in a community is necessary in order to 
realise a state of affairs in which individual community members can pursue the 
basic values for themselves, unimpeded by the threats to their well-being that may 
accompany the failure of community members to abide with legal precepts. 
An additional and related point to be made regarding the moral sense of legal 
obligation recalls the requirement of practical reasonableness stipulating that persons 
should not demonstrate arbitrary self-preference in their pursuit of the basic values, 
otherwise described as the requirement of impartiality.
14
  Finnis claims that if a 
person is to enjoy the benefits that accrue to him from the fact that other persons 
comply with the law, then he must also in fairness accept the burden of complying 
                                                 
12
 Finnis NLNR, supra note 3 at 319. 
13
 See discussion in Chapter 3 at 84-86 above. 
14
 See Finnis NLNR, supra note 3 at 106-08. 
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with the law himself.
15
  Finnis further suggests that in light of law’s particular 
usefulness for advancing the common good of a community, law creates a special 
frame of reference for assessing the impartiality of persons’ conduct: according to 
Finnis, the beneficiaries of legal obligations are the community members that are 
governed by law, and in this regard law “gives, at least to those responsible for 
superintending the common good, a right to demand compliance… as something 
morally owed 'to the community'.”16     
2.  Legal Obligation as Rational Response and Cooperation 
 
The new classical theory places considerable emphasis on the role of the 
practical reasoning of persons subject to law in explaining the concept of legal 
obligation.  For new natural law theory, legal obligation emerges through the rational 
response of legal subjects to certain apprehended facts, and persons’ compliance with 
their legal stipulations constitutes a form of cooperation with the endeavour of legal 
governance. 
The full significance, under new natural law theory, of the legal subject’s 
practical reasoning for understanding legal obligation comes to light in Finnis’s 
explanation of the relationship between legal obligation and legislative will.  
According to Finnis, a lawmaker’s decision to stipulate an obligation-imposing rule 
is not, of itself and independently, the source of legal obligation.
17
   The legislator’s 
                                                 
15
 See ibid at 473; see also Finnis’s discussion of the significance of legal sanctions in maintaining 
fairness among the members of a community, ibid. at 262-63.  Finnis in this regard echoes the Hartian 
claim that “when a number of persons restrict their liberty by certain rules in order to obtain benefits 
which could not otherwise be obtained, those who have gained by the submission of others to the rules 
are under an obligation to submit in their turn”: H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) at 119; see also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 96.   
16
 Finnis NLNR, supra note 3 at 319; see also ibid. at 304.. 
17
 Finnis in this regard contemplates ‘purely penal law’ theories that enjoyed currency in the writings 
of many jurists between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries; according to these theories, legal 
obligation derives from the lawmaker’s will and can be imposed or withheld at the legislator’s 
discretion when he posits a legal rule.  See Finnis NLNR, supra note 3 at 325-30. 
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decision to make a given pattern of conduct legally obligatory is indeed what 
accounts for the formal existence of a legal obligation in the legal sense, and the 
corresponding presumptive existence of a moral obligation to obey the law 
concerned.
18
  As Finnis specifies, however, the lawmaker’s stipulation of an 
obligation-imposing rule is effective in generating obligation not because the 
lawmaker wills that it be effective, but because it is apprehended by the legal subject 
as being in accordance with a normative framework that does not itself derive from 
the lawmaker.
19
  The components of this normative framework are the considerations 
discussed earlier in describing the legal and moral senses of legal obligation – in 
brief, the particular value of law as an instrument for promoting the common good of 
a community, and the corresponding need for persons to comply with legal 
stipulations if a legal system is to provide effective resolution of the community’s 
coordination problems.  Legal obligation arises, Finnis claims, because the 
legislator’s stipulation of an obligation-imposing rule fits within this normative 
framework and thereby has an impact on the legal subject’s practical reasoning: a 
person responds to the intelligible need for compliance with legal obligations for the 
sake of the common good, and to the significance of the legislator’s stipulation as a 
component in the matrix of legal order, by acting in accordance with that 
stipulation.
20
 
In affirming that legal obligation entails a rational response by persons to the 
stipulation of an obligation-imposing rule, new natural law theory additionally claims 
that the character of the obligation-imposing rule – in terms, that is, of its 
                                                 
18
 See ibid. at 334. 
19
 See ibid. at 335.  As Maris Tinturé observes, the legislator’s decision to stipulate an obligation-
imposing rule is a ‘necessary but not sufficient’ condition for a legal obligation to arise: see Maris 
Köpcke Tinturé, “Finnis on Legal and Moral Obligation” in John Keown & Robert P. George, eds., 
Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
379 at 383.   
20
 See Finnis NLNR, ibid. 
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relationship to the common good principle – is an important factor underlying the 
response of legal subjects.  Finnis suggests that legal obligation involves a virtual 
substitution of the lawmaker’s directive for that of the persons governed by law: the 
lawmaker’s stipulation of a particular pattern of conduct to be followed for resolving 
a coordination problem within the community is treated by community members as if 
it were their own directive, their own determined plan of action for their common 
good.
21
  According to Finnis, a lawmaker’s stipulation is capable of signifying this 
substitution (and thus generating compliance among legal subjects) because it is 
“transparent for the common good” – that is, because it manifests an intelligible 
relationship between the objective of furthering the common good and the means 
selected for doing so.
22
  The fact that the lawmaker’s directive bears an intelligible 
relationship to advancing the common good, Finnis claims, is what allows this 
directive to be reasonably treated by the legal subjects as if it were their own.
23
 
The abovementioned considerations regarding the relevance of legal subjects’ 
practical reasoning for understanding legal obligation also provide insight into the 
manner in which the new classical theory characterises legal governance.  Given the 
new natural law claim that legal obligation involves a rational response by persons to 
the imposition of legal stipulations, and the further claim that the stipulation of 
obligation-imposing rules entails a virtual substitution of the practical reasoning of 
these persons, it is evident that persons subject to obligation-imposing rules are not 
                                                 
21
 In making this claim, Finnis draws on the classical natural law concept of imperium: according to 
Aquinas, this is an act of intelligence whereby a person makes a representation to himself of a 
particular course of action that he has chosen.  See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981), Vol. 2, I-II, q. 
17, a. 1; see also Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 338-41.  As Finnis notes, the notion of imperium is central to 
the classical natural law claim that deliberate human action is ultimately triggered by an act of reason 
in which a person ‘sees the point’ of pursuing his chosen course of action since he understands both 
the desirability of the objective involved and the appropriateness of the means chosen for achieving it: 
see ibid. 
22
 Ibid. at 342. 
23
 See ibid at 341. 
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merely ‘subjects’ but actually collaborators in the endeavour of using law as a 
mechanism for addressing a community’s coordination problems.  As Finnis 
observes, legal governance in community “is in some respects a joint enterprise, a 
kind of co-ordination of the acts of the governed amongst themselves by co-
ordination of each with the directives given by their rulers.”24  By the terms of the 
new natural law analysis, a person’s compliance with legal stipulations may be 
described as a form of practically reasonable cooperation with his community’s 
efforts to promote its common good through legal order. 
3.  Legal Obligation and Unjust Laws 
 
As the foregoing account of the legal and moral senses of legal obligation 
indicates, new natural law theory affirms that there are important moral 
considerations underlying the obligation to comply with legal precepts. In light of 
these considerations, according to Finnis, the moral obligation to obey legal 
stipulations is “relatively weighty”.25  New natural law theory also claims, however, 
that this moral obligation is not absolute; rather, it is presumptive and defeasible, and 
the extent of the obligation varies according to the particular law concerned and the 
consequences of non-compliance.
26
  These assertions may be understood more fully 
by having reference to the theory’s interpretation of the effects of injustice in law on 
legal obligation. 
Finnis notes that injustice in law may arise in a number of ways.  Laws may 
be enacted with an intention of conferring a private benefit upon the lawmaker or 
other persons she favours, instead of an intention of favouring the common good; 
they may be ultra vires the legislative authority of the lawmaker; they may be 
                                                 
24
 Finnis Aquinas, supra note 9 at 257. 
25
 Finnis NLNR, supra note 3 at 319. 
26
 See ibid. at 318-19. 
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promulgated in a manner that violates the formal requirements that are constitutive of 
the Rule of Law; finally, they may be unjust in their content, through failing to 
achieve a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among members of a community, 
or through violating human rights.
27
  Finnis considers whether there is an obligation 
to obey an unjust law in situations where this law is part of a legal system that is 
generally just.
28
  In addressing this question, Finnis again draws attention to the new 
natural law distinction between legal and moral senses of legal obligation.  
Regarding the former, Finnis observes that while legal systems are meant to function 
as comprehensive sources of authoritative guidance for the communities they govern, 
there are instances in which these systems allow for legal obligations to be nullified 
in virtue of principles of justice that do not have their origins in the legal systems 
themselves.
29
  As Finnis further notes, however, legal obligation in its legal sense can 
only be negated if a principal institution within a legal system (specifically, a court of 
final resort) determines that in virtue of an extra-legal principle, an otherwise valid 
legal obligation is not legally obligatory.
30
  As such, the possibility that injustice in a 
particular law may limit a person’s legal obligation in the legal sense ceases to be a 
consideration if a principal legal institution in a community determines that the law is 
not unjust, or declares that the law remains legally valid and obligatory 
notwithstanding its injustice.
31
 
The new classical theory makes a different claim regarding the moral sense of 
legal obligation.  Proceeding from the premises that persons possessing authority in 
community have this authority to make laws for the sake of the common good, and 
                                                 
27
 See ibid. at 353-54. 
28
 See ibid. at 357. 
29
 Finnis cites as an example the ‘golden rule’ of statutory interpretation in English law, which 
provides that the words of a statute are to be given their plain meaning unless doing so results in 
absurdity or injustice.  See Finnis NLNR, ibid. at 356. 
30
 See Finnis, ibid at 356-57. 
31
 Ibid. 
187 
 
that such laws are compelling for members of a community because of their 
apprehended value for furthering the common good, the theory asserts that unjust 
laws are not obligatory in moral terms.  According to Finnis, laws that are unjust in 
any of the forms described above lack the presumptive moral authority that they 
would otherwise have simply in virtue of emanating from the lawmaker, and do not 
generate any moral duty of compliance for members of a community even though 
they may be formally valid and remain legally obligatory in the legal sense.
32
 
Notwithstanding the new natural law position that injustice in law has an 
essentially fatal effect on the moral sense of legal obligation, the theory also 
recognises an additional form of obligation to obey the law, which it describes as a 
‘collateral’ moral obligation.33  As Finnis observes, a person’s non-compliance with 
an unjust legal stipulation may contribute to weakening the effectiveness of other 
laws and overall respect for legal and political authority among members of a 
community, thereby causing harm to the common good.
34
  According to Finnis, this 
collateral factor may give rise to a moral obligation to comply with the law despite 
its injustice, in order that law is ‘seen’ to be obeyed.35  Finnis explains that collateral 
moral obligation is distinct from legal obligation in the moral sense since “it is not 
based on the good of being law-abiding, but only on the desirability of not rendering 
ineffective the just parts of the legal system.”36  Finnis suggests that a collateral 
moral obligation only arises in exceptional circumstances and only requires 
compliance with an unjust law to the extent necessary to avoid compromising the 
                                                 
32
 See ibid. at 359-61.  Finnis specifies that a law that suffers from a defect of justice in its enactment 
due to the improper motivations of the lawmaker, but is nevertheless substantively just, retains its 
moral authority; he further claims that the distributive injustice of a given law does not negate the 
moral obligation of compliance of those persons who are not unfairly burdened by the law: see ibid. at 
360. 
33
 See ibid. at 354. 
34
 See ibid. at 361. 
35
 See ibid. at 361.   
36
 Ibid. [emphasis in original]. 
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legal system as a whole;
37
 he further notes that a ruler has a responsibility to repeal 
an unjust law even if persons subject to the law have a collateral moral obligation to 
obey it.
38
 
  
II.  A Normative Account of International Legal Obligation Based on New 
Natural Law Theory 
 Having considered the new natural law conception of legal obligation, it 
remains to apply this conception to articulating an account of the significance of 
legal obligation in the international sphere.  Proceeding from the new natural law 
understanding of legal obligation, two main normative theses may be identified in 
relation to the obligation of states to obey international law.  First, there is a general 
obligation of states to obey international law that is essentially moral in nature; this 
obligation is explained primarily by the necessity of state compliance with 
international law for furthering the international common good, and additionally by 
the principle of fairness.  Second, a state’s moral obligation to obey a particular 
international rule is presumptive and defeasible; unjust international laws generate no 
legal obligation in the moral sense for states, although states may sometimes have a 
collateral moral obligation to obey such laws.  
1.  International Legal Obligation as a Moral Obligation 
   
As seen above, the new classical theory posits the existence of legal and 
moral senses of legal obligation; while the theory affirms that the legal sense of legal 
obligation is useful in explaining how the nature of legal order itself affects the 
practical reasoning of persons subject to legal rules, it maintains that the general 
                                                 
37
 See ibid.  According to Finnis, “[t]here is no reason to suppose that the bad side effects of 
disobedience or non-compliance will normally or frequently be so significant that the relevant moral 
considerations will impose the kind of collateral obligation in question”: ibid. at 476 [emphasis in 
original].  
38
 See ibid. at 362. 
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obligation to obey the law is moral in character.  Applying this conceptual 
framework to the international sphere, it may be similarly affirmed that while 
international legal obligation has both legal and moral dimensions, the general 
obligation of states to obey international law is fundamentally a moral obligation, 
and that the unique characteristics of the international legal system are relevant to 
understanding the moral basis of this obligation. 
To a significant extent, the obligations arising from the primary instruments 
of normativity in international law, namely treaty and customary rules, do possess 
the quality of legal invariance that Finnis describes as characteristic of legal 
obligation in its legal sense.  For example, by the terms of the ‘most-favoured-nation’ 
principle articulated in Article 1.1 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a 
state party that affords an advantage to a particular product in its trade relations with 
another country must grant the same advantage for like products to all other state 
parties.
39
 Unless a state can demonstrate that an intended act of preferential trade 
treatment falls into one of the categories of exceptions to the most-favoured-rule that 
are provided for under the GATT, it is bound absolutely by Article 1.1 and would 
have no justifiable basis, if it violated the provision, for claiming that its legal duty of 
non-discrimination had been overridden or diminished.
40
  Similarly, the prohibition 
against attacks on undefended towns or buildings during armed international 
conflicts, as an established international customary norm, imposes an unqualified 
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 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [GATT], Art. 
I:1.  This Agreement is a continuation and modification of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, October 30 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
40
 For examples of recognised exceptions to the most-favoured-nation rule, see GATT, ibid., Arts. XX 
& XXIV. 
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obligation of compliance upon all states regardless of whether they are parties to the 
international treaty in which this prohibition is also recognised.
41
 
Notwithstanding this, it should be noted that given certain features of 
international legal order, Finnis’s claim that the legal sense of legal obligation is 
grounded in the nature of legal order as an integral and coherent framework of 
normativity does not appear to be entirely germane to an account of international 
legal obligation.  First, it may be observed that the international legal ‘system’ is in 
reality an array of distinct legal regimes.  Specialised international regulatory 
frameworks have emerged in relation to trade, criminal prosecution, environmental 
protection, and numerous other spheres of state activity having international 
dimensions, and each of these is normatively ‘self-contained’ and not necessarily 
congruent with other international legal regimes that may be simultaneously relevant 
to a particular issue that arises in inter-state relations.
42
  Additionally, instruments 
that are intended to be applicable to the entire international community, such as the 
human rights treaties within the United Nations system, often exist alongside 
regional instruments that address the same subject-matter (although not necessarily 
in exactly the same way) for a geographically-defined subgroup of states.
43
  The 
cumulative effect of these features of international legal order is that states may at 
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 See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), [2005] I.C.J. Rep. 168 at 80, para. 219; see also Hague Convention IV respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 187 Cons. T.S. 227, Art. 25. 
42
 This is one aspect of the much-discussed phenomenon of the ‘fragmentation’ of contemporary 
international law.  See International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) [Fragmentation of 
International Law] at paras. 5-8, 15. 
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 See Joost Pauwelyn, “Fragmentation of International Law” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
International Law, online: Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL>, para. 3.. 
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times be subject to parallel and potentially conflicting obligations under international 
law. 
44
 
Second, international law is characterised by its plurality of formal sources of 
legal normativity and legal obligation.  In particular, both treaties and custom serve 
as primary sources of international law, with no hierarchy being recognised between 
them.
45
  As noted previously, given the criteria for ascertaining the emergence of a 
customary norm, there is often considerable uncertainty in determining whether a 
particular pattern of conduct has achieved the status of international custom,
46
 and 
this can in turn create uncertainty regarding the existence and content of international 
legal obligations corresponding to a putative customary norm.  Apart from this, since 
treaty rules and customary norms governing a particular issue can exist 
simultaneously, it is possible for a state to be subject to identical or indeed distinct 
treaty and customary obligations in relation to the same issue.
47
 
Third, unlike the situation in national legal systems, international law does 
sometimes allow the subjects of law to themselves determine whether and to what 
extent they will be bound by particular legal stipulations.  The practice of states filing 
reservations to multilateral treaties is recognised in customary international law and 
is also expressly provided for under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; 
according to this practice, a state can modify its treaty obligations at the time that it is 
seeking to become a party to a treaty by formulating a reservation, provided that the 
treaty does not prohibit this and the reservation is not incompatible with the object 
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 See discussion in Chapter 3 at 122 above. 
47
 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States), [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 at 83-96, paras. 175-179. 
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and purpose of the treaty.
48
  The ability of states to limit the extent of their 
international obligations also finds expression under international custom in the 
‘persistent objector’ rule, by the terms of which a state that has made sustained 
objections to a rule of international custom during the course of its emergence is 
deemed not to be bound by that rule once it has crystallized.
49
 
Taken together, these characteristics of international legal order suggest that 
the legal sense of international legal obligation cannot be properly explained by the 
idea that international law constitutes an integral legal system, such that a state’s 
adherence to international law as a whole entails that the state must comply with 
each rule that is relevant to governing inter-state conduct.  If international law may 
indeed be described as creating a ‘web’ of normativity for the international 
community, it is evidently not a seamless one, and it is far from being entirely 
coherent; additionally, for at least some rules of international law, states can and do 
exercise a measure of control over the scope of their international legal obligations. 
Given that the features of international legal order tend to undermine rather 
than support an account of the legal sense of international legal obligation that is 
based on the systemic unity and coherence of international law, the moral basis of 
international legal obligation arguably assumes greater significance.  Since new 
natural law theory characterises legal obligation as a form of moral obligation, the 
theory will affirm that moral considerations are the primary factors justifying the 
obligation to obey international law, and that these considerations retain their 
ultimate justificatory relevance even if international law does not constitute an 
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 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 [Vienna 
Convention], Arts. 2(1)(d), 19.   
49
 See Tulio Treves, “Customary International Law” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of International 
Law, online: Planck Encyclopedia of International Law <http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL>, para. 
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integral legal system and international legal obligation thus cannot be adequately 
explained in strictly legal terms.   
Based on the new natural law framework, it may be suggested that the 
international common good and fairness are the primary moral considerations 
underlying the moral obligation to obey international law.  These claims may now be 
elaborated. 
International Legal Obligation and the International Common Good 
 
As previously considered, the international community of states experiences a 
variety of coordination problems and has an ongoing need for definitive resolution of 
these problems as they arise.  From the perspective of new natural law theory, 
international law provides a mechanism for generating definitive norms to govern 
inter-state conduct and resolve the coordination problems of the international 
community, and thereby contributes to realising the supranational conditions that 
enable individuals and communities residing within states to pursue the basic values 
for themselves.
50
  International law can however only be properly effective for its 
purpose of furthering the international common good if international legal rules are 
treated by states as definitively settling the coordination problems that they address, 
notwithstanding the possibility that other reasonable approaches to resolving such 
problems may exist and that some states may prefer different solutions to the ones 
stipulated.  The moral sense of international legal obligation describes the necessity 
of state compliance with international legal stipulations in order to facilitate the 
coordination of the international community that is beneficial to the international 
common good. 
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The unique characteristics of international legal order are themselves relevant 
to understanding the moral basis of international legal obligation.  As is evident from 
the cited examples of state reservations to multilateral treaties and the ‘persistent 
objector’ rule in relation to the emergence of international custom, state consent 
plays an important role in the development of international legal norms.  Given the 
significance of sovereignty as a principle of international law, and the fact that states 
are simultaneously the subjects and primary authors of international legal rules, 
states enjoy far greater influence in practice over the authority of international norms 
than do persons within national political communities who do not form part of the 
community’s structures of authority and are ‘subject’ in a straightforward sense to 
the legal stipulations of persons in authority.  Importantly related to this 
consideration is the fact that many areas of international law suffer from an absence 
or relative weakness of mechanisms for the enforcement of international rules, and 
the further reality that even where such mechanisms exist, they may not always be 
applied to render a state accountable for its violation of international norms.  As a 
result of these factors, international legal order is inherently compromised in its 
ability to constrain the behaviour of states even in the presence of established 
international laws:  there is ample scope for states to define their international legal 
commitments in a manner that promotes their particular interests rather than the 
common good of the international community, or for them to avoid their 
international legal obligations entirely without suffering significant negative 
consequences. 
The essential moral reason for states to comply with their international legal 
obligations is the consideration that while international legal order is in many 
respects less than ideally capable of ensuring the international common good, the 
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need to secure the international common good for the sake of furthering human 
welfare remains a priority.  It is well known, for example, that the legal regime in the 
Charter of the United Nations governing the use of force in inter-state relations has 
proven to be an imperfect mechanism for facilitating collective international 
responses to acts of inter-state aggression, and that the regime has accordingly been 
less than ideally effective in providing a deterrent to states contemplating such acts.
51
  
Still, it is evident that the need for states to adhere to the international law prohibition 
on the use of force persists, on the basis that an unprovoked act of international 
aggression disrupts international peace and security – an aspect of the international 
common good that is intended to be preserved by the Charter regime – and 
invariably results in unjustifiable infringements of the basic aspects of the well-being 
of persons living within the state attacked, if not also the welfare of persons within 
the attacking state.
52
  Similarly, it may be observed that while the multilateral treaty 
banning the possession or development of biological weapons lacks a formal 
verification mechanism to monitor the compliance of states parties, and is 
accordingly structurally weaker as an international legal instrument than the 
equivalent treaty prohibiting the development or use of chemical weapons,
53
 this fact 
has no bearing on the legal obligation of states parties to comply with the prohibition 
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 See Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI [Charter], Art. 2(4) & Ch. VII.  
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of biological weapons.  The rationale for the legal obligations imposed on states by 
the Biological Weapons Convention is the same as that underlying the legal 
obligations stipulated in the Chemical Weapons Convention – namely, pursuit of the 
objective of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, including biological and 
chemical weapons, on the basis that such weapons constitute unacceptable threats to 
human welfare – and this rationale is what ultimately grounds the equivalent legal 
force of the obligations identified in these two treaties as well as the normative claim 
that the terms of these instruments should be respected.
54
   
The considerable autonomy of states as actors in the international sphere and 
the limitations in international law’s ability to constrain state behaviour arguably 
reinforce the significance of the idea that legal obligation is a form of cooperation by 
the subjects of law with the enterprise of legal governance.  Notwithstanding the 
often fragile fabric of international law, its importance for furthering the international 
common good and thereby facilitating human flourishing suggests that states have a 
strong moral obligation to cooperate to make international law effective for its 
purpose through adhering to their international legal obligations. 
International Legal Obligation and Fairness 
 
As seen earlier, new natural law theory affirms that impartiality forms part of 
the considerations comprising the moral obligation to obey the law.  This claim may 
likewise be made in relation to international legal obligation.  In complying with 
international legal rules, states in effect voluntarily restrict the range of possible 
types of action that might otherwise be open to them in the international sphere and 
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 The Preambles to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention 
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and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons 
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act instead in accordance with norms stipulating a ‘common way’ of state conduct.   
Fairness requires that if a particular state benefits from the fact that other states have 
limited their exercise of freedom through adhering to international laws, it must 
likewise accept the burden of complying with international legal stipulations.  Where 
a state does not comply with its international legal obligations, it thereby enjoys a 
measure of freedom of action that is not enjoyed by other states that are adhering to 
the laws concerned; in this regard, it unfairly privileges its own interests and 
becomes a ‘free-rider’ in relation to the benefits provided by international legal 
order. 
The notion that the duty to comply with legal requirements is morally owed 
to the community governed by the law is also relevant to understanding the 
justification of legal obligation in the international sphere.  As noted earlier, Finnis 
suggests that given law’s distinct value in promoting the common good of a 
community, law gives persons in authority, as those responsible for ensuring the 
community’s common good, a right to demand that legal stipulations be followed.55  
This claim is significant not only for the observation that legal obligation 
corresponds to a ‘right’ that the law be obeyed, but also for the insight that the right 
contemplated belongs to the subjects of law, and only vicariously to the lawmaker as 
the authority responsible for ensuring the community’s common good.  The 
international community is of course distinguished from national political 
communities by its lack of an overarching institution enjoying comprehensive 
authority over all states.  Given, however, the abovementioned consideration 
regarding the identity of the right-bearers in relation to legal obligations, the absence 
of a supreme authority in the international sphere does not appear to preclude an 
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affirmation that compliance with international law is morally owed to the community 
that is governed by and benefits from international legal order.  Taking into account 
the decentralized structure and functioning of the international community in relation 
to its processes of norm-creation and enforcement, it may be suggested that 
international law, in virtue of its utility in furthering the international common good, 
itself gives states in the international community a right to demand the compliance of 
other states with their international legal obligations. 
2.  Effects of Injustice in International Law on International Legal Obligation 
 
As indicated in the preceding section, the new natural law conception of legal 
obligation suggests that there is a substantial moral obligation upon states to comply 
with international legal norms.  Given, however, that the new classical theory also 
affirms that the moral obligation to obey each law is presumptive and defeasible, it is 
appropriate to consider the relevance of this claim to a normative account of legal 
obligation in the international sphere.  New natural law theory’s claims regarding the 
effects of injustice in law on legal obligation in its moral sense support a conclusion 
that the moral obligation of states to obey international laws is not absolute; at the 
same time, the theory suggests that there may be a collateral moral obligation to obey 
international laws even in circumstances where these laws are unjust. 
Of the various forms of injustice in law described by Finnis, two may be 
highlighted as being particularly germane to international law.  First, international 
laws may be influenced in their formation by the improper intention of states 
involved in creating the laws.  International legal instruments are generally the 
product of negotiation among states, and as a result of the significant disparities in 
the relative economic, political, and military power of states in the international 
community, certain states may enjoy a disproportionate ability to influence the 
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outcome of international law-making processes in a manner that advances their 
private interests as compared to furthering the common good of the international 
community.  One way in which this issue manifests itself is in the ‘watering-down’ 
of the content of proposed laws during the negotiation of international instruments, 
as a compromise in order to secure the agreement of certain states.  For example, it is 
known that the absence of a verification mechanism in the Biological Weapons 
Convention relates to the fact that the Soviet Union, one of the key original parties to 
the treaty that was itself interested in acquiring biological weapons, was opposed to 
the inclusion of such a mechanism in the treaty and succeeded in having the 
proposed verification provision removed before agreeing to became a party.
56
   
Second, international laws may be substantively unjust.  On the one hand, 
international laws may demonstrate an unfair allocation of benefits and burdens 
among states.  This issue arguably arises, for example, in relation to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which requires states parties that do not 
possess nuclear weapons to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such 
weapons, while implicitly permitting states parties already in possession of nuclear 
weapons to retain these weapons, acquire additional weapons, and share nuclear 
weapons technologies amongst themselves.
57
  Alternatively, international laws may 
violate human rights, in their application if not also their content.  This concern arose 
in relation to the economic sanctions regime against Iraq imposed by the United 
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Nations Security Council in 1990, a regime that was imposed in response to Iraq’s 
illegal invasion of Kuwait but which ultimately became criticised for its debilitating 
impact on the Iraqi civilian population.
58
 
In considering the effects of injustice in international laws on international 
legal obligation, it is useful to once again recall the new natural law distinction 
between legal and moral senses of legal obligation.  As noted earlier, Finnis suggests 
that injustice in positive law can affect legal obligation in its legal sense if a principal 
institution within a legal system determines that the injustice in question serves to 
negate a legal obligation that would otherwise exist.
59
  An analogous idea is seen in 
international law in the doctrine of peremptory norms or jus cogens, which affirms 
that an international treaty (and by implication, the obligations arising under that 
treaty) is invalid if it conflicts with a norm recognised by the international 
community as a peremptory norm.
60
  The norms typically identified as jus cogens 
include principles pertaining to the protection of basic human rights.
61
  The Vienna 
Convention provides that where states parties are unable to reach a solution to a 
dispute regarding the invalidity of a treaty because of conflict with a peremptory 
norm, the dispute is to be referred to the International Court of Justice unless the 
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parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration;
62
 thus, the Vienna Convention does 
contemplate a process for determining the validity of international laws and their 
corresponding legal obligations through the deliberation of one of the principal 
international legal institutions. 
It may nonetheless be suggested that most of the instances of injustice in 
positive international laws are not ones in which the legal sense of international legal 
obligation is likely to be at issue.  Situations such as those where international 
instruments are compromised in their content due to the improper motivations of 
states parties, or where international laws provide for an unfair distribution of 
burdens and benefits among states, will not necessarily amount to being 
circumstances in which international laws conflict with peremptory norms of 
international law.  Given the nature of international legal order already described and 
the arguments presented herein in favour of understanding the obligation to obey 
international law as being fundamentally a moral obligation, it is arguably the moral 
sense of international legal obligation that is of primary interest in considering the 
impact of injustice in international laws on international legal obligation. 
As applied to international law, the new natural law account of the effects of 
injustice in laws on the moral sense of legal obligation suggests that unjust 
international laws fail to create, of themselves, any moral duty of compliance for 
states, even though they may be legally valid and obligatory in formal legal terms.  
Since for new natural law theory, the obligation to obey international law is premised 
on the idea that international law is a salient coordinator for the international 
community and that state compliance with international rules is necessary in order to 
facilitate the effectiveness of international law in furthering the international 
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common good, the theory will affirm that international laws that are incompatible 
with the objective of advancing the international common good lack the moral 
authority that they would otherwise have simply in virtue of their status as 
international legal norms. 
This rather stark conclusion regarding the effect of injustice in international 
laws on the moral sense of international legal obligation admittedly presents certain 
difficulties as a guide to state conduct in the international sphere.  If injustice in a 
particular international law is to be taken as denoting that this law is not obligatory in 
moral terms, then the injustice of the law in question should presumably be clearly 
established.  Few international laws, however, can be readily characterised as being 
straightforwardly unjust.  More commonly, as the example of the Security Council’s 
economic sanctions regime against Iraq demonstrates, international laws give rise to 
a mixture of considerations of justice and injustice in relation to their content and the 
effects of their application.  Apart from this, there may be reasonable disagreement 
among states within the international community as to whether the terms of a given 
international legal regime are in fact unjust.  In circumstances where the injustice of 
an international law is unclear or contested, it may be difficult to definitively 
conclude that a state has no moral duty to comply with the law in question.   
Even if the injustice of a particular law is beyond dispute, however, it may be 
argued that the notion that states may disregard their international legal obligations 
on moral grounds poses a threat to the stability of international legal order, and that 
this is a matter of concern given the importance of international law for furthering 
the international common good.  As Finnis acknowledges, there is indeed merit in the 
idea that the common good may sometimes be better served through the breach of 
legal obligations than through conformity to them, and it may be similarly affirmed 
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that situations may arise in the international sphere in which the international 
common good may best be advanced through the decision of states to disregard 
particular obligations imposed on them by international law.
63
  Nevertheless, this 
very context-specific possibility must be reconciled with the broader considerations 
already raised herein, namely that international legal order is fundamentally 
dependent for its functioning on the cooperation of states – such ‘cooperation’ being, 
in large measure, the essentially voluntary compliance of states with the content of 
international norms – and that international law cannot be ideally effective for its 
purpose of furthering the international common good unless states actually treat 
international legal stipulations as binding and comply with their terms. 
In light of these concerns, it is relevant to recall the further claims of the new 
classical theory regarding the effects of injustice in law on legal obligation.  As seen 
earlier, Finnis’s treatment of this issue focuses on whether there is a moral obligation 
to obey an unjust law in the context of a legal system that is generally just; in this 
regard, he suggests that there may be a collateral moral obligation to obey the unjust 
law for the sake of preserving the effectiveness of the just parts of the legal system.
64
  
Applying this idea to the international sphere, it may be suggested that even where 
international laws are unjust and generate no legal obligation in the moral sense for 
states, there may be a collateral moral obligation on states to comply with such laws 
in order to preserve the portions of international legal regimes that are just and 
beneficial to the international common good.   
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The notion of collateral moral obligation takes into account the potential 
precedential significance of a state’s non-compliance with international norms for 
other actors in the international sphere.  A state’s refusal to abide by the terms of an 
unjust international law may not only inspire other states to follow suit in relation to 
this law, but may also encourage states to treat other, just international laws as mere 
propositions to be adhered to or derogated from at will as deemed appropriate by 
states themselves.  As noted previously, the possibility that states may take an ‘a la 
carte’ approach to their international legal obligations is augmented by the significant 
autonomy enjoyed by states in international affairs and the lack or weakness of 
enforcement mechanisms in many areas of international law.  Since a decline in 
overall state respect for the normativity of an international legal regime is likely to 
undermine the beneficial role played by that regime in addressing the coordination 
problems of the international community, there is indeed a relevant sense in which 
international legal obligation may be described as relating to a need for international 
laws to be ‘seen’ to be obeyed.   
The same argument in favour of a collateral moral obligation may be made in 
slightly different terms, through reference to the institutional dimension of the 
international legal order.  As has already been observed, a number of institutions 
function as authoritative entities for the international community and for particular 
groupings of states within this community, furthering the international common good 
through coordinating multiple aspects of states’ international relations.65  If a state 
refuses to comply with a legally obligatory yet unjust directive emanating from an 
international institution that is generally beneficial to the international common good, 
this may undermine the authority of that institution in the eyes of other states in 
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relation to its directives and other authoritative pronouncements generally; an 
increase of state non-compliance with the institution’s decrees may, in turn, lead to 
the institution becoming critically hampered in its efforts to address the coordination 
needs of the international community.  A collateral moral obligation to obey an 
unjust international law may thus also be described as relating to safeguarding the 
effectiveness of international institutional authority, the latter being understood as 
part of a generally just international legal regime. 
Applying the notion of collateral moral obligation to some of the scenarios of 
injustice in international law mentioned earlier, it may first be suggested that non-
nuclear-weapons states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have a 
collateral moral obligation to comply with the treaty’s rules on non-proliferation 
notwithstanding the asymmetrical manner in which these rules apply to non-nuclear-
weapons states and nuclear-weapons states parties under that treaty.  The existence of 
this obligation may be justified on the basis of the need to ensure the maintenance of 
state respect for, and thus the effectiveness of, other important parts of the treaty that 
are arguably just such as the ‘safeguards’ mechanism.66  It should be emphasised that 
the acknowledgement of a collateral moral obligation in this instance does not 
amount to an endorsement of the unjust characteristics of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime.  On the contrary, it may be affirmed that as long as nuclear 
weapons states are effectively permitted to retain and acquire nuclear weapons to the 
exclusion of non-nuclear weapons states, and in the absence of any genuine efforts 
by nuclear weapons states to pursue comprehensive nuclear disarmament, the moral 
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 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires non-nuclear weapons states parties to accept 
safeguards, including periodic inspection of their nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, to verify that they are fulfilling their obligations under the treaty.  See Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, supra note 57, Art. III. 
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obligation of non-nuclear-weapons states parties to adhere to the non-proliferation 
rules remains ‘diminished’ even though their legal obligation persists.67 
It can also be suggested that states may, in certain circumstances, have a 
collateral moral obligation to obey international laws that violate human rights.  It 
may be plausibly argued, for example, that states may have a collateral moral 
obligation to adhere to the terms of United Nations Security Council resolutions even 
if these resolutions infringe human rights, for the sake of preserving the overall 
authority and effectiveness of the Security Council as an institution that is generally 
desirable for maintaining international peace and security.  Such a claim is however 
subject to a number of qualifications.  First, given the new natural law account of the 
significance of human rights and their relationship to natural law principles, the 
theory will maintain that there cannot be any form of moral obligation for states to 
obey international laws that violate absolute human rights.
68
  Second, there cannot be 
a collateral moral obligation for states to comply with international laws that violate 
jus cogens, a category that includes a number of international human rights norms.
69
  
As already noted, international laws that are inconsistent with peremptory norms are 
legally invalid, thus even the legal sense of legal obligation does not arise in relation 
to unjust international laws of this character.   Additionally,  it now appears that 
international laws that violate human rights cannot give rise to binding legal 
obligations for member states of the European Community (EC), at least where such 
laws are being implemented via EC legislation, since the European Court of Justice 
has affirmed that fundamental rights guarantees that form part of the general 
principles of Community law entail limits on the types of measures that may be 
adopted in EC legislation even where such measures have been adopted in fulfilment 
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 Cf. Finnis NLNR, supra note 3 at 362. 
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 See the discussion in Chapter 4 at 140 and 146-47 above. 
69
 See the discussion in Chapter 3 at 126-27 above. 
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of the international legal obligations of EC member states under the Charter.
70
  This 
implies that in situations where an unjust international law is being given effect via 
EC legislation and the latter conflicts with fundamental rights recognised in 
Community law, the possibility of a collateral moral obligation will not arise for EC 
member states.  Finally, it may be noted that even if a particular set of circumstances 
supports the existence of a collateral moral obligation to obey an international law 
that violates human rights, this will not obviate the need for the injustice in that law 
to be rectified as a matter of urgency.  A collateral moral obligation, it should be 
stressed, is a secondary form of moral obligation, and as such is inherently limited in 
its moral force.  Notwithstanding the relevance of a concern about safeguarding the 
effectiveness of international legal regimes and institutional authority, such a concern 
can hardly be characterised as a robust moral consideration where international laws 
and institutions are perpetuating injustice against persons.  From the perspective of 
new natural law theory, the moral obligation of states to comply with international 
laws is most persuasive where these laws are actually suitable for furthering the 
international common good, through their consistency with the requirements of 
practical reasonableness. 
                                                 
70
 See Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European 
Union and Commission of the European Communities, C-402/05 P; C-415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-
6351, paras. 285, 326 and generally paras. 280-330.  The case concerned, inter alia, the ability of EC 
courts to review the lawfulness of EC legislation in light of fundamental rights enshrined in 
Community law, where such legislation was enacted for the sake of implementing Security Council 
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are not limited to either absolute human rights or human rights principles identified as jus cogens, but 
instead encompass the rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and those rights resulting from the constitutional traditions 
common to EC member states. See ibid. at paras. 283, 326; cf. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union, 7 February 1992, [2012] O.J. C 326/01, Art. 6(3). 
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III.  New Natural Law Theory and Existing Thought in International Legal 
Theory on International Legal Obligation: The Challenge of Goldsmith and 
Posner 
The issue of state compliance with international norms has long fascinated 
writers on international law and international relations.  Thus far, the majority of 
scholarship on international legal obligation has focused on explaining why states act 
in accordance with  international treaties and customary rules, or on identifying the 
factors that may foster state compliance with international law; in relation to these 
concerns, theorists have invoked a range of concepts including state consent, the 
legitimacy of international law-making processes, the substantive fairness of 
international rules, and the internalization of international legal norms within 
domestic legal systems.
71
  There has been relatively little consideration of whether 
states have a moral duty to obey international law, and few attempts to articulate 
normative interpretations of international legal obligation.
72
  A challenge to such 
normative perspectives has nonetheless recently been issued by Jack Goldsmith and 
Eric Posner, who in The Limits of International Law specifically raise and purport to 
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 Among relevant works, see e.g., James L. Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law and 
Other Papers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959); Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and 
Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Thomas Franck, The Power of 
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 A notable recent exception in this regard is David Lefkowitz, “The Principle of Fairness and States’ 
Duty to Obey International Law” (2011) 24 Can. J.L. & Jur. 327.  Lefkowitz offers a theory of the 
moral duty to obey international law based on the principle of fairness, focusing on the voluntarist 
interpretation of the fairness principle expressed by A. John Simmons.  See A. John Simmons, Moral 
Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), Ch. V;  
Lefkowitz, ibid. at 329 et seq.  In appealing to the principle of fairness as a basis for international legal 
obligation, Lefkowitz’s analysis dovetails with the new natural law account provided herein, although 
as already seen the latter account focuses primarily on the international common good in explaining 
states’ moral obligation to obey international law.  
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refute the notion that there is a moral obligation to obey international law.
73
  It is 
appropriate to consider their claims. 
In The Limits of International Law, Goldsmith and Posner advance an 
interpretation of international law that is based on rational choice theory and claims 
that effective international law is the product of states’ pursuit of self-interest in the 
international sphere.
74
  The authors characterise international treaties and customary 
international norms as comprising “a special kind of politics” that bears certain 
formal similarities to domestic law, but is fundamentally determined in its potential 
scope and impact by the dynamics of state power and interests.
75
  Consistent with 
these claims, Goldsmith and Posner argue that state compliance with international 
norms is itself to be understood in terms of its relationship to state interest: the 
authors assert that “international law can be binding and robust, but only when it is 
rational for states to comply with it.”76 
Goldsmith and Posner devote a chapter of their work to criticising the idea 
that states have a moral obligation to comply with international law.  Apart from 
contesting the view that state consent provides a normative basis for international 
legal obligation,
77
 Goldsmith and Posner reject the claim that states should obey 
international law because this will enhance human welfare.
78
  According to 
Goldsmith and Posner, international law reflects the interests of states rather than 
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 See Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 2.  An earlier version of Goldsmith and Posner’s discussion 
of this issue appears in Eric Posner, “Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?” 
(2002-2003) 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1901. 
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 See Goldsmith and Posner, ibid. at 3, 13. 
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 See ibid. at 13, 202. 
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 Goldsmith and Posner, ibid. at 202. 
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 Goldsmith and Posner note that many aspects of international law do not operate on the basis of 
state consent; they further observe that while a person’s act of promising may be understood as giving 
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 Goldsmith and Posner extrapolate this thesis from Joseph Raz’s claim that persons have a duty of 
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and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 355; Goldsmith and Posner, ibid. at 193-94. 
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those of persons, and its content is further skewed in favour of the interests of 
powerful states.
79
  The authors note that international treaties and norms of 
international custom often serve the interests of the states that they directly concern 
at the expense of third parties, and on this basis they assert that “[t]he rules of 
international law facilitate cooperation, but do not necessarily facilitate cooperation 
benefiting the world.”80  Goldsmith and Posner further observe that the 
predominance of state interest in shaping international law is compounded by the 
lack of international institutions to attend to the needs of all persons worldwide 
through enacting international laws and changing these laws as required.
81
  
Goldsmith and Posner conclude that in the context of the current global order in 
which states seek to further the interests of their own citizens over the interests of 
persons in other states, and in which more powerful states enjoy more international 
political influence than weaker ones, there is no basis for claiming that the 
international legal system is just and gives rise to moral duties of compliance for 
states.
82
 
Goldsmith and Posner indicate at the outset of their work that they are 
interested in interpreting the functioning of international law in the context of “the 
realities of international politics.”83  Although their interpretation of international 
legal normativity through the lens of rational choice theory has proven 
controversial,
84
 there can be little disagreement with their basic claim that 
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international law is significantly influenced, both in its structural features and its 
substantive content, by considerations of state interest.  Yet even if it is 
acknowledged – as it has been herein – that injustice in international laws may arise 
as a consequence of political inequalities among states and attempts by states to 
privilege pursuit of their private interests over the common good of the international 
community, it is not apparent, at least from the perspective of new natural law 
theory, that Goldsmith and Posner have provided a satisfactory basis for denying the 
claim that states have a moral obligation to obey international law.   
As already seen, the new natural law account of the moral sense of 
international legal obligation is grounded in an affirmation of the notion of an 
international common good and its significance for human flourishing, and an 
appreciation of the value of international law as a mechanism for furthering the 
international common good.  In this regard, it may be observed that while Goldsmith 
and Posner emphasise the manner in which international law advances and reflects 
the private interests of states, they pay little attention to the fact that certain 
objectives in the international sphere have authentically shared significance for 
states; these are objectives that, according to a new natural law conception of 
international law, correspond to the conditions comprising the international common 
good.
85
   Furthermore, Goldsmith and Posner arguably give insufficient recognition 
to the extent to which international law plays a beneficial role in actually resolving 
the coordination problems of the international community, and thereby contributing 
to the international common good.  Goldsmith and Posner affirm the technical utility 
                                                                                                                                          
International Law: Insights from the Theory and Practice of Enforcement (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 103-30 et passim. 
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 See discussion in Chapter 2 at 70-71 above.  Goldsmith and Posner refer on one occasion to 
“international public goods” and cite as examples “the protection of fisheries, the reduction of 
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of international treaties in fostering cooperation or coordination, noting that treaties 
“can play an important role in helping states achieve mutually beneficial outcomes 
by clarifying what counts as cooperation or coordination in interstate interactions”;86 
beyond this, however, their discussion of international treaty regimes essentially 
focuses on demonstrating the ways in which the functioning of these regimes is 
determined by the dynamics of state interest.  The new classical theory, meanwhile, 
highlights both the role of international law in facilitating coordination and the 
manner in which this coordination furthers pursuit and realisation of the shared 
objectives of the international community.  This was seen, for example, in the 
discussion in Chapter 3 of the territorial sea rule in The Law of the Sea Convention, a 
rule that was there described as significant not only because it has facilitated clarity 
in international affairs regarding the permissible scope of territorial sea claims, but 
also because it has enhanced the prospects for maintaining peace between states in 
relation to their maritime boundaries.
87
 
The appropriate response to Goldsmith and Posner regarding the moral 
obligation to obey international law may be articulated against the backdrop of the 
foregoing considerations.  For new natural law theory, as already described, the 
moral sense of international legal obligation denotes the necessity of state 
compliance with international laws in order to facilitate the coordination of the 
international community that international legal order provides, and to thereby 
realize the shared objectives of the international community that comprise the 
international common good and are instrumental to human flourishing.  The moral 
necessity of international legal obligation for the sake of the international common 
good cannot be negated by the factual consideration that some existing international 
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laws work to the advantage of certain states rather than favouring the common good 
of the international community.  Where injustice in international laws exists, this can 
only override the moral obligation to obey those particular laws – an obligation 
which, according to new natural law theory, is presumptive and defeasible in relation 
to each international legal rule.  The general moral obligation to obey international 
law, however, persists undiminished. 
The grounds cited by Goldsmith and Posner for rejecting the idea that states 
have a general moral obligation to comply with international law reflect the authors’ 
overall scepticism about the ability of international law to address significant  
coordination problems of the international community.  In defending their claim that 
international law is limited in what it can achieve by the essentially political 
framework within which it operates, Goldsmith and Posner assert that “[g]iven the 
multiple conflicting interests of states on various issues, and the particular 
distribution of state power with respect to those issues, many global problems are 
unsolvable.”88  In relation to current global challenges such as climate change, if one 
considers the refusal of certain major states to either ratify the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or adhere to its 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, and the fraught state of international 
negotiations to agree on future regulatory mechanisms for combating climate change, 
there indeed seem to be ample grounds for concluding that Goldsmith and Posner are 
correct.
89
  Yet if climate change left unchecked poses a fundamental threat to the 
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quality of the Earth’s life-sustaining environment,90 then it is evident that the task of 
devising an appropriate international regulatory framework for combating climate 
change cannot simply be abandoned as a political impossibility.   The realpolitik 
considerations that Goldsmith and Posner identify, while important for understanding 
the dynamics of law-making in the international sphere, have no bearing upon the 
need for states to actually arrive at solutions to the coordination problems of the 
international community.  International law and the moral obligation to obey it fit 
into this framework of necessity, and commonly represent what is required as a 
matter of practical reasonableness if states are to promote the international common 
good and thereby facilitate human flourishing. 
Goldsmith and Posner suggest that the notion that state adherence to 
international rules is morally needed for the sake of human well-being confuses two 
distinct ideas – the idea that states have an obligation to promote the welfare of all 
persons worldwide regardless of citizenship, and the idea that states have a moral  
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obligation to obey international law.
91
  The authors claim that these ideas are actually 
in conflict with each other, inasmuch as governments in practice prioritise advancing 
the interests of their own citizens.
92
  For Goldsmith and Posner, a moral obligation to 
obey international law could only arise if states really did have an obligation to 
further the welfare of all persons in the world – an idea that they describe as 
“attractive but utopian” – and if, pursuant to that obligation, they created 
international legal rules that actually did reflect and promote the ‘world good’.93 
From the perspective of new natural law theory, however, there is no error in 
associating the ideas that Goldsmith and Posner seek to distinguish.  Since the new 
classical theory justifies the moral obligation to obey international law by reference 
to the international common good, and since the theory further describes the 
international common good as being instrumental to the flourishing of persons 
comprising the universal human community,
94
 it may be affirmed that for new 
natural law theory, the moral obligation of states to comply with international law is 
indeed an obligation that has as its ultimate object the welfare of all persons in the 
universal human community.  It is precisely in the course of a state’s seeking to 
promote the welfare of its own citizens that it becomes aware that in certain respects, 
it cannot achieve this objective without securing the supranational conditions that 
comprise the international common good; thus, the pursuit of particular interests by 
states inevitably leads to the consideration of common interests.  The pursuit of these 
common interests by states through collaborative efforts, including the creation of 
international laws, draws states into a relationship with persons whose welfare is not  
their direct responsibility, but who are necessarily affected by any state conduct that 
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has an impact on those common objectives or on the mechanisms being used to 
realise them.   
In sum, securing universal human flourishing cannot be construed as an 
obligation that is distinct from the moral obligation of states to obey international 
law; rather, the former obligation is what gives ultimate intelligibility to the latter.  It 
is because the need to secure the common good of the universal human community is 
an actual, ongoing concern that the general moral obligation of states to comply with 
international law is of continuing relevance, notwithstanding the limitations of 
international legal order and the influence of state interest in shaping many 
international norms.  While Goldsmith and Posner may consider this to be a utopian 
interpretation of international law, it is arguably no less incredible to imagine that in 
the context of an interconnected, interdependent global community of persons whose 
welfare depends on the realisation of certain conditions requiring international 
cooperation, the international community of states can function indefinitely as a 
series of isolated entities that only observe international legal obligations when these 
suit their private interests. 
IV.  Implications of New Natural Law Theory for Understanding Particular 
Aspects of International Legal Obligation 
1.  International Legal Obligation and Peremptory Norms 
The nature and authority of peremptory norms has been considered in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis.
95
  Based on the new natural law account of law and 
authority, that discussion of peremptory norms identified a distinction between the 
moral authority of peremptory norms, which is described as stemming from the 
consistency of the content of these norms with natural law principles, and the legal 
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authority of these norms in their peremptory character, which is explained by the fact 
that the jus cogens doctrine has been posited in international law by the international 
community.
96
  In light of both that discussion and the account of international legal 
obligation provided herein, it is appropriate to return briefly to the issue of 
peremptory norms.  As explained below, the new natural law conception of legal 
obligation assists in underscoring the claim that in its legal dimension, the jus cogens 
doctrine is properly understood as a positive law concept.  It may additionally be 
affirmed that the moral obligation of states to comply with peremptory norms is no 
different in character to the moral obligation of states to obey other international 
laws.     
It was argued earlier in this thesis that while the doctrine of peremptory 
norms has been the subject of competing voluntarist and non-voluntarist accounts 
regarding its conceptual foundations, the new natural law account of law and 
authority entails an affirmation that there are both natural law and positive law 
aspects to jus cogens.
97
 Apart from the fact that the concept of jus cogens has been 
formally incorporated into positive international law, the idea that the doctrine of 
peremptory norms has a distinct positive law dimension is borne out by the legal 
consequences for international laws that violate jus cogens, considered in contrast to 
the new classical theory’s claims regarding legal obligation and unjust laws.  New 
natural law theory does not claim that an unjust law is not a ‘law’: rather, the theory 
affirms that an unjust law is a non-focal instance of ‘law’, and that there is no moral 
obligation (except possibly a collateral moral obligation) to obey such a law 
notwithstanding its legal validity.
98
  The doctrine of peremptory norms, meanwhile, 
indicates that conflict between a peremptory norm and a particular international law 
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results in the legal invalidity of the latter and the nullity of any related legal 
obligations.  As such, to the extent that jus cogens can be characterised as a restraint 
on the effects of injustice in international laws, it is evident that the doctrine goes 
beyond what is entailed by the new natural law conceptions of law and legal 
obligation.  The consequence of invalidity for international laws that violate jus 
cogens is not inconsistent with natural law principles, and can indeed be 
complementary to the objectives of safeguarding the dimensions of human welfare 
and the international common good, giving specific legal weight to the moral 
requirements entailed by these principles.  Still, the voiding of laws and legal 
obligations that conflict with jus cogens can only be understood as a legal 
consequence that is ‘posited’ under the doctrine of peremptory norms, rather than 
one that is specifically mandated by natural law principles. 
A further point to be made, returning to the account of the moral basis of 
international legal obligation discussed in this chapter, is that the obligation of states 
to comply with peremptory norms is no different in its moral dimension to the 
obligation states have to comply with non-peremptory rules of international law.  It 
may be recalled that as understood through the framework of the new classical 
theory, the moral sense of international legal obligation relates to the need for states 
to comply with international legal stipulations in order to facilitate the effectiveness 
of such laws in addressing the coordination problems of the international community 
for its common good; in this regard, international legal obligation in its moral 
dimension pertains to the function that international laws play precisely as laws, 
notwithstanding the structural inadequacies of the international legal order.
99
  It is 
true that the obligations arising from peremptory norms are of a distinct legal 
                                                 
99
 See the discussion at 193-96 above. 
219 
 
character compared to other international legal obligations: consistent with the 
superior legal status of peremptory norms, these obligations are non-derogable and 
override other international legal obligations in cases of conflict.  This special legal 
character, however, does not correspond to a special moral obligation to obey 
peremptory norms.  While the moral obligation to obey the law can be diminished 
through the presence of injustice in a law, it is not intensified in sheer virtue of the 
fact that a particular set of laws has a superior legal status: peremptory norms, like 
other rules of international law, are positive laws directed towards the objective of 
furthering coordination in a community.  As such, the account outlined herein of the 
moral basis of international legal obligation is similarly applicable to peremptory 
norms as to other rules of positive international law.  In relation to jus cogens, then, it 
may be said that the moral sense of international legal obligation denotes the need for 
states to comply with peremptory norms in order to facilitate the effectiveness of 
international law and international legal mechanisms, including the mechanism of 
normative hierarchy, in furthering the international common good. 
2.  Erga omnes Obligations 
Erga omnes obligations are international legal obligations that states have to 
the international community as a whole, as distinct from obligations that states have  
only in relation to another state or group of states.
100
  In the Barcelona Traction case,  
the International Court of Justice, in articulating the concept of obligations erga 
omnes, affirmed that such obligations are “the concern of all States” and that “[i]n 
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection”.101  Erga omnes obligations have accordingly been 
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described as featuring two characteristics, namely universality (in reference to the 
scope of the obligations) and solidarity (in virtue of the collective character of the 
interests to which these obligations correspond).
102
  The international norms that are 
commonly cited as involving erga omnes obligations include the prohibitions against 
international aggression, genocide, torture, slavery, and racial discrimination, and the 
right of peoples to self-determination.
103
  The concept of erga omnes obligations has 
been formally incorporated into the law of state responsibility: the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility affirm the existence of 
obligations that are owed by a state “to the international community as a whole” and 
stipulate that where a state breaches such an obligation, any state other than the state 
affected by the breach is entitled to invoke the responsibility of the state 
concerned.
104
 
The concept of erga omnes obligations is a departure from the traditional 
‘bilateralist’ conception of legal obligation in international law, which interprets 
legal obligations as existing between individual states, or between one state and a 
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 See Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997) at 17.     
103
 See Barcelona Traction, supra note 100 at para. 34; Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia), [1995] I.C.J. Rep. 90 at 102, para. 29; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija,  IT-95-17/1-T, 
Judgment (10 December 1998) at para. 151 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY < http://www.icty.org/case/furundzija/4>; Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
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between the norms described as giving rise to erga omnes obligations and those are commonly 
identified as peremptory norms: cf. Chapter 3 at 126-27 above.  The concept of erga omnes 
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 See International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56
th
 Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [State 
Responsibility] at 29-30 (Article 48).  An ‘injured state’ i.e., a state that has itself been affected by a 
state’s internationally wrongful act can invoke the responsibility of that state under Article 42 of the 
Draft Articles.  In invoking the responsibility of a state for an internationally wrongful acting 
involving the breach of an obligation owed to the international community as a whole, a state acting in 
accordance with Article 48 may demand that the responsible state cease the internationally wrongful 
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group of states, based on the terms of a treaty or on international custom.
105
  It may 
be noted that contemporary international law has already witnessed the emergence of 
other exceptions to the notion of bilateral obligations: in multilateral human rights 
treaties, for example, each state party assumes ‘parallel’ obligations to adhere to 
treaty terms in relation to all persons within its jurisdiction, rather than assuming 
obligations towards other states parties.
106
  The concept of erga omnes obligations, 
however, goes beyond even this form of exception to the paradigm of bilateral 
international obligations, affirming that there are international legal obligations that 
have the entire international community as their object.  Furthermore, as confirmed 
by the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the erga omnes doctrine entails that any 
state in the international community is entitled under international law to invoke the 
responsibility of a state that has breached an obligation owed to the international 
community as a whole, notwithstanding the fact that it has not been itself affected by 
the breach: put differently, any state other than an injured state can invoke a state’s 
responsibility for breach of an erga omnes obligation purely on the basis of collective 
community interest.           
The unique characteristics of erga omnes obligations invite inquiry into the 
theoretical foundation of this concept.  In this regard, it is worth noting the extent to 
which this concept has been justified by express reference to moral considerations.  
As seen in the comments of the International Court of Justice in Barcelona Traction, 
the Court related the universal character of erga omnes obligations to the 
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 According to Prosper Weil, “no international obligations erga omnes, traditionally, exist: it is up to 
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222 
 
significance of the rights that are protected by these obligations.
107
  The Institut de 
Droit International, which has adopted a resolution on erga omnes obligations, 
defines these as obligations that are owed by a state to the international community 
as a whole “in view of its common values and its concern for compliance”.108  In 
relation to the law of state responsibility, the collective interest of states in erga 
omnes obligations has similarly been explained in straightforwardly moral terms.  
Prior to the finalisation of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the International 
Law Commission’s final Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, James 
Crawford, commented on the significance of the concept of obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole, suggesting in this regard that “[g]enocide, 
aggression, apartheid, forcible denial of self-determination constitute wrongs which 
‘shock the conscience of mankind’, and it seems appropriate to reflect this in terms 
of the consequences attached to their breach.”109   
Considered through the framework of new natural law theory, the recognition 
of erga omnes obligations in international law may be interpreted as an affirmation 
of the unity of the universal human community, a community that has been 
postulated in this thesis as the substratum of the international community of states.
110
  
In this regard, it may be suggested that implicit in the notion of erga omnes 
obligations is a claim that certain international legal obligations properly correspond 
to the human rights of all persons.  As discussed earlier in this thesis, duties to 
respect human rights are implications of the ontological unity of the human race, a 
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27 August 2005, online: Institut de Droit International <http://www.idi-
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unity that entails that the basic human goods are commonly good for all persons.
111
  
Inasmuch as the international common good has been described herein as being 
instrumental to the ability of persons to enjoy their human rights,
112
 it may also be 
said that the conditions comprising the international common good are commonly 
instrumentally good for all persons.  Applying these considerations to the idea of 
erga omnes obligations, it may be suggested that where international legal 
obligations are owed to the international community as a whole, the obligations of 
states to respect the norms giving rise to these obligations – both the international 
norms that directly concern the protection of human rights, and those norms that 
concern the promotion and preservation of the international common good – are 
actually obligations that correspond to the interests of all human persons.  As 
interpreted through the new natural law framework, erga omnes obligations are 
indeed appropriately described as arising in virtue of the ‘common values’ of the 
international community, since the norms to which these obligations relate address 
the common dimensions of welfare of the universal human community – a 
community which, in relation to the articulation and enforcement of global norms 
relevant to universal human flourishing, is mediated in its functioning by the 
international community of states. 
Based on the new natural law conception of the moral dimension of 
international legal obligation, it may be suggested that the concept of erga omnes 
obligations is additionally grounded in the moral obligation owed by each state to the 
international community as a whole to obey international law.  As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, international law, in virtue of its value in furthering the international 
common good, may itself be seen as giving all states in the international community 
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a right to demand the compliance of other states with their international legal 
obligations; correspondingly, it may be said that the moral duty of states to obey 
international legal stipulations is not an obligation owed to international law itself, 
but one owed to the community that is subject to and benefits from international 
legal order.
113
  From the perspective of the new classical theory, then, all 
international legal obligations arising from norms that are applicable to the entire 
international community – including, for example, obligations to obey international 
customary rules pertaining to the freedom of the high seas,
114
 and obligations to obey 
the terms of Security Council resolutions binding on all UN member states – are, in 
moral terms, obligations owed by states to the international community as a whole.  
The erga omnes doctrine invests this moral obligation with legal significance in 
relation to certain international norms described as identifying collective interests of 
the international community, with the law of state responsibility affirming that all 
states in the international community are legally entitled to invoke the responsibility 
of a state that has breached an erga omnes obligation. 
3.  Conflicting International Legal Obligations 
Since, as noted earlier, the international legal order features a plurality of 
international legal regimes, states may at times find themselves subject to distinct 
international legal obligations from different sources that come into conflict with 
each other.  For example, a state may have an obligation under an international 
environmental treaty, or arising from international custom, requiring that state to take 
appropriate measures within its own territory to further various aspects of global 
environmental preservation; at the same time, it may have an obligation under a 
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 See the discussion at 197-98 above. 
114
 On these rules, which have now largely been codified, see Donald Rothwell & Tim Stephens, The 
International Law of the Sea (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) at 148-50 and 153ff .  
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multilateral trade agreement that requires it to remove discriminatory barriers to 
trade.  A ‘conflict’ can arise for the state in relation to these obligations, in that 
complying with one of these obligations may give rise to a violation of the other 
obligation.
115
  In most situations where such conflicts arise, the international norms 
giving rise to the conflicting obligations are not themselves in conflict with a 
‘superior norm’ of international law,116 and as such the limited normative hierarchy 
of the international legal system cannot be invoked to resolve the conflict.  The 
question thus arises: in these types of situations where states are faced with 
conflicting international legal obligations, should one of these obligations have 
priority over the other, and if so, on what basis? 
There are no evident mechanisms within international law for affording 
greater weight to one valid international legal obligation over another in situations 
such as the one described.  Since international law does not admit of a hierarchy of 
norms based on their source, no ranking of international legal obligations may be 
made in virtue, for example, of the fact that an obligation originates in a treaty as 
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compared to a rule of international custom.
117
  While general law principles such as 
lex posterior derogat lege priori (‘later law supersedes earlier law’) are recognised as 
aids to interpretation in international law, principles establishing normative priority 
based on the relative time that a norm came into existence are arguably inappropriate 
for addressing situations in which the norms giving rise to conflicting international 
legal obligations are derived from thematically distinct international legal regimes.
118
  
In relation to treaty obligations, it may be noted that Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention indicates that the interpretation of treaties should occur taking into 
account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties”, thus signalling that the interpretation of a treaty’s norms and obligations 
should occur with due reference to applicable international norms existing outside 
the treaty.
119
  At the same time, it is not apparent that this provision can be 
understood as itself providing a framework for the weighing of conflicting legal 
obligations.  In considering the significance of Article 31(3)(c), the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law has in this 
regard suggested that “[t]he question of the normative weight to be given to 
particular rights and obligations at the moment they appear to clash with other rights 
and obligations can only be argued on a case-by-case basis.”120 
The new classical theory likewise cannot be seen as providing criteria for 
resolving such conflicts.  If states are not able to achieve some reconciliation of their 
conflicting international legal obligations by complying with one international norm 
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in a manner and degree that is consistent with what is required of them according to 
the other norm, it would appear that affording ‘priority’ to one obligation will in 
effect entail disregarding the other one.  In this regard, it should not be forgotten that 
international legal obligations are indeed legal obligations.  If states were to consider 
the relative normative value of conflicting yet valid international legal obligations as 
providing them with a justification for disregarding one set of obligations in favour 
of another, this would have a significantly detrimental impact on the stability and 
effectiveness of international treaties, which are fundamental to the functioning of 
the international community.  From a normative standpoint, furthermore, it has been 
argued herein that compliance with international legal obligations is morally required 
in order to facilitate the effectiveness of international law in furthering the 
international common good.  Accordingly, it cannot be coherently suggested under 
the new natural law framework that in situations of normative conflict, moral 
considerations can provide an adequate basis for choosing to comply with one 
international norm and simultaneously violating another one, where both of these 
norms are in their respective ways beneficial to the international common good.   
It may be suggested that if a state is faced with a situation of conflicting 
international legal obligations, it should not attempt to unilaterally give preference to 
one obligation over another but should instead seek to resolve the conflict through 
negotiation with the other states to which it bears obligations (thus, for example, with 
the other parties to a multilateral trade treaty where an issue of compliance with an 
international environmental norm has arisen).  Such an approach may assist in 
ensuring that if a decision is made to give one obligation priority over another, this is 
done by means of a process that demonstrates due regard for the legal character of 
both sets of obligations.  Beyond this, it is evident that situations of normative 
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conflict will be best avoided if states define treaty norms and obligations in a manner 
that anticipates such conflicts and provides clear guidance as to how they are to be 
resolved, for example through clauses stipulating the priority of certain norms or 
obligations over others in cases of conflict.
121
        
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a normative account of international legal 
obligation based on new natural law theory.  It has affirmed that states have a general 
moral obligation to comply with international law, based primarily on the 
significance of state adherence to international norms for facilitating the functioning 
of international legal order and, by implication, furthering the international common 
good.  The chapter has additionally highlighted the contingency of the moral 
obligation to obey international law, describing in this regard the relationship 
between the moral sense of international legal obligation and the substantive justice 
of individual international laws.  In its characterisation of the moral foundation of 
international legal obligation, the foregoing discussion confirms the extent to which 
new natural law theory supports an interpretation of international law that 
emphasises its significance for securing universal human flourishing rather than its 
utility for achieving particular state interests. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to articulate a normative theory of international law 
based on new natural law theory.  It has examined the tenets of the new classical 
theory regarding fundamental concepts in political philosophy and legal theory, and 
has applied these to the consideration of key themes relevant to international law and 
international affairs, formulating normative propositions concerning the international 
common good, international authority and international law, justice and human rights 
and their relationship to positive international law, and international legal obligation. 
At the outset of this thesis, it was observed that normative scholarship in 
international legal theory was traditionally characterised by two related features, 
namely an affirmation of the existence of objective standards for evaluating 
international law, and a conception of international law as serving particular 
purposes.
1
  In concluding this thesis, these traditional traits of normative international 
legal scholarship will again be invoked as a means of structuring a review and 
restatement of the main normative claims that have been advanced in the preceding 
chapters. 
New Natural Law Theory and the Moral Purpose of International Law 
 
 Based on the new natural law conception of the common good, this thesis has 
articulated a conception of an ‘international common good’ and has posited it as the 
focal consideration in a normative theory of international law.  The international 
common good denotes a set of supranational conditions that facilitate the flourishing 
of persons comprising the universal human community, and that require the 
collaboration of states in order to be realised.  This definition recalls Francisco 
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Suárez’s discussion of the ‘universal good’ and draws out the significance of an idea 
that found a measure of expression in Suárez’s thought, namely that there are certain 
objectives to be pursued that are themselves of instrumental importance to realising 
the universal good.
2
  Although this thesis does not purport to identify an exhaustive 
list of the conditions comprising the international common good, a number of such 
conditions have been discussed throughout the course of this work: these include the 
absence of political, military, economic or other forms of hostility between states 
(‘international peace’); the protection of states against external acts of aggression 
from other states or non-state actors (‘international security’); the ability of all 
populations worldwide to access the range of global resources and commodities 
needed for human flourishing, entailing activities such as international trade; and the 
existence of a global environment that can sustain human life, entailing the 
preservation of the earth’s atmosphere and natural resources. 
In keeping with the new natural law conception of authority and law, this 
thesis has proposed that international authority and international law may both be 
understood in terms of their relationship to the objective of promoting the 
international common good.  The purpose of international institutional authority and 
international law is to further the international common good through coordinating 
the activities and interactions of states comprising the international community of 
states, and resolving the coordination problems that arise within this community.  
This interpretation of the purpose of international authority and international law 
brings to light the relationship between the coordination of the international 
community afforded by such authority and law and the ability of persons residing 
within states to pursue the basic goods; in so doing, it also allows for an appreciation 
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of the sense in which international institutional authority and international law 
themselves form part of the conditions comprising the international common good. 
This thesis has further suggested, based on the new classical conception of 
legal obligation, that international legal obligation is a form of moral obligation that 
is to be understood in terms of its significance for furthering the international 
common good.  The general moral obligation of states to obey international law is 
primarily explained by the necessity of state compliance with international legal rules 
in order to enable international law to be effective in its function of coordinating the 
affairs of the international community.  As with the account of the significance of 
international authority and law, the interpretation of the purpose of international legal 
obligation highlights the link between this seemingly strictly juridical concept and 
the objective of facilitating the flourishing of individuals and communities. 
In identifying promotion of the international common good as the moral 
objective that describes the purpose of international law, this thesis has adopted the 
new natural law conception of community, and has posited the existence of both a 
universal human community and an international community of states.  The 
conditions comprising the international common good, in addition to being  
described as supranational conditions that are of instrumental significance for human 
welfare, have been affirmed herein as constituting shared objectives for states.  The 
notion that states can be conceived as being members of an international community, 
and as having a shared interest in pursuit of the conditions comprising the 
international common good, is a function of the fact that the basic human values to 
be realised through pursuit of the international common good are ‘commonly’ good 
for all persons comprising the universal human community.  In this regard, the 
identification of the international common good as the moral objective to be pursued 
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through international law and international authority, with its accompanying 
affirmation of a conception of community relevant to the international sphere, is a 
counterpoint to theories of international law that are based on an underlying 
conception of states as isolated, self-regarding entities with no objectives other than 
the maximisation of national interest. 
New Natural Law Theory and the Moral Standards for International Law 
 
Consistent with the new classical theory’s interpretation of the relationship 
between natural law principles and positive law, this thesis has affirmed that natural 
law principles constitute a form of ‘higher’ law that informs the creation of positive 
international law.  As suggested herein, natural law principles serve as general 
normative standards that influence the practical deliberation of persons in authority 
within states who are involved in the formulation of positive international norms; this 
often implicit process of influence leads to the creation of international laws and 
legal regimes that, in the types of objectives that they seek to achieve and the 
substantive rules they articulate, are seen to give effect to the principles of practical 
reason and requirements of practical reasonableness.  The characterisation of natural 
law principles as higher law is also fundamental to the claim in this thesis that the 
authority of positive international laws includes a dimension of moral authority that 
is contingent upon the conformity of such laws with natural law principles, and the 
further claim that unjust international laws, as lacking moral authority, generate no 
primary moral duty of compliance for states. 
New natural law theory affirms that the requirements of justice are 
implications of the requirement of practical reasonableness indicating that persons 
should promote the common good of their communities, and that human rights, as 
indicia of the various aspects of human welfare, provide the content for articulating 
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the requirements of justice in the context of community life.  Proceeding from these 
claims, this thesis has sought to articulate principles of justice for international law, 
addressed to states as the entities primarily responsible for the creation of 
international law.  In this regard, two overarching principles of justice have been 
identified.  First, the content of positive international law should both promote and 
demonstrate respect for human rights.  In this regard, as suggested herein, states in 
determining the content of international laws should ensure that these laws are 
consistent with international human rights norms.  Second, positive international law 
should be consistent with the objective of promoting and safeguarding the 
international common good, given the instrumental significance of the international 
common good for the enjoyment of human rights.  It has further been suggested that 
the principles of justice for international law should be regarded as paramount 
principles of the international legal order, entailing that the international community 
should approach the development and evaluation of international laws in a manner 
that affords priority to principles requiring promotion of and respect for human rights 
and the promotion and protection of the international common good. 
 
Finnis suggests that modern legal philosophy has suffered from a 
longstanding “inattention to the human person”, a failure to appreciate that human 
welfare and human interests themselves identify the ‘point’ of law.3  For a long time, 
this claim could have similarly been made in relation to international legal theory: for 
much of the past century, the dominant narratives in international legal scholarship 
related the significance of international law to the interests of states, to such an extent 
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that some of these perspectives denied the legal quality of international law and 
instead characterised it as sheer politics.  While some writers on international law 
still interpret its significance in these terms, contemporary international legal theory 
now also features theorists who are interested in making normative claims about 
international law and the conduct of states in international affairs, and who in this 
regard point to the relationship between international law and the protection of 
human interests.  As suggested in the introduction to this thesis, this development 
constitutes a revolution rather than a distinct new direction in international legal 
thought, and recalls themes raised by scholars writing in the era of the emergence of 
modern international law. 
The ideas advanced in this thesis are intended to contribute to the renaissance 
of normative scholarship in international legal theory, by presenting a distinctive and 
illuminating framework for reflecting on the moral significance of international law.  
The theory of international law developed in this thesis suggests that natural law 
principles, which direct persons to pursue the basic human goods and identify criteria 
for the practically reasonable pursuit of those goods, are foundational to the claim 
that international law should both promote and demonstrate respect for human rights.  
The further and broader point emerging from this thesis is that since human welfare 
is the proper concern of the international community and of international law, there 
is a need to recognise the significance of the international common good and to 
affirm pursuit of this objective as the primary moral goal for international law. 
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